In his provocative essay, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, Professor Adam Kolber addresses an underappreciated problem in criminal law theory: What is the relevance of the criminal defendant's subjective experience of punishment to the justifiability of that punishment? As Kolber explains, punishment theorists have neglected to analyze carefully whether the harsh conditions of punishment should be understood objectively (e.g., as a deprivation of liberty) or subjectively (e.g., as the physical or emotional distress that the particular offender suffers). Retributivists, he points out, have said relatively little about the issue, and also have much greater difficulty than consequentialists reconciling their views with his stance, which I will call the "subjectivist" view. In this Response, I suggest that Kolber understates the conceptual and normative difficulties with the subjectivist view, and is mistaken in believing that only a subjectivist version of retributivism is defensible.

March 2009

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