ESSAY

THE FALSE PROMISE OF JURISDICTION STRIPPING

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Jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nuclear option. Its logic is simple: By depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over some set of cases, Congress ensures those courts cannot render bad decisions. To its proponents, it offers the ultimate check on unelected and unaccountable judges. To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers. Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful weapon. On this understanding, politicians, activists, and scholars throughout American history have proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures as a way for Congress to reclaim policymaking authority from the courts.

The conventional understanding is wrong. Whatever the scope of Congress’s Article III power to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other federal courts, jurisdiction stripping is unlikely to succeed as a practical strategy. At least beyond the very short term, Congress cannot use it to effectuate policy in the face of judicial opposition. Its consequences are chaotic and unpredictable, courts have tools they can use to push back on jurisdiction strips, and the judiciary’s active participation is ultimately necessary for Congress to achieve many of its goals. Jurisdiction stripping will often accomplish nothing and sometimes will even exacerbate the problems it purports to solve.

Jurisdiction stripping can still prove beneficial, but only in subtle and indirect ways. Congress can regulate jurisdiction to tweak the timing of judicial review, even if it cannot prevent review entirely. Jurisdiction stripping also provides Congress a way to signal to the public and the judiciary the importance of an issue—and, possibly, to pressure courts to change course. But these effects are contingent, indeterminate, and unreliable. As a tool to influence policy directly, jurisdiction stripping simply is not the power that its proponents hope or its critics fear.

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INTRODUCTION

If Congress seeks to check the judiciary, jurisdiction stripping is supposedly one of the most potent weapons in its legislative arsenal. The underlying logic is simple enough: Depriving a court of power to hear a case entirely prevents the court from producing a bad decision. Jurisdiction stripping would seemingly let Congress legislate and the President act without fear of judicial second-guessing and would prevent federal courts from intruding on states’ prerogatives. To its proponents,

jurisdiction stripping offers the ultimate democratic check on unelected and unaccountable judges.\(^2\) To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers—even “the moral equivalent of nuclear war.”\(^3\) Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful armament.

Working on this assumption, members of Congress have, at various points in American history, proposed bills to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over hot-button issues such as school desegregation, abortion, school prayer, and same-sex marriage.\(^4\) Activists and pundits, too, see jurisdiction stripping as a useful policy tool.\(^5\) Most recently, progressives have embraced it as a way to rein in an aggressively conservative Supreme Court.\(^6\) And while scholars have extensively debated jurisdiction stripping,

\(^2\) See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy 431 (2022) (calling jurisdiction stripping a “tactical move[]” Congress might deploy against a hostile Supreme Court); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 841, 846 (1975) (arguing that congressional control of federal court jurisdiction is “the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy”); Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 Calif. L. Rev. 1703, 1744 (2021) (“If properly calibrated, jurisdiction stripping statutes . . . could insulate precisely the attempted expansion of legislative rights from judicial limitation . . . while leaving judges power to protect other rights from unsuspected majoritarian excess.”); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and the Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1778, 1799–800 (2020) [hereinafter Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power] (describing jurisdiction stripping as “a means by which substantial, durable democratic majorities can push back against constitutional entrenchment and the counter-majoritarian force of judicial supremacy”).


\(^4\) See infra section I.D (describing jurisdiction-stripping measures proposed throughout American history).


that conversation has focused almost exclusively on questions about its constitutionality and taken for granted that jurisdiction stripping, if permissible, is a mighty power.\(^7\)

Yet these debates almost entirely gloss over a fundamental question: Would jurisdiction stripping actually work? That is, even if the Constitution gives Congress broad power over federal courts’ jurisdiction, could Congress successfully wield that power to compel its desired policy outcomes?\(^8\) This Essay argues that—contrary to what nearly everyone has assumed—\(^9\) the short answer is “no.” As a strategy for directly circumventing hostile courts, jurisdiction stripping will in practice often prove pointless or even backfire. To the extent that jurisdiction stripping can

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\(^7\) See infra section I.D (describing jurisdiction-stripping measures proposed throughout American history).


\(^9\) See infra section I.D.
prove beneficial in some contexts, it does so only in subtle, indirect, and unreliable ways. It is thus a far weaker tool for policy reform than conventional wisdom suggests.

To prove this thesis, we work through various scenarios in which Congress might try to circumvent or countermand judicial precedents. It might, for example, strip courts of jurisdiction over a particular set of legal issues in the wake of an objectionable decision. Alternatively, it might attempt a preemptive strike—trying to protect certain precedents by stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction before it has the chance to overrule them. We also explore differences between jurisdiction stripping over issues that primarily emerge with respect to state law versus those that pertain to federal statutes and programs. Across all these contexts, we show that direct attempts to combat undesirable precedents (or prevent courts from issuing unfavorable decisions in the first place) will fail in most circumstances—at least beyond the very short term. Sometimes, jurisdiction stripping might even exacerbate the problem that it purports to solve.10

In parsing these various scenarios, we largely ignore whether and to what extent Congress should possess unfettered power over jurisdiction.11 Instead, we ask only whether—assuming Congress has some power to regulate jurisdiction—Congress could accomplish its goals. In asking that question, the Essay operates within current jurisprudence and mainstream scholarly views about Congress’s power. Under this view, Article III itself imposes few (if any) limitations on Congress’s power, although other constitutional provisions (such as the Due Process Clause) might curb that power.12 Even under this fairly broad conception of Congress’s authority, and regardless of the context or how Congress manipulates the levers at its disposal, jurisdiction stripping simply is not the power that its proponents hope or its critics fear.

This is true for various reasons that depend on the particular context in which Congress seeks to strip jurisdiction. Sometimes, jurisdiction stripping will prove pointless because it will simply empower other actors (such as state courts) who will not share Congress’s policy preferences. Sometimes, jurisdiction stripping will prove ineffective because the Court itself will refuse to go along. Whatever the “right” answer about the meaning of Article III, the Court in practice has sufficient doctrinal tools at its disposal to overcome the strip if it sees Congress as subverting judicial authority. Indeed, case law stretching over more than a century strongly suggests that the Court would find a way around a jurisdiction strip that sought to eliminate any possibility of Supreme Court review. And in other situations, jurisdiction stripping will fail because Congress cannot

10. See infra section II.A.1.
11. These questions have dominated the immense literature in this area. See infra section I.B.
12. See infra sections I.B–.C.
accomplish its goals without the active participation of the judiciary—for example, in implementing a comprehensive regulatory program. We explore all these scenarios in detail below, but the overarching point is that myriad practical difficulties mean that Congress cannot achieve its goals by getting courts out of the way.

Nevertheless, jurisdiction stripping might have some value as a policy tool. But its potential is limited and contingent. While direct efforts to undo or prevent disfavored rulings (or to entrench favorable precedent) will mostly prove fruitless, jurisdiction stripping could sometimes help Congress achieve its goals indirectly. It can allow Congress to sequence decisions—tweaking when and where cases are heard—and, relatedly, to buy time for a new federal program to become entrenched. Extra time can make all the difference. It created space for Military Reconstruction to take hold in the South after the Civil War, for the government to combat inflation during World War II, and even for a nascent labor movement to gain traction in the 1930s. Congress also can deploy jurisdiction stripping to make a powerful statement to the public about an issue’s importance and thus raise its political salience. And Congress can put the judiciary on notice that it may be overstepping its bounds. We reinterpret several jurisdiction stripping success stories as resting on these subtle, indirect benefits rather than on any direct attempt to keep courts at bay forever. But even under specific and narrowly drawn circumstances, these indirect benefits are not inevitable, and Congress’s efforts could easily backfire.

By exploring a policy question that scholars and legislators overwhelmingly have neglected, this project sheds light on several important conversations. Perhaps most obviously, it contributes to the growing debate about court reform. Supreme Court confirmation battles

13. See infra section III.A.
14. See infra section III.B.
15. See infra section III.B.
16. For a sampling of the recent literature on Supreme Court reform, see William Baude, Reflections of a Supreme Court Commissioner, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 2631, 2631 (2022) (analyzing suggested court reform proposals, including term limits, court packing, and jurisdiction stripping); Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 2747, 2750–52 (2020); Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term Limits, 95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2021); Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1706 (comparing different statutory reforms, including partisan balancing and jurisdiction stripping); Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, The Future of Supreme Court Reform, 134 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 398, 398 (2021), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/134-Harv-L-Rev-F-398.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NCA-GP77] (arguing that court reform is possible despite current political realities); Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 Yale L.J. 148, 152 (2019) (proposing a “Balanced Bench” and “Supreme Court Lottery”); Daniel Epps, Nonpartisan Supreme Court Reform and the Biden Commission, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 2609, 2611 (2021); Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, 130 Yale L.J. Forum 821, 824 (2021), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/EppsSitaramanEssay_uongzmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL52-9H6V] (hereinafter Epps & Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy) (identifying the Court’s legitimacy challenges and
continue to grow more heated, and an increasingly conservative Supreme Court has begun to revisit wide swaths of legal questions that scholars, policymakers, and the general public have long considered settled. The left has responded with a sudden surge of interest in reform proposals, and President Joseph Biden tasked a commission comprising a number of distinguished legal scholars with examining the various options. Although major reform appears unlikely in the very near future, the reform debate will endure. Understanding what might work—and what would not—will be crucial if major reforms ever become a more tangible possibility.

This Essay also provides new perspective on longstanding debates about Congress’s power to regulate jurisdiction. Though it does not advance a particular theory about Congress’s power under the Constitution, its analysis has implications for those debates. Even among those who embrace a broad conception of Congress’s Article III power, most worry that jurisdiction stripping is unwise. Recognizing jurisdiction stripping’s practical limitations shows that those concerns are overblown. Rather than a nuclear weapon capable of decimating the separation of powers, jurisdiction stripping is a more subtle tool that Congress can use to reclaim policymaking space in response to a power grab by the Court.

Finally, this project implicates enduring theoretical debates about the nature of precedent, the parity of state and federal courts, and the permissible scope of non–Article III adjudication. These debates also have gained new salience. They squarely address questions that scholars, judges, and
some Supreme Court Justices have raised about the constitutionality of certain agencies and even the administrative state writ large.20

The Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a high-level overview of the voluminous scholarship on jurisdiction stripping as well as the current state of the jurisprudence. We also summarize arguments that tout jurisdiction stripping as a means for Congress to achieve policy outcomes. This all sets the stage for Part II, which begins by laying out the various ways that Congress might try to use jurisdiction stripping to effectuate substantive policy goals. It then considers the best-case scenario for when jurisdiction stripping might work as well as the situations in which it almost certainly will fail. Part III then synthesizes the findings to argue that jurisdiction stripping for the most part will fail as an attempt to directly prevent or countermand judicial decisions. It can work as a policy tool but only indirectly. Congress can use jurisdictional levers to sequence decisions and raise the salience of issues, but those benefits remain highly contingent. In other words, jurisdiction stripping is weak, imprecise, and unpredictable—hardly the silver bullet that nearly everyone assumes.

The Essay concludes by discussing the larger lessons of its analysis. Recognizing jurisdiction stripping’s failures sheds new light on scholarly conversations by reframing jurisdiction stripping as a tool for dialogue between the branches instead of an assault on the constitutional order. Our conclusions also have practical implications for court reform debates, undermining arguments that reformers should prefer “disempowering” strategies over structural and institutional changes.21 More broadly, our conclusions suggest that those who believe the Court has lost sight of fundamental constitutional values should not look for easy answers hidden in the constitutional text. Quite simply, there are no constitutional magic tricks.

I. RECEIVED WISDOM

A. Jurisdiction Stripping Defined

Jurisdiction stripping can be a slippery concept, so we begin by defining terms. Thus far, we have elided critical differences between the


21. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1721.
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, non–Article III adjudicators created by Congress, and state courts. Most scholarly attention has trained on proposals to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction after it has handed down a controversial opinion. Other scholars have usefully considered Congress’s power to strip lower federal courts of jurisdiction as well. And while the literature once had failed to include federal non–Article III tribunals in the conversation, several important contributions over the last generation have filled that gap. As discussed in Part II, understanding these different possibilities is critical to assessing jurisdiction stripping as a policy tool, and so we analyze all of them.

The most capacious understanding of jurisdiction stripping would include any instance when Congress reallocates decisionmaking authority among various courts and tribunals. But this Essay has a limited focus by looking to situations in which Congress shifts jurisdiction away from one or more Article III courts—whether it reallocates that jurisdiction to a different Article III court, a state court, an administrative agency, or nowhere at all.

What does our focus leave out? “Reverse” jurisdiction stripping, in which Congress moves jurisdiction into Article III courts, mainly by taking cases away from state courts. Diversity jurisdiction, by allowing parties to bring certain state-law claims into federal court, offers the clearest example. Sometimes Congress goes further by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts as to particular federal statutes, such as those regulating federal securities, copyrights, and patents. Moreover,
Congress on occasion has deployed reverse jurisdiction stripping in a successful attempt to pursue substantive policies. For example, the corporate interests that lobbied for the Class Action Fairness Act\(^\text{28}\) sought to move many class actions from state courts to what they perceived as the more business-friendly federal courts.\(^\text{29}\)

These examples of reverse jurisdiction stripping deserve more attention.\(^\text{30}\) But we bracket them for several reasons. First, shifting jurisdiction from state courts to federal courts, as opposed to moving cases out of Article III courts, raises distinct structural concerns. Because federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction,\(^\text{31}\) they simply cannot hear most cases that parties otherwise litigate in state court. Moreover, while the Constitution gives Congress power to create (and destroy) lower federal courts\(^\text{32}\) and also to tweak the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,\(^\text{33}\) Congress possesses no such power over state courts. Finally, on a more pragmatic level, reverse jurisdiction stripping is of less interest at this political moment. To the extent that proponents of court reform view the Supreme Court or lower federal courts as the problem, shifting more cases into federal courts (and away from state courts) seems counterproductive and thus unlikely to receive attention.\(^\text{34}\)

One last restriction on this project’s scope: It focuses on Congress’s use of jurisdiction stripping to accomplish substantive policy goals in the face of actual or anticipated judicial impediments. Think, for instance, about proposals that aim to permit voluntary school prayer (despite


\(^{29}\) See David Marcus, *Erie*, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1247, 1288 (2007) (noting that the Act “was the brainchild of a group of Fortune 100 corporate counsel” seeking to “address what its members believe[d] to be a civil justice system that [had] spiraled out of control”).

\(^{30}\) Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Congressional Power to Strip State Courts of Jurisdiction, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (2018) (describing and analyzing four categories of cases in which Congress exercises affirmative power by stripping state courts of jurisdiction).

\(^{31}\) See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

\(^{32}\) Id. § 1 (permitting but not requiring “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).

\(^{33}\) Id. § 2 (describing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”).

\(^{34}\) Consider one more variation on jurisdiction stripping. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021), the Court considered a challenge to Texas’s S.B. 8, which effectively banned abortion in the state using an elaborate scheme of private civil actions designed to preclude pre-enforcement constitutional challenges to the bill. See Texas Heartbeat Act, S.B. 8, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (codified as amended at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 171.201–.212 (West 2022)). In essence, a state managed to strip federal courts of jurisdiction. The gambit succeeded: The Court largely accepted that the law deprived challengers of potential defendants to sue in seeking to obtain a pre-enforcement declaration of unconstitutionality. See *Whole Woman’s Health*, 142 S. Ct. at 531–36. Though a fascinating (if troubling) variation on jurisdiction stripping, this example poses sufficiently difficult issues that it is outside this Essay’s scope.
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary) or to protect reproductive rights (to deprive the Court of a chance to overrule Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey before it did so in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization).

We largely ignore other uses of Congress’s power to control federal courts’ jurisdiction—that is, the use of jurisdiction stripping to accomplish nonsubstantive policy goals, such as judicial administration. To take just one example, in 1925 Congress abolished most of the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction, largely giving the Court power to choose its cases through certiorari jurisdiction. Under conventional accounts, Congress was not attempting to skew the substantive outcome of any case or issue. Instead, it was responding to concerns about the Court’s caseload, the quality of its decisionmaking, and so on—as well as acquiescing to concerted lobbying by the Justices who sought to increase their own discretion. One might also view Congress’s jurisdictional reform as an attempt “to safeguard, not to undermine, the Court’s constitutional

35. See infra section II.A.1.
36. See infra section II.A.2.
40. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 962–68 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, The Exceptions Clause] (explaining discretionary certiorari jurisdiction as a way to address the Court’s caseload crisis and enhance the Court’s role in resolving federal questions).
42. See id. (noting that the Court’s previously large caseload had “taken away from other[] cases which present[ed] grave questions and need[ed] careful consideration” and that therefore discretionary jurisdiction was “proposed by the Supreme Court (quoting jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 8206 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13 (1924) (statement of Justice Willis Van Devanter)); see also, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1704–05 (2000) (“In advocating their bill, the Justices frequently argued that they needed the discretionary power to refuse to decide cases in order to avoid frivolous appeals.”); Benjamin B. Johnson, The Origins of Supreme Court Question Selection, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 793, 835–39 (2022) (describing Justices’ lobbying for the Judges’ Bill as a way to reduce their onerous caseload).

Some situations defy easy classification. For example, Congress sometimes shifts cases away from Article III courts and into non–Article III tribunals for non-result-oriented reasons. This was the situation with the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, when Congress created new bankruptcy courts to alleviate docket congestion and improve the quality of decisionmaking. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 116–17 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress sought to improve accuracy and efficiency rather than “aggrandize” power to itself). By contrast, some administrative agencies are known for reflecting the political priorities of the presidential administration of the day. See Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law or Politics?, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 637, 637–38 (2010).
role” by “facilitat[ing] the Court’s role in providing a definitive and uniform resolution of federal questions.” 43 On this account, Congress might “strip” the Court’s jurisdiction over some cases—but with the goal of giving the Court time to focus on resolving more important cases. Even if, on their face, these examples meet the definition of jurisdiction stripping, such exercises of congressional power fall outside the scope of this Essay’s inquiry. The question we seek to answer is whether Congress can use jurisdiction stripping to deprive the Court, or other federal courts, of power in order to shape policy.

B. The Academic Debate

The question of whether, and to what extent, Congress may strip federal courts of jurisdiction has generated immense academic commentary. The scholarly search for potential fetters on this power seems to reflect, in part, an unspoken assumption that one day Congress might succeed in accomplishing what jurisdiction stripping proposals have threatened to do. The next Part explains the deep flaws of that assumption. In sketching the commentary and jurisprudence on the question of congressional power, we don’t offer a comprehensive overview. Instead, we concentrate on the contributions and holdings that bear directly on our inquiry. Most importantly, we highlight the few limitations that courts have recognized in this area, as they help elucidate our core conclusions.

Most of the literature on Congress’s power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction falls into three broad camps.

First, the traditional theory contends that Article III gives Congress plenary authority to create, destroy, and define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts. 44 This theory posits a similarly plenary power under the Exceptions Clause to control the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 45 Together, these principles suggest that Article III itself imposes no internal limits on Congress’s power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction. 46 Nevertheless, to use the now-familiar terminology, the traditional theory holds that Congress still faces external constraints—that is, limitations imposed by parts of the Constitution other than Article III. 47 For example, even if Congress generally can limit lower federal courts’ jurisdiction, Congress couldn’t deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over suits brought by Black or female plaintiffs, as that would surely violate the external

43. Grove, The Exceptions Clause, supra note 40, at 931.
44. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 8, at 899; Redish, supra note 8, at 912; Wechsler, supra note 8, at 1905.
45. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 8, at 908; Redish, supra note 8, at 902; Wechsler, supra note 8, at 1905. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, though, is not subject to the Exceptions Clause.
46. Note, however, the general view that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction vests automatically, such that Congress may not add to or take from it. See infra note 203.
47. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 900; Redish, supra note 8, at 902-03.
constraint posed by the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.48 But the traditional theory holds that Congress faces no internal Article III constraints.49

The second view, famously articulated by Henry Hart, has become known as the “essential functions” thesis.50 Variations abound, but, in broad strokes, the scholars who subscribe to some version of this theory share the view that while Congress has wide latitude to control federal courts’ jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a way that destroys the “essential role” of the Supreme Court, or of the federal courts more generally, in the constitutional order.51 As some have articulated the point, “exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction must remain just that—exceptions can’t swallow the rule.52 This may be more of a conceptual limitation than a practical one. It rests on a structural axiom about the judiciary’s vital role in a tripartite system of government, but it offers no clear judicially administrable standard for discerning how much congressional meddling is too much.53

Third, a few scholars have advocated different versions of a mandatory vesting theory—the idea that Congress must confer some (or potentially all) of the jurisdiction delineated in Article III on at least one federal

48. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 263 (1973) (arguing that an “exception” to the Court’s jurisdiction based on race clearly would violate the Fifth Amendment).

49. One variant posits that Congress has plenary power but only to the extent that its restriction genuinely counts as an “exception” to the defaults in Article III. See Baude, supra note 16, at 2644. William Baude thus has suggested that Congress may strip the Court’s jurisdiction so long as it removes “less than fifty percent of the Court’s possible appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 2644–45.


51. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 24, at 1087–95 (arguing that Congress may not go too far in impairing the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers over lower federal courts); Hart, supra note 50, at 1365 (contending that exceptions may not “destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”); Monaghan, supra note 24, at 10–31 (interpreting Hart’s “essential functions” thesis as rooted in a legal process theory and arguing that “Hart got it right”); Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review, supra note 22, at 935 (identifying the essential functions of the Supreme Court as resolving conflicts between state and federal courts on federal questions and maintaining the supremacy of federal law); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 55–57 (1981) (arguing for the Supreme Court’s essential role in supervising state courts and ensuring compliance with the Constitution); see also Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 504 (arguing that lower federal courts now perform critical functions and thus may not be abolished by Congress).

52. E.g., Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 170 (1960) (arguing that “in a legal context an exception cannot destroy the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies”).

53. See Hart, supra note 50, at 1365 (acknowledging through dialogue that the standard “seems pretty indeterminate”); see also Fallon, supra note 24, at 1089–90 (agreeing with Hart that these questions “would need to be answered on a case-by-case basis, without the aid of any sharply determinate test”).
court. These theories would impose the greatest restrictions on Congress’s power to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. But aside from dicta in an 1816 opinion by Justice Joseph Story, the federal courts never have seriously entertained these readings.

Finally, in recent years some scholars have advocated a variation on the traditional theory—what we call an absolutist view that Congress has truly unfettered power to regulate jurisdiction. This theory goes further than the traditional notion that Congress faces no internal constraints (from Article III). It provocatively suggests that few, if any, external constraints limit Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction. For example, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen contends that when it comes to jurisdiction stripping, “Congress can pretty much do whatever it wants.” Professor Christopher Sprigman has advanced the most comprehensive version of this argument. Because “[n]either text, nor history, nor precedent tells us with any certainty whether Congress’s Article III power is subject to external limitations,” Sprigman argues, “Congress has room to act.” In his telling, “[i]f a determined Congress acts to fill that space, courts will have little power to resist.”

54. Robert Clinton advocated the strongest form of the mandatory vesting view—that (at least presumptively) Article III “mandate[s] that Congress allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each and every type of case or controversy defined as part of the judicial power of the United States.” Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 749–50 (1984).


56. Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 8, at 48–49.

57. Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1836.

58. Id. at 1784; see also Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1725 (noting that “sweeping” reform could entirely prohibit courts from reviewing the constitutionality of federal legislation).
In the analysis that follows, this Essay takes the traditional view—under which Article III imposes no internal constraints on jurisdiction stripping—as its starting point. We do so for several practical reasons, given our focus on discerning whether Congress can use jurisdiction stripping to push back against a hostile judiciary. First, as discussed below, the courts generally have endorsed the traditional view, so it seems most predictive of how courts would respond to jurisdiction-stripping efforts in the future. (We are agnostic about whether courts over the years have adopted the best reading of Article III.)

More importantly, though, treating the traditional theory enables us to make our arguments most persuasively. That is because the leading alternatives (namely the “essential functions” and “mandatory vesting” views) offer more restrictive theories of Congress’s power. If one of those theories were correct, Part II’s arguments about the practical limitations of jurisdiction stripping would only become stronger, as Congress would have even less latitude to use jurisdiction strips to craft substantive policy. For that reason, we can make the best case by showing that jurisdiction stripping will not fulfill its promise even if Congress has the plenary power that the traditional theory presumes.

In proceeding from the traditional theory, however, we necessarily reject the absolutist theory that Congress is not bound even by external constitutional constraints when regulating jurisdiction. If the Court subscribed to that view, some (though not all) of our arguments about jurisdiction stripping’s policy failures would lose force. But the absolutist view’s idea that the Supreme Court would acquiesce in all possible jurisdiction strips, no matter how extreme, strains credulity. For example, if Congress ever defined a federal court’s jurisdiction along racial lines, the Court surely would find grounds to invalidate such legislation. Taken to its logical extreme, the absolutist view also would become a way for Congress to circumvent any limitation on its powers—passing whatever legislation it wants (however constitutionally dubious) and forbidding courts from declaring it unconstitutional. This, too, seems unlikely.

The absolutist theory also remains an outlier, endorsed by only a few scholars and rejected by the overwhelming majority. That is unsurprising, as the theory finds little support in the case law. The (concededly limited) precedent on jurisdiction stripping strongly supports the view that courts

59. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.

60. See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1791–92 (noting that while a “substantial number of commentators” acknowledge Congress’s authority to jurisdiction strip, “many of the same commentators . . . argue at the same time that it is limited.”).
will continue to recognize external constraints limiting Congress’s power.\(^{61}\)

Finally, an absolutist theory—and the view that jurisdiction stripping can succeed as the ultimate democratic check on hostile courts—depends on several questionable predicates. Most critically, it assumes that the Supreme Court would remain committed to principled formalism—that while the Court might genuinely believe Congress has transgressed its substantive powers, the Court would faithfully respect a jurisdiction strip, no questions asked. If this were true, then Congress theoretically could outflank a hyperformalist Court—write a substantive law, append a jurisdiction strip, and trust the Court to abide by it.

Enthusiasts of jurisdiction stripping (and the absolutist theory) don’t rely on or defend such assumptions. Quite the contrary. Sprigman, for example, contends that jurisdiction stripping is necessary because the Court’s conservative majority is likely to “gin up conservative interpretations of the Constitution for the purpose of killing off as much of the Democratic reform agenda as possible.”\(^{62}\) In other words, the supposed need for jurisdiction stripping arises from the Court’s unprincipled interpretation of the Constitution’s substantive provisions. Sprigman then predicts that the judiciary would nonetheless submit to Congress’s attempt to strip jurisdiction.\(^{63}\) Yet if—as Sprigman acknowledges—the outer limits of Congress’s power over jurisdiction remain indeterminate, it is hard to see why a lawless, partisan Court would not be willing to “gin up” interpretations of Article III that would permit it to overcome a jurisdiction strip.

C. Judicial Precedent

For all the academic commentary that has sought to identify textual and structural bounds on Congress’s power, federal courts overwhelmingly have adhered to the traditional theory that Congress has plenary authority subject only to external constitutional constraints. The Supreme Court in \textit{Ex parte McCardle} famously endorsed this view.\(^{65}\) As part of Reconstruction after the Civil War, Congress had expanded federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction, allowing persons detained by state authorities to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. The clear objective was to protect recently emancipated Black citizens from recalcitrant Southern states. But William McCardle, an unreconstructed Mississippi newspaperman who had


\(^{63}\) See \textit{Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power}, supra note 2, at 1784.

\(^{64}\) See id.

\(^{65}\) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
inveighed against military occupation of the South, invoked this provision to challenge his detention and the government’s plan to try him using a military commission.66

*McCardle* seemed poised to turn the new habeas statute on its head and use it to challenge the constitutionality of the entire Reconstruction project. So, Congress scrambled to repeal the new habeas statute. Its motive in trying to insulate Reconstruction from constitutional challenge couldn’t have been clearer, especially considering that it acted after the Supreme Court had heard oral arguments in McCardle’s case.67 Nevertheless, the Court acceded to Congress’s jurisdictional wishes.68

In the century and a half since *McCardle*, the Supreme Court has continued to espouse the view that Congress enjoys “plenary” authority to control federal courts’ jurisdiction.69 True, Congress may not do literally anything it wants by dressing up some unlawful action in the garb of jurisdiction stripping.70 Moreover, the Supreme Court sometimes goes out of its way to avoid having to define the outer boundaries of Congress’s power in this regard.71 But the Court has invalidated only two jurisdiction-stripping statutes in the history of the republic,72 suggesting relatively

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67. See Van Alstyne, supra note 48, at 233–42 (describing this historical background).
68. See *McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515 (holding that “this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal”); see also Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877, at 336 (updated ed. 2014) (noting that “the Supreme Court acceded to a law rushed through Congress stripping it of jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, thus rendering moot [a case] that might have raised the question of the constitutionality of Reconstruction”).
69. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, Enter. Lodge No. 27 v. Toledo, Peoria & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 63 (1944)); id. at 907 n.4 (arguing that “the core holding of *McCardle*—that Congress does not exercise the judicial power when it strips jurisdiction over a class of cases—has never been questioned[.] and has been repeatedly reaffirmed”); see also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187–88 (1943) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that Congress has plenary authority to control the jurisdiction of lower federal courts).
72. See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1053 (“*Boumediene v. Bush* is the first decision since *United States v. Klein*, in 1871, to hold unequivocally that a statute framed as a withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal courts violates the Constitution.” (citations omitted)); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The *Boumediene* Decision, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1 & n.2 (noting the ambiguity of *Klein* as to this point and that perhaps *Boumediene* was the first true invalidation). Some scholars have argued that *McCardle* shouldn’t be read for all that it seems to say. See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1081; Monaghan, supra note 24, at 18.
modest boundaries on Congress’s power to control federal courts’ jurisdiction. Those limits fall into two major categories, one of which is probably best understood as a subset of the other.

First, and conceptually most important, Congress itself may not violate a provision of the Constitution and then use a jurisdiction strip to insulate that violation against legal challenges. This limit largely tracks the distinction, noted above, between internal Article III constraints (of which there appear to be few to none) and external constraints that Congress must respect. Chief among such external constraints are due process rights. Thus, Congress may not impinge on those rights and then strip courts of jurisdiction to hear any legal challenges to the due process violation.

The chief case on point—though not a Supreme Court case—is Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. There, the Second Circuit took seriously a due process challenge to the Portal-to-Portal Act, which altered federal law on overtime compensation for mine workers and also deprived all courts of jurisdiction over claims seeking to hold employers liable under prior law. The Second Circuit endorsed the notion of external constitutional constraints on jurisdiction stripping, reasoning that if one of the jurisdiction strip’s “effects would be to deprive the appellants of property without due process or just compensation, it would be invalid.” The court ultimately found no such constitutional violation because it concluded that Congress had power to change the statutory right that it had created.

Another external constraint comes from Article I’s Suspension Clause. So, Congress may not improperly suspend habeas corpus and then try to prevent judicial challenges. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court

73. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 8, at 908 (concluding based on constitutional text, historical practice, and Supreme Court pronouncements that “there are no substantial internal limits on Congress’ article III power to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction”).

74. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).


77. See 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (“No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any action or proceeding . . . .”).

78. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 257; see also id. (“[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not . . . exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property without just compensation.”).

79. See id. at 259–61.

80. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).

considered a challenge to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by enemy combatants detained at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. The Court found the withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction unconstitutional after concluding that Congress had not created an adequate alternative forum for review of detainees’ status. The Court recognized that the MCA, on its face, deprived the Court itself of jurisdiction over the case. Nonetheless, it was willing to consider the constitutionality of the jurisdiction strip.

Second, Congress may not encroach on the “judicial Power” that Article III confers on federal courts. Although one might view every instance of jurisdiction stripping as such an incursion, the Court has made clear that simply regulating jurisdiction doesn’t cross the line. After all, as the Court has noted, “Congress generally does not infringe the judicial power when it strips jurisdiction because, with limited exceptions, a congressional grant of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power.” But Congress cannot use its power over jurisdiction to usurp the judicial power.

For example, Congress may not tell a court how to resolve a particular case, a venerable principle often associated with United States v. Klein. Shortly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court had held that presidential pardons of former Confederate rebels constituted proof of the pardon recipients’ loyalty to the United States, a condition for Southerners to seek compensation in the Court of Claims for property seized during the war. Congress sought to countermand these efforts. It passed a statute that deemed a presidential pardon proof of disloyalty and required the Court

82. Id. at 732–36. The year before, Congress had similarly created military commissions and attempted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction. But in Hamdan, the Court sidestepped “grave” constitutional questions and construed the jurisdiction strip not to apply to pending cases. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572–84 (2006). Congress responded with the MCA and thus teed up the questions that Hamdan had avoided. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735.
83. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
84. See id. at 736–39 (noting that section 7 of the MCA purported to strip all federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions by persons whom the United States detained as enemy combatants, but nonetheless proceeding to assess the statute’s constitutionality).
85. Determining what counts as an exercise of the “judicial power” has occupied courts since the earliest days of the republic, see, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792), and continues to inform modern debates about the propriety of administrative agencies and other types of non–Article III adjudication, see, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, The New Separation of Powers Formalism and Administrative Adjudication, 90 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1088, 1117–18 (2022) (noting current debates about the constitutionality of administrative agencies vested with some form of “judicial power”).
87. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872).
88. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1870) (holding that “the law makes the proof of pardon a complete substitute for proof that [the claimant] gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion”).
of Claims to dismiss claims based on pardons for lack of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Klein} found the statute unconstitutional. Congress had no authority either to redefine the effect of a presidential pardon or to command a specific result in the Court of Claims.\textsuperscript{90}

The \textit{Klein} opinion remains enigmatic and contested, as this Essay explores later.\textsuperscript{91} But the Court routinely understands it to mean at least that Congress had unconstitutionally encroached on the judicial power by trying to direct a specific result.\textsuperscript{92} Or, as the Court has put the point more succinctly in recent years, Congress may not pass a statute that says: “In \textit{Smith v. Jones}, Smith wins.”\textsuperscript{93}

This second set of limitations is really a variation on, or, as we’ve suggested, a subset of, the first. The cases in which the Court has found an invasion of the judicial power identify additional external constraints on jurisdiction stripping that Congress must respect.\textsuperscript{94} The only difference is that these are general structural limitations rather than individual rights rooted in discrete constitutional provisions. But either way, Congress may not skirt those limitations by attempting to deprive courts of the power to call them what they are.

Given the relatively few cases on point, open questions remain about how broadly courts will understand external constraints and how robustly they will police them. Some of the uncertainty owes to the murky line between (permissibly) allocating jurisdiction and (impermissibly) manipulating jurisdiction to accomplish a forbidden end. But the traditional theory still gives Congress wide latitude. Perhaps ironically, the more sweeping a jurisdiction strip, the more likely it is to pass constitutional muster rather than seem geared toward engineering a particular result in a particular case.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Klein}, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–46.

\textsuperscript{90} See id. at 146–48.

\textsuperscript{91} See infra note 314 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{92} See \textit{Bank Markazi v. Peterson}, 578 U.S. 212, 228 (2016) (interpreting \textit{Klein} to hold that Congress had “infringed the judicial power . . . because it attempted to direct the result without altering the legal standards . . . [that] Congress was powerless to prescribe”); id. at 245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing \textit{Klein}’s “central holding” as the admonition that “Congress may not prescribe the result in pending cases”); see also \textit{Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y}, 503 U.S. 429, 439 (1992) (suggesting that a statute would be unconstitutional if it “failed to supply new law, but directed results under old law”).

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Patchak v. Zinke}, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (plurality opinion); see also \textit{Bank Markazi}, 578 U.S. at 231 (same example); id. at 246 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (same example).

\textsuperscript{94} The restrictions in \textit{Klein}, discussed above, are the classic examples. See also \textit{Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.}, 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (holding that in “retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated th[e] fundamental principle” of judicial finality).

\textsuperscript{95} For example, most scholars agree that if Congress wanted to, it could return to Article III’s original position by abolishing all lower federal courts and sending all federal-question cases (outside of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction) to state courts. See
The case law, though limited, reveals a fairly consistent view of Congress’s power to control federal courts’ jurisdiction. That power is “plenary,” subject only to external constitutional constraints that Congress may not evade through the fig leaf of jurisdiction stripping.\(^96\) The Court has, at times, left some ambiguity about where the ultimate outer boundaries of Congress’s power lie.\(^97\) In that vein, some Justices have mused in dicta about whether wholesale deprivations of power might veer into the territory about which Hart and others warned—that is, situations in which Congress has impaired the judiciary’s ability to discharge its “essential functions.”\(^98\) But aside from some minor uncertainty about the most extreme deprivations of jurisdiction, the Court appears to subscribe to the view that Article III itself imposes no limits.\(^99\)

D. Jurisdiction Stripping as Policy Reform

Legislators and activists have proposed various jurisdiction-stripping measures over the course of American history. This section documents some of those efforts. In particular, consistent with the goals of the Essay, we look only to jurisdiction-stripping measures proposed as tools for influencing substantive policy in some way, rather than those introduced for reasons of judicial administration. We don’t aim to provide a complete catalog of all such efforts since the Founding. But we strive to recount enough examples to show the different contexts in which advocates have conceived of jurisdiction stripping as an effective tool for congressional policymaking and the particular ways in which Congress might strip or regulate jurisdiction to achieve its goals.

Arguably the first example of jurisdiction stripping on policy grounds occurred early in American history. Shortly before leaving office following their defeat in the 1800 election, the Federalists passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created sixteen circuit court judgeships (filled by President John Adams just before leaving office), reorganized the district courts, gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions, and

\(^96\) E.g., \textit{Patchak}, 138 S. Ct. at 906 (2018) (plurality opinion).
\(^97\) See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
\(^98\) See, e.g., \textit{Felker v. Turpin}, 518 U.S. 651, 666–67 & n.2 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (hypothesizing such a situation and citing various scholars who have endorsed or explored the “essential functions” theory of Article III).
\(^99\) See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
eliminated a seat on the Supreme Court.100 Once the Jeffersonians took office, they encountered an entrenched judiciary firmly controlled by Federalists that seemed poised to rein in the new Republican administration.101 In March 1802, the new Congress repealed the 1801 Act, controversially eliminating the new circuit judgeships.102

Recognizing that the repeal stood on shaky constitutional ground and thus “fearful of how the Court might rule on the act,”103 Congress swiftly passed another bill canceling the Court’s upcoming Term.104 The Court had been scheduled to sit in June 1802, but the new statute prevented it from reconvening until February 1803.105 Though Republicans asserted they were simply adjusting the Court’s schedule to account for its low caseload, this contention “fooled few observers—least of all the justices.”106 Nonetheless, the gambit worked. The Court did not have the chance to rule on the repeal’s constitutionality until 1803, when Stuart v. Laird upheld it because “there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or restrain the exercise of legislative power” over inferior federal courts.107

This episode is not typically seen as an instance of jurisdiction stripping, as it did not remove the Court’s power to hear any particular class of cases. Nonetheless, in our view, it belongs under that heading because it represents a situation in which Congress restricted the Court’s jurisdiction to head off a potentially unfavorable ruling—even if Congress did so for only a limited period of time. Typically, jurisdiction stripping means removing some of the Court’s jurisdiction over a defined class of cases permanently; here, Congress effectively removed all of the Court’s jurisdiction temporarily.

Shortly after the Civil War, Congress engaged in its most successful act of jurisdiction stripping when it blocked the Court from resolving Ex parte McCardle on the merits.108 Congress again became interested in jurisdiction stripping not long after McCardle. In 1875, Republicans, in a lame-

104. An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156, 156 (1802).
106. Glickstein, supra note 105, at 551.
107. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
108. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
duck congressional session, passed a new Judiciary Act that significantly expanded federal courts’ jurisdiction, with one goal being to help corporate defendants remove cases to more business-friendly federal courts.\textsuperscript{109} Democratic members of Congress responded over several decades by putting forward legislation that would have restricted corporations’ removal rights.\textsuperscript{110} Though several of these bills passed the House, the Republican-controlled Senate blocked them.\textsuperscript{111}

Another surge of enthusiasm about jurisdiction stripping occurred in the middle of the twentieth century. In response to various Warren Court rulings, members of Congress proposed stripping the Court’s jurisdiction over numerous issues, including legislative reapportionment,\textsuperscript{112} civil liberties for Communists,\textsuperscript{113} the admissibility of criminal confessions,\textsuperscript{114} and habeas corpus.\textsuperscript{115} None passed, though some may have subtly pressured the Court to change course, as we discuss later.\textsuperscript{116}

Jurisdiction stripping attracted renewed interest in the late twentieth century. Members of Congress proposed stripping the Court’s jurisdiction over issues including busing in desegregation cases, school prayer, and abortion.\textsuperscript{117} In 1981, John Roberts, then serving as a Special Assistant to Attorney General William French Smith, wrote an internal Department of Justice memorandum defending such proposals’ constitutionality and disagreeing with a contrary opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel.\textsuperscript{118} In 1996, Congress succeeded in jurisdiction stripping several times.\textsuperscript{119}
curtailed federal courts’ ability to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. It limited courts’ power to remedy certain constitutional claims brought by prisoners. And it restricted judicial review of some discretionary immigration decisions.

Interest in jurisdiction stripping picked up again in the early 2000s. One proposal sought to restrict jurisdiction over cases involving same-sex marriage. Another example, worth considering in detail, focused on challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance. In 2002, in response to a Ninth Circuit ruling that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause, U.S. Representative Todd Akin introduced legislation to strip all federal courts of jurisdiction over such challenges. In promoting the bill, Akin described jurisdiction stripping as a powerful policy tool under which “Congress has the ability to rein in a renegade judiciary.” Soon after, the House actually passed by a wide margin a version of the bill that had been amended to make its jurisdiction-stripping language even more sweeping, but the bill died in the Senate.

127. See Pledge Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. § 2(a). This amended bill provided, “No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its recitation.” Id.
During the War on Terror, Congress successfully enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation aimed at insulating from Article III review the detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. This effort ultimately failed, however, when in *Boumediene* (as recounted above) the Court held that the jurisdiction strip violated the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.\(^{129}\)

Most recently, jurisdiction stripping attracted renewed interest after hardball tactics by Republicans gave President Donald Trump three appointments to the Supreme Court and allowed him to push it in a much more conservative direction. Progressives started debating various reforms as a possible response, with jurisdiction stripping emerging as a leading contender\(^{130}\) alongside term limits, court packing, and other structural reforms.\(^{131}\) Leading scholars, including Professors Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn,\(^{132}\) Christopher Sprigman,\(^{133}\) and Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath,\(^{134}\) endorsed it as a promising strategy. And President Biden’s commission, responding to this latest surge of enthusiasm, studied jurisdiction stripping in detail.\(^{135}\)

While occasionally alluding to the indirect benefits discussed at greater length in Part III,\(^{136}\) proponents of jurisdiction stripping overwhelmingly emphasize that it would permit Congress to wrest control of decisionmaking from courts and have a *direct* (perhaps even immediate) effect on substantive policies. Doerfler and Moyn endorse what they call “disempowering” reforms, such as jurisdiction stripping, over “personnel” reforms like court packing, on these grounds:

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129. See *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008); supra section I.C.


131. See Epps & Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, supra note 16, at 836–50.

132. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1744 (arguing for “disempowering reforms” such as jurisdiction stripping).

133. See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1799 (arguing that jurisdiction stripping is a tool to combat “judicial supremacy”).

134. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 2, at 431 (arguing for jurisdiction stripping as a “tactical” challenge to the Supreme Court).

135. See Final Report, supra note 8, at 154–69. Consistent with this Essay’s overarching thesis, the Commission expressed skepticism about jurisdiction stripping’s efficacy. See id. at 155, 159–60.

136. See, e.g., Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1834 (suggesting that the political coalition supporting jurisdiction “may be quite durable”).
With jurisdiction stripping, . . . the fate of . . . controversial legislation would be determined by Congress and the President in September or April, and not by the Supreme Court in June. By removing the judiciary from the process, jurisdiction-stripping legislation would thus tie policy outcomes exclusively to the most recent congressional and presidential elections.\textsuperscript{137}

A common thread runs through the many proposals considered above: a conception of jurisdiction stripping as an awesome power. The next Part confronts that common assumption. In nearly every context, that belief turns out to be wrong.

II. PREDICTABLE FAILURE

To evaluate jurisdiction stripping as a policy tool, this Part games out precisely how it would work under different scenarios. To that end, we explore the various ways that Congress might try to use jurisdiction stripping to compel a particular substantive policy result. In seeking to influence policy through jurisdictional regulation, Congress has a variety of options. It might attempt to strip some courts (or other tribunals) of jurisdiction and intentionally direct cases into others. Or, most controversially, it might try to strip all federal tribunals of jurisdiction. Congress’s choice will affect which tribunal hears a case in the first instance and which (if any) reviews decisions on appeal. And the option Congress chooses will depend on what particular problem it hopes to solve.

The efficacy of jurisdiction stripping often depends on the source of law that has motivated Congress to act. Congress might strip jurisdiction with the goal of shaping outcomes in federal constitutional challenges to state laws. Alternatively, it might be concerned with federal courts’ power to interpret, and to evaluate the constitutionality of, federal laws. We thus divide our analysis into these two categories.

Within each category, we tease out further possibilities. When state law is at issue, Congress might strip federal courts of jurisdiction to circumvent Supreme Court precedent or protect precedents against overruling. When it comes to federal law, there are again different possibilities depending on whether questions of statutory or constitutional interpretation are at stake and which particular courts Congress views as problematic.

These rough groupings may shade into one another in some instances. As ideal types, though, they help illustrate the complexities of trying to use jurisdiction stripping as a substantive policy tool. Across the range of possibilities we consider, we show that jurisdiction stripping turns out to be far less efficacious as a policy tool than almost everyone assumes. In nearly every instance, Congress is unlikely to succeed in directly achieving its desired substantive outcome of either circumventing an

\textsuperscript{137} Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1726 (footnote omitted).
existing precedent or preventing an adverse decision. In some situations, this conclusion becomes obvious as soon as one plays things out. In others, understanding jurisdiction stripping’s failures requires a more careful parsing of the mechanics of precedent and the few fetters on Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction. Either way, jurisdiction stripping is a far weaker weapon than common wisdom assumes.

A. State Laws

1. Circumventing Precedent. — The quintessential problem that invites talk of jurisdiction stripping is a constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court with which Congress disagrees. More specifically, the high-profile examples usually involve situations in which the Court has declared a state law or policy unconstitutional. Think about rulings that have invalidated on constitutional grounds state laws that permit voluntary school prayer, prohibit flag burning, or criminalize abortion. Or consider rulings that require states to adopt affirmative school desegregation measures, such as busing.

The most common jurisdiction-stripping proposals that emerge in the wake of such rulings would deprive all federal courts of jurisdiction and thus give each state the final word on these constitutional questions. We leave aside the vibrant debate about whether the potential disuniformity would cause chaos or undermine the structural purpose of having “one supreme Court.” Instead, we focus on whether such strips would prove

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138. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (invalidating a state law requiring schools to begin each day with Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invalidating a public school’s policy that students begin each day with a prayer).

139. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that a criminal conviction for desecrating the American flag was inconsistent with the First Amendment).


142. See generally supra section I.D (providing a summary of recent jurisdiction-stripping debates and proposals).

143. See Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 495, 496 (1983) (contending that giving each state the final word on certain constitutional questions could create such chaos); Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review, supra note 22, at 935 (arguing that stripping the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction would create massive inconsistencies).

144. Compare Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 828 (1994) (arguing that lower federal courts must be “subordinate to” the Supreme Court), and James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1451–59 (2000) [hereinafter Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping] (arguing that constitutional text and history mandate that the Supreme Court exercise supervisory authority over inferior federal
efficacious. That is, by directing these constitutional questions to the states, could Congress subvert or undo an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling? Maybe, the same way that firing buckshot at a fly on a window could be effective. It might hit the target, but only occasionally and haphazardly and with plenty of collateral damage along the way.

Consider the school prayer example, which offers a best-case scenario for proponents of jurisdiction stripping’s efficacy. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Engel v. Vitale* and *Abington School District v. Schempp* held that teacher-led prayers and Bible readings in public schools violated the Establishment Clause. Over the ensuing decades, members of Congress—including, most prominently, Senator Jesse Helms—offered several proposals that would have stripped all federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases challenging state laws that related to “voluntary prayer, Bible reading, or religious meetings in public schools.” Thus, jurisdiction stripping of this nature would force all litigation into state courts. Without the prospect of Supreme Court review, each state would have the final say on the constitutionality of state laws that authorize voluntary school prayer. So, could this gambit successfully evade the likes of *Engel* and *Schempp* and permit school prayer?

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145. 370 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1962) (holding that a public school’s daily prayer recitation was unconstitutional even though individual students could opt not to participate).

146. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223–24 (1963) (holding that a state law that mandated teacher-led Bible readings in public school, even without commentary, was unconstitutional).

147. Gressman & Gressman, supra note 143, at 500–02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Voluntary School Prayer Act, S. 784, 98th Cong. (1983)); see also Baucus & Kay, supra note 112, at 991–92 & n.18 (listing bills introduced to limit federal court jurisdiction over school prayer questions).

148. We address only the mechanical problems here. Others have flagged further difficulties in accomplishing the goals of jurisdiction stripping. For example, other scholars have shown that most jurisdiction-stripping proposals suffer from ambiguity in describing the class of cases to which they refer. See, e.g., Gressman & Gressman, supra note 143, at 501 (noting that Senator Helms’s 1983 proposal could be read to apply to “any and all cases ‘arising out of’ state action relating to voluntary prayer, Bible reading, or religious meetings” (quoting S. 784)).
Imagine how this would work in practice. The first difficulty lies in figuring out how state courts would treat the precedents that Congress finds offensive. Scholars disagree as to the formal strength that precedents like *Engel* and *Schempp* would still have. One approach contends that these Supreme Court decisions remain binding precedent, even if the Court has no power to police whether state courts have applied those precedents correctly. If so, then jurisdiction stripping closes the stable door after the horse has already bolted. It freezes in place the objectionable decisions and, even worse, prevents the only court that can reconsider those precedents from doing so. Other scholars contend that a precedent’s binding force necessarily depends on whether the rendering court has revisory power over lower courts. Thus, adherents of this view argue that if the Supreme Court no longer has jurisdiction to review state-court school-prayer decisions, precedents like *Engel* are no longer binding on state courts.

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149. For purposes of the argument, we’ll assume, perhaps contrary to fact, that the Court would adhere to its school prayer precedents.

150. See Final Report, supra note 8, at 160–61 (noting that “it is not clear whether state-court judges would be bound by preexisting Supreme Court precedents”). And, in fact, the two of us differ on the right answer to this question.

151. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Withdrawing Jurisdiction From Federal Courts, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 33 (1984) (arguing that “the proper answer is that standing Supreme Court precedent would continue to be authoritative law”); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255, 276 n.106 (1992) (arguing that “the Exceptions Clause does not permit Congress to free the inferior federal courts or the state courts from their obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent in all cases”); Redish, supra note 8, at 925 (“Removal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over an area of substantive law has no legal effect whatsoever on the validity of pre-existing Supreme Court decisions.”); see also Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 673 (1995) (noting that lower court judges “must follow applicable Supreme Court precedent”); Wechsler, supra note 8, at 1006 (“The lower courts or the state courts would still be faced with the decisions of the Supreme Court as precedents—decisions which that Court would now be quite unable to reverse or modify or even to explain.”).

152. See Redish, supra note 8, at 925 (“Ironically, such congressional action would have the effect of locking in those decisions, for the only court that has power to modify, limit or overrule those decisions is the Supreme Court itself.”); Wechsler, supra note 8, at 1006 (arguing that “[t]he jurisdictional withdrawal thus might work to freeze the very doctrines that had prompted” jurisdiction stripping).

153. See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 54, at 258 n.170 (contending that binding precedent is “governed not by any inherent judicial hierarchy in the structure of the Constitution” and that “state courts are currently bound to follow Supreme Court precedent because . . . if they do not, they can be reversed”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s *Justice Accused*, 7 J.L. & Religion 33, 83–84 (1989) (endorsing Amar’s view and arguing that a higher court precedent is “controlling” on a lower court only to the extent that that higher court may reverse the lower court’s decisions); Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 8, at 59–61 & n.55 (similar); cf. Caminker, supra note 144, at 837–38 (arguing that neither the Supremacy Clause nor structural federalism dictates that Supreme Court precedents bind state courts).

154. The notion that a jurisdiction strip changes the formal bindingness of a precedent is problematic because binding precedent does not always track the chain of appellate
This theoretical dispute touches on the rich commentary about the nature of precedent and the provenance of its rules as well as the long-running debate about judicial supremacy versus departmentalism. We don’t attempt to resolve those debates. Our point is that this all remains contested, including the specific question at issue here—how a conscientious state-court judge should treat precedents like Engel and Schempp after a jurisdiction strip.

Regardless of who gets the better of the argument as to the existing precedents’ formal strength, what really matters is what would happen in practice. Proponents usually feel compelled to talk elliptically about what they hope jurisdiction stripping will accomplish. Sometimes this comes in the form of modest language about preventing federal courts—usually the Supreme Court—from “extending” supposedly errant holdings. As a practical matter, though, if state courts have the final word on a constitutional question, they can distinguish, narrow, ignore, or openly flout Supreme Court precedents with impunity.

Therein lies the hope of jurisdiction stripping and the best argument for its efficacy. A state might take up Congress’s implicit invitation. The state legislature might pass a bill authorizing school prayer, the governor

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156. See Whittington, supra note 111, at xi (describing debate).

157. See, e.g., Carl A. Anderson, The Power of Congress to Limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 1981 Det. Coll. L. Rev. 753, 768 (arguing that one version of a school-prayer-jurisdiction-stripping bill wouldn’t seek to “overturn” any precedents but would prevent the Supreme Court “from extending its past holdings” to new situations); Charles E. Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65 Judicature 190, 197 (1981) (arguing that jurisdiction stripping “would not reverse the Supreme Court’s rulings on school prayer” but “would ensure that the Court received no opportunity to further extend its errors”).

158. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1861, 1862-63 (2014) (defining “distinguishing” to mean that “the precedent, when best understood, does not actually apply,” whereas “narrowing” entails construing a precedent to be “more limited in scope than . . . the best available reading”).

159. See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 959, 985 (1981) (arguing that “some state courts would openly disregard the Supreme Court precedents . . . once the prospect of reversal by the Supreme Court had been removed”); see also Gunther, supra note 8, at 910–11 (arguing that some “courts no doubt would feel freer to follow their own constitutional interpretations if the threat of appellate review and reversal were removed”); Sager, supra note 51, at 41 (arguing that Congress would be “casting a lewd wink in the state courts’ direction”).
might sign it into law, and the state courts might then act on their own understanding of the First Amendment to declare the state policies constitutional. To work, though, all of these dominoes would need to line up. And this leaves to one side the problem, from the perspective of the jurisdiction strip’s proponents, that other states might interpret the First Amendment to impose more onerous restrictions on public religious expressions.

Of course, this all requires the Supreme Court to willingly go along with the jurisdiction strip. It’s far from certain that the Justices would feel powerless to respond. As we’ve discussed, the mainstream view of jurisdiction stripping still contemplates that external constitutional constraints curb Congress’s power.160

Could the Court interpret the external constraints to provide a toehold for reviewing a state court’s constitutional ruling, notwithstanding the jurisdiction strip? Possibly, yes. Although the Court has acceded to jurisdiction strips that foreclosed its review of a constitutional question, in each case, some alternative avenue still allowed the question to reach the Court. In *McCardle*, the Court went along with Congress’s removal of jurisdiction over the constitutionality of McCardle’s detention—but only after suggesting that another route, a habeas petition filed under the Judiciary Act of 1789, remained viable.161 (Later that year, the Court confirmed as much in *Ex parte Yerger*.) In *Yakus v. United States*, the Court held that Congress acted within its powers when depriving a criminal defendant of the opportunity to challenge the validity of the price-control regulation he was charged with violating.163 But in doing so, it stressed that the statutory scheme provided a mechanism for raising constitutional objections to the regulations using the process that provided for review by a special court, the Emergency Court of Appeals, and, ultimately, by the Supreme Court itself.164 And though the Second Circuit in *Battaglia* upheld a jurisdiction strip that foreclosed Article III review of a constitutional question, it did so only after essentially reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional objections to determine that the jurisdiction strip itself was constitutional.165

There is thus no precedent upholding a jurisdiction strip that denied a person the opportunity to raise a constitutional objection before any Article III court when the constitutional argument was potentially meritorious. Certainly none in which the jurisdiction strip prevented Article III review of state conduct that contravened clearly established

160. See supra section I.C.
161. See *Ex parte McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888, at 306 (1992); see also infra notes 270–272 and accompanying text.
162. See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1869).
164. See id. at 434.
Supreme Court precedent (let alone a jurisdiction strip designed to accomplish that result). So, while the Court might go along with this hypothetical jurisdiction strip regarding school prayer, that outcome is far from inevitable. A Court determined to thwart Congress could certainly find the jurisdiction strip an impermissible attempt to evade the Establishment Clause.

A jurisdiction strip that deprived lower federal courts, but not the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over school prayer cases seems much more certain to pass constitutional muster. Such a law would thus require cases to be litigated in the state courts in the first instance while preserving the possibility of Supreme Court review. If state courts were unconcerned with reversal, the measure could give states some temporary breathing room before being reined in when a case finally ends up at the Supreme Court. In that way, jurisdiction stripping would have the indirect benefit of buying time, as we discuss later. But it would not give states the free rein for which advocates of jurisdiction stripping hope.

But back to the hypothetical statute that precluded Supreme Court review entirely: Perhaps state courts would embrace the opportunity to flout Supreme Court precedent, no matter what federal courts scholars might say about the precedent’s formal status. And perhaps the Supreme Court would accept the withdrawal of jurisdiction. Such a scenario would offer the cleanest example of how jurisdiction stripping might successfully empower states to do something that the Supreme Court has found unconstitutional. Even so, this example may overstate jurisdiction stripping’s value as a policy tool.

We chose the school-prayer example as our case study because it presents the best possible case for jurisdiction stripping to succeed. But the school-prayer context—while not truly sui generis—differs in important ways from many situations in which Congress might use a jurisdiction strip to insulate state law from second-guessing by federal courts. What makes school prayer different from many other scenarios is that in the archetypal school-prayer case, the person raising the constitutional objection as a plaintiff seeks to stop the state from engaging in some conduct not directed exclusively at the plaintiff.

166. See infra section III.B.

167. Another reason that Congress might favor a law precluding lower federal court review is that the Supreme Court has limited docket resources and thus might not be able to correct every state court decision flouting precedent. As the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit explained when asked why he wrote decisions that he knew the Supreme Court would want to overturn, “They can’t catch ’em all.” Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Dissenting Against the Supreme Court’s Rightward Shift, N.Y. Times (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/opinion/supreme-court-right-shift.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
This differs from a situation in which the objector is an individual against whom the state is directing coercive force. A recurring feature of Establishment Clause litigation is that plaintiffs have difficulty establishing that they are distinctly injured by the challenged government conduct and thus fail to establish standing. By contrast, many cases involving constitutional challenges to state laws differ from the school-prayer context because they involve situations where the state seeks to enforce its laws against some person who will rely on the federal Constitution as a shield. And the case for overcoming a jurisdiction strip becomes more compelling when a state tries to deny someone the right to present a constitutional defense in an enforcement proceeding.

Consider criminal enforcement. If a jurisdiction-stripping measure sought to empower states to enact criminal prohibitions that the Supreme Court has found unconstitutional (say, laws criminalizing flag burning or handgun possession), the calculus becomes much more complicated. Imagine, for example, that a Congress hostile to the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any cases raising constitutional challenges to firearms prohibitions. Then imagine that a state proceeds to criminalize all handgun possession—a prohibition that would contravene the core holdings of District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.

How would things play out? The state would—assuming prosecutors were willing to flout Supreme Court precedent—prosecute someone for possessing a firearm in violation of state law. That defendant would raise a constitutional defense, invoking the Second Amendment rights recognized in Heller and McDonald. And the state courts, including the state’s highest court, would (if all goes according to plan) reject that defense, contravening the Supreme Court’s precedents. Has the jurisdiction strip worked? More practically, would the Supreme Court stand by as all of this happens?

Probably not. Over the centuries, the Court has left open multiple avenues to address questions that a jurisdiction strip purports to make unreviewable. Not coincidentally, the cases in which the Court artfully finds its way past a jurisdiction strip have tended to involve deprivations of

168. Of course, a state that required a student to participate in prayers on fear of punishment would present a different case. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1945) (holding unconstitutional a resolution requiring students to salute the flag on threat of expulsion).


170. 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment embraces an individual right to bear arms).

171. 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (incorporating the individualized Second Amendment right against the states).
So, even as the Court espous the traditional view that Article III itself imposes no limits on Congress’s power to regulate federal courts’ jurisdiction, the Court construes jurisdiction strips narrowly and, most relevant to this example, recognizes external constraints on Congress’s power.

In the handgun prosecution hypothetical, a Supreme Court that believed state courts had trampled on a criminal defendant’s Second Amendment rights could easily find a way to intervene. How could the Court get involved? A criminal defendant could ask the Court to evade a jurisdiction strip on several rationales.

Most obviously, the defendant could argue that Congress’s jurisdiction strip and the state’s subsequent actions all conspired to violate the defendant’s Second Amendment rights. This doesn’t present the same exact scenario as *Klein*—where Congress attempted to redefine the President’s pardon power contrary to Supreme Court precedent and then strip courts of jurisdiction—but it seems analogous. Congress effectively has invited states to redefine what the Constitution means (contrary to Supreme Court precedent on the Second Amendment) and then stripped federal courts of jurisdiction. And, as in *Klein*, the Court could step in to prevent Congress, working in tandem with a compliant state, from using jurisdiction stripping to undermine a constitutional right.

Alternatively, and perhaps more adventurously, defendants could argue that the various machinations by Congress, the state legislature, and the state judiciary, taken together, violate their due process rights. Under this conception, the jurisdiction strip would prevent them from having a

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173. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (discussing narrow construction of jurisdiction strips).

174. See supra notes 74–94 and accompanying text (discussing external constraints).


176. Moreover, a jurisdiction strip of this nature tests the outer boundaries of whether state and federal courts truly enjoy parity to interpret questions of federal law. Although the traditional view of Article III and the Supremacy Clause would allow the hypothetical jurisdiction strip—by giving state courts final interpretative authority over what the Second Amendment means—several scholars have raised powerful arguments against the assumption of parity on historical and normative grounds. See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 54, at 230 (arguing that state-court judges do not enjoy constitutional parity with federal judges); Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 53, 96–98 (2015) (arguing that federal judges are better positioned than state judges to interpret federal laws for various reasons, including experience, resources, and life tenure); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105–06 (1977) (arguing that state courts do not have constitutional parity with federal courts).
genuine opportunity to raise their constitutional defense. In two well-known instances, federal courts have been willing to entertain such due process arguments, though without actually settling whether such a challenge remains available in the face of an ironclad jurisdiction strip.\(^\text{177}\) Moreover, strong constitutional arguments suggest that courts should take particular care to ensure that criminal defendants have adequate opportunities to raise defenses.\(^\text{178}\)

Finally, the defendant could urge the Supreme Court to intervene under the theory that the jurisdiction strip deprived the Court of its inherent authority to supervise inferior courts, including state courts. Professor James Pfander has advanced this argument, contending that while “Congress has broad power to fashion exceptions to the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction,” it “may not place the work of inferior tribunals entirely beyond the Court’s supervisory authority.”\(^\text{179}\) This core logic seems to have animated much of the Court’s decision in \(\text{Felker v. Turpin}\), which upheld Congress’s withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and simultaneously asserted the Court’s power to continue to entertain original habeas petitions.\(^\text{180}\)

Thus, the Court could find support in its precedent for various ways to overcome the literal language of a jurisdiction strip. While we cannot claim that any of these arguments are slam dunks, they each represent a possibility that a determined Court could exploit. Even though the Court continues to recite the principle that Article III gives Congress plenary power over federal courts’ jurisdiction,\(^\text{181}\) the doctrine remains attuned to external constraints.\(^\text{182}\) This framework has particular force in the context of criminal prosecutions, but it would also be relevant if a state sought to enforce potentially unconstitutional laws civilly. And as noted above, it

\(^{177}\) Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), offers the clearest example. Despite language that purported to strip all courts of jurisdiction, the Second Circuit considered but ultimately rejected due process challenges. See id. at 257. Similarly, in \(\text{Yakus}\), the defendant argued that the bifurcation of administrative challenges to price controls and subsequent criminal prosecutions violated due process. While rejecting the argument, the Court nonetheless was willing to entertain the meta–due process argument about the jurisdiction strip itself. See \(\text{Yakus}\), 321 U.S. at 434–38, 444–46.

\(^{178}\) See Hart, supra note 50, at 1379–85 (observing that “no decision in 164 years of constitutional history” had ever sanctioned sending a man to jail “without his ever having had a chance to make his defenses”); see also Fallon, supra note 24, at 1126–27 (noting that “the special burdens and stigma of criminal punishment should require more extensive judicial process under the Due Process Clause, and possibly under Article III as well, than do impositions of civil liability”).

\(^{179}\) Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 144, at 1504.

\(^{180}\) See \(\text{Patchak v. Zinke}\), 138 S. Ct. 897, 906, 909 (2018) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming this idea and cabining language from \(\text{Klein}\) suggesting that Congress’s motive matters in the calculus); see also supra section I.C.

\(^{181}\) See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906, 909 (2018) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming this idea and cabining language from \(\text{Klein}\) suggesting that Congress’s motive matters in the calculus); see also supra section I.C.

might even provide a toehold for the Court to intervene in best-case-scenario cases like the school-prayer hypothetical.

Still, a skeptic of our overarching thesis about the inefficacy of jurisdiction stripping might contend that falling back on external constraints, at least as we’ve presented them, proves too much. Even among those who accept the notion of external constraints, disagreement persists about how far those restrictions reach. Unlike a more obviously unconstitutional hypothetical such as stripping jurisdiction only over claims brought by, say, Black plaintiffs, here the hypothetical jurisdiction strip does not distinguish between litigants. Nor does it prevent the defendant from raising a Second Amendment defense. It simply requires the defendant to litigate that matter in state court. Federal defenses are litigated in state court all the time, often out of necessity.183

And—the skeptic might press on—isn’t it true that the Supreme Court lacked any jurisdiction over a large swath of constitutional issues litigated in state courts for much of its history? Moreover, isn’t the gun-rights hypothetical far less problematic than the scheme the Supreme Court blessed in Yakus, in which the defendant was forbidden from challenging the validity of a regulation he was prosecuted for violating?184

On closer analysis, though, these arguments aren’t persuasive. While the Supreme Court indeed lacked jurisdiction over many state cases for much of the history of the republic, the Judiciary Act of 1789 only denied the Court jurisdiction over state cases upholding claims of constitutional right.185 There isn’t a historical tradition of stripping the Court’s jurisdiction over a wide swath of state court cases rejecting a constitutional defense.186

As for Yakus, Congress hadn’t entirely deprived someone of the right to present a constitutional argument to the Supreme Court. It had simply

183. Criminal prosecutions based on state law almost always happen in state courts, which the Constitution trusts to entertain federal-law defenses. Cf. Harrison, The Power of Congress, supra note 54, at 233 (noting the presumption that courts of one sovereign will not enforce another sovereign’s penal laws but contending that Article III permits exceptions to this maxim). Moreover, under the well-pleaded complaint rule in the civil context, a federal defense does not confer federal statutory arising-under jurisdiction. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (articulating the well-pleaded complaint rule for the statute currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018)).


186. For an interesting argument that, contrary to received wisdom, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give the Court jurisdiction over state criminal appeals denying claims of federal right, see Kevin C. Walsh, In the Beginning There Was None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Prosecutions, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1867 (2015). The Court, though, certainly believed it had such jurisdiction. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415 (1821) (“The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the constitution or laws of the United States, is, we believe, essential ....”).
prescribed a procedural means for the defendant to do so.\textsuperscript{187} The Emergency Price Control Act bifurcated the constitutional defense and the actual criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{188} It forced (potential) defendants to litigate the constitutional question in front of an administrative agency (on pain of forfeiture) before they knew whether they were in actual jeopardy of prosecution. That arrangement may seem unfair, but the person subject to the regulation had an opportunity to seek review of the administrative agency’s determination in the Emergency Court of Appeals (an Article III court) and, ultimately, in the Supreme Court itself. The statute channeled the Court’s jurisdiction over a set of constitutional issues but did not remove it entirely.

The most important point, though, isn’t a doctrinal argument. We don’t claim that the broad external-constraints theory sketched above is the best or right answer to the formal legal question at stake. We thus can’t argue that in the case of such a jurisdiction-stripping measure, the Court certainly would intervene using an external-constraints theory—let alone that the Court would ultimately vindicate the defendant’s asserted Second Amendment rights. But, in keeping with the Essay’s goals here, our external-constraints argument is a practical one. Namely, there are plausible arguments that would let the Court overcome a jurisdiction strip if it were inclined to do so. And if Congress thought jurisdiction stripping necessary to rein in a rogue Supreme Court, there would be plenty of reason to worry that the Court would choose the plausible interpretation of the Constitution that would preserve its own power.

* * *

This has been a long walk through some intricate scenarios, so we will summarize our principal conclusions thus far: The best-case scenario for a successful jurisdiction strip involves a situation in which Congress deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to state activity that does not involve enforcement actions against any individual—such as school prayer—and in which the state courts could be expected to ignore Supreme Court precedent. Even there, the Supreme Court over the centuries has left open multiple ways to intervene, despite seemingly iron-clad jurisdiction-stripping language. The gambit seems even less likely to work when the challenged action involves enforcement actions—and, in particular, criminal prosecutions for conduct that the Supreme Court has found constitutionally protected. Jurisdiction stripping, then, seems to provide no surefire way to protect state laws from disfavored Supreme Court precedent.

2. Protecting Precedent. — Enthusiasm for jurisdiction stripping has also swelled at various points when the Supreme Court seemed poised to


overrule popular precedents. This idea has had allure over the years, but it’s gained renewed attention since Democrats retook both Congress and the White House around the same time that conservatives solidified a 6-3 majority on the Supreme Court. Progressives recently proposed jurisdiction stripping as a way to prevent the overruling of abortion precedents after Republicans locked in a conservative supermajority. Democrats missed that opportunity once Dobbs was decided. But reacting to credible suggestions that all substantive due process rights might come under threat, Congress moved to codify same-sex marriage rights.

Could Congress go further and preemptively try to thwart the overruling of key substantive due process rights by depriving the Court of jurisdiction?

The idea sounds superficially attractive. Jurisdiction stripping would seemingly freeze favorable precedent in place before the Supreme Court can wreak havoc on it. As we explain, though, jurisdiction stripping in this context would prove ineffective at best and, at worst, could have exactly the opposite effect that its proponents want and thus exacerbate the perceived problem.

To see why, begin with the logistics. Precedent-protecting jurisdiction stripping involves a temporal variation on the precedent-circumventing scenarios considered immediately above. Rather than trying to circumvent a bad decision, Congress would be trying to prevent an adverse decision
This variation matters for several reasons and demonstrates why jurisdiction stripping would backfire predictably and quickly.

Proposals of this nature would take primary aim at the Supreme Court—locking in a decision that Congress doesn’t want the Court to revisit and forcing state courts (and potentially lower federal courts) to continue applying that precedent. But these proposals make a critical assumption about how lower courts will handle the precedent. In the context of the precedent-circumventing proposals discussed earlier, proponents assume that at least some courts will accept Congress’s invitation to ignore Supreme Court precedent on, for example, school prayer or Second Amendment rights. That assumption seems defensible as a pragmatic matter, whatever the answer to the normative question about Supreme Court precedent’s formal status. Here, though, Congress would be assuming that a precedent like Obergefell v. Hodges, which guarantees same-sex marriage rights, would remain formally binding and that state courts—including those that disagree with its correctness—will continue to apply it faithfully, even without the prospect of reversal.

The idea of proactively protecting certain precedents almost always trains on state laws. Most of the contemporary discussion considers the abortion rights cases specifically, but the idea encompasses other scenarios when Congress tries to prevent states from passing laws that do not pass muster under Supreme Court precedent. So, although Congress might still leave lower federal courts with jurisdiction—for example, to entertain pre-enforcement challenges—the focus really trains on how state courts would apply Supreme Court precedents in evaluating state laws.

Look beyond the superficial allure and consider how a proposal of this nature would play out. In May 2022, the country was stunned when a draft Supreme Court opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization was leaked to Politico. The leak revealed that the Court was on the precipice of overruling Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.

196. See, e.g., Order of March 4, 2016, Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Pol’y Inst., 200 So. 3d 495, 562–63 (Ala. 2016) (Moore, C.J., statement of non-recusal); id. at 600 (Bolin, J., concurring specially) (“I do not agree with the majority opinion in Obergefell; however, I do concede that its holding is binding authority on this Court.”); Costanza v. Caldwell, 167 So. 3d 619, 622 (La. 2015) (Knoll, J., concurring) (“I concur because I am constrained to follow the rule of law set forth by a majority of the nine lawyers appointed to the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell . . . .”).
197. Such challenges are typically brought under the familiar paradigms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).
What if Congress had rushed to try to protect a constitutional right to abortion by preventing the Supreme Court from hearing any cases presenting questions about whether the Constitution protects a right to reproductive freedom? That move would have looked a lot like what Congress did in *McCardle*, in which Congress deprived the Court of jurisdiction during the pendency of a case. What would happen at the state level politically and judicially?

Begin with a state like Vermont, which already guarantees reproductive rights far beyond what the Supreme Court articulated as a constitutional minimum under the *Roe–Casey* regime. There, nothing hinges on how and whether the Supreme Court protects abortion rights. So, jurisdiction stripping—from the perspective of someone who wants to protect reproductive rights—hasn’t improved the situation in Vermont.

Now consider Texas, which prior to *Dobbs* prohibited nearly all abortions after the six-week mark of a pregnancy using a devious civil enforcement regime designed to avoid judicial review. As the proponents of the Texas law recognized, this restriction was unconstitutional under Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time. Would an attempt to freeze the law through jurisdiction stripping have helped protect abortion rights? Perhaps *Roe* and *Casey* would have formally remained binding precedents in Texas and the Supreme Court would have been denied the chance to revisit them in *Dobbs*. As noted earlier, those arguments are debatable as a matter of formalism. So, Texas judges might genuinely believe that *Roe* and *Casey* would lose their binding force. But even if the precedents remained binding as a matter of first principles, nothing would stop Texas state courts from distinguishing or narrowing them. Or the

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203. Vermont, for example, does not impose limits on elective abortions, even limits that the Supreme Court over the years has deemed consistent with *Casey*’s “undue burden” test. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 9497 (2023) (codifying that a public entity shall not restrict access to abortion).
205. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, Behind the Texas Abortion Law, a Persevering Conservative Lawyer, *N. Y. Times* (Sept. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/us/politics/texas-abortion-lawyer-jonathan-mitchell.html (on file with the *Columbia Law Review*) (last updated Nov. 1, 2021) (describing Texas’s efforts to push back on Supreme Court abortion precedents and evade judicial review); see also *Whole Woman’s Health*, 142 S. Ct. at 543 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Texas has passed a law banning abortions after roughly six weeks of pregnancy. That law is contrary to this Court’s decisions in [*Roe*] and [*Casey*].” (citations omitted)).
206. See supra notes 149–156 (contrasting different formal approaches to whether precedent would remain binding if the Supreme Court had no authority to police compliance with that precedent).
state courts, knowing that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reverse, could simply ignore the Court's precedent entirely. In other words, state courts could—and, we suggest, likely would—rely on their practical power to interpret the Constitution free from Supreme Court interference. From the perspective of someone trying to protect reproductive freedom, the jurisdiction strip would have provided no benefits.

What if the Supreme Court found its way through this hypothetical, precedent-protecting jurisdiction strip and weighed in on the constitutionality of a state abortion law? Here, too, the jurisdiction strip proves useless. Imagine that, before Dobbs, a state legislature had gone even further than Texas and criminalized all abortions. Suppose further that state courts reject any constitutional defenses based on Roe and Casey.

As in the hypothetical gun prosecution, the Supreme Court might intercede using an external-constraints theory. Perhaps the Court would then adhere to its precedents. The proponents of the jurisdiction strip would have gotten the result they wanted—but jurisdiction stripping would have had nothing to do with it. Alternatively, the Court might overcome the jurisdiction strip and do what the proponents feared all along (and what ended up happening in Dobbs)—overrule Roe and Casey. In this scenario, the jurisdiction strip would again have accomplished nothing.

A final possibility shows how jurisdiction stripping might even make things worse. Imagine that some states enact laws going beyond what even the Dobbs majority might countenance—say, prohibiting someone from traveling out of state to seek an abortion. A jurisdiction strip would mean that the Court couldn’t police even the most extreme and unconstitutional restrictions. So, from the perspective of abortion-rights supporters, the jurisdiction strip would lead to a worse result.

Thus, when used as a preemptive weapon to protect precedent, jurisdiction stripping either provides no benefits or proves counterproductive. And compared to some of the more complex scenarios discussed in the context of retroactive jurisdiction stripping, such as the school prayer

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207. See supra notes 170–188 (imagining that Congress strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases involving constitutional challenges to firearms prohibitions and then a state criminalizes handgun possession).

208. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2309 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (suggesting that if a state tried to “bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion,” such a prohibition would be clearly unconstitutional); Caroline Kitchener & Devlin Barrett, Antiabortion Lawmakers Want to Block Patients From Crossing State Lines, Wash. Post (June 29, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/29/abortion-state-lines/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated June 30, 2022).
hypothetical, the effort to withdraw jurisdiction proactively is even less likely to succeed. It can’t improve the situation; it can only make it worse.

3. Uncharted Territory. — Finally, with respect to jurisdiction stripping aimed at protecting state laws, we flag two other possibilities that have existed only in the realm of academic discussion. One seems even more counterproductive than the proactive jurisdiction strips that we have just discussed, to say nothing of its likely unconstitutionality. The second is more intriguing but rife with constitutional concerns.

First, nearly everyone who has written about jurisdiction stripping assumes—correctly, in our view—that Congress could not foreclose all judicial review of state laws. Suppose that it tried to do so, though. If Congress stripped all state and federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases concerning abortion or gun rights, then it effectively would authorize state legislative supremacy. All the unsettled questions about the nature of precedent and what constitutes binding law would descend into uncertainty and chaos as states could disregard any possibility of federal constitutional litigation and legislate with complete abandon. Those consequences seem sufficiently chaotic and unpredictable that it would be hard for Congress to feel confident that the jurisdiction strip would produce its desired results.

Second, Congress might engage in adventurous attempts to create some sort of federal court review but not in what Congress perceives to be a hostile Supreme Court. Perhaps Congress might try to vest final decisionmaking authority in an existing lower federal court. But imagine an even more blatant effort, such as creating a lower court whose sole purpose is protecting abortion rights. In passing, Professor Akhil Reed Amar hypothesized an “Abortion Court.”

209. See supra notes 148–169 (imagining that Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Establishment Clause challenges to public-school prayer after the Supreme Court already held that such prayer violated the Establishment Clause).

210. Sometimes scholars do not differentiate between proactive jurisdiction stripping with respect to constitutional review of state law versus federal law. See, e.g., Doerrler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1725–27 (discussing jurisdiction stripping without addressing state laws); Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three String Serenade, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 593, 598 (2006) (discussing jurisdiction stripping with respect to all constitutional claims regardless of whether they involve state or federal law). This imprecision obscures important differences. Our argument here pertains only to review of state laws. As the following section explains, the analysis becomes more nuanced when only federal law is at issue.

211. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 24, at 1093 (“[T]here should be no doubt that Congress has very broad power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, as long as the Supreme Court retains appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims initially litigated in state court.”). A complete jurisdiction strip with respect to a federal statute presents a different question altogether, as mentioned with respect to the Portal-to-Portal Act, see supra notes 74–79, and as further discussed in the following section. See infra section II.B.1.

212. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 54, at 258 (arguing that the power to structure which federal court reviews federal questions “comprehends the power to create
How would that work? The statute considered in *Yakus* as well as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) exemplify one possible model. Under these statutory frameworks, Congress creates a new lower court (whose purpose is clear) populated by existing Article III judges.\(^{213}\) The advantage here is not requiring new appointments and confirmations. It prevents expanding the Article III judiciary and, critically, allows Congress to shut the court down without controversially eliminating any judgeships, because the court’s members could just go back to their day jobs.

Those statutes gave the Chief Justice the power to appoint the judges.\(^{214}\) That option would work only if the Chief Justice, but not the Court as a whole, were ideologically friendly to Congress and willing to use his appointment power to skew expected case outcomes by staffing the court with at least a majority of judges favorable to abortion rights.\(^{215}\) Congress would have no guarantee that even an ideologically friendly Chief Justice would behave in this way. Moreover, depending on contingent events, the Chief Justice might eventually be replaced by a new Chief hostile to the rights Congress sought to protect.

Another approach would involve creating a new court with entirely new judges selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Assuming the political branches were on the same page, the President and Senate could choose judges who they expect to rule favorably on abortion rights. But political majorities are fleeting. Depending on future elections, the new court eventually could become populated with judges nominated and confirmed by the opposition. In other words, the new court quickly

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an unreviewable Article III Tax Court—or an Abortion Court” but conceding that such “power to choose which Article III judge shall have the last word can be abused by Congress”); see also Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 8, at 61 (“[O]ne could even create a new federal court specifically for resolution of a certain category of issues . . . . and deny appellate jurisdiction over such cases to the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus Congress could create a new, federal ‘Abortion Cases Court’ . . . .”).


214. In the case of the Emergency Court of Appeals under the Emergency Price Control Act, this meant that the court was “staffed with New Deal judges who practically never set a regulation aside.” Conde & Greve, supra note 213, at 830. This seems unsurprising, given that Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was widely regarded as a sympathetic New Dealer. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR’s Court Plan, 61 Yale L.J. 791, 793 (1952) (“In [Justice Stone’s] opinions, as nowhere else, New Dealers, including the President himself, found authoritative support for their charges.”).

could become weaponized—in the same way that today’s progressive critics argue the Supreme Court has been.

These machinations to create a new court might succeed in the short term. An Abortion Court, whether existing as a freestanding court or a temporary court staffed with Article III judges, could restore protections under *Roe* and *Casey* or even protect reproductive rights more rigorously than the Supreme Court ever did. The constitutionality of giving a lower federal court final authority remains unresolved, but leave such legal questions aside. Even if the new court passed constitutional muster, its efficacy would be tethered to fleeting contingencies—who occupies the Chief Justice’s seat and who controls the White House and Congress. If anything, the most creative approach to reallocating federal jurisdiction is consistent with our central thesis developed below—that, at best, a jurisdiction strip can buy time.

**B. Federal Laws**

Thus far this Essay has considered the ultimate futility of jurisdiction stripping with respect to federal constitutional questions that arise through adjudication of state law. We shift focus now to consider how jurisdiction stripping can play out in adjudicating federal statutes—questions of pure statutory interpretation as well as cases concerning the constitutionality of federal statutes. This section considers three basic scenarios and the ways that Congress can operate within each: first, jurisdiction stripping with respect to purely statutory questions; second, jurisdiction stripping of lower federal courts when they (rather than the Supreme Court) are the perceived problem that Congress seeks to solve; and, finally, jurisdiction stripping that tries to protect unique federal policies or regimes against constitutional challenges.

We bring together various examples and argue that they reveal remarkably consistent lessons. Congress can sometimes exercise its power over federal courts’ jurisdiction to achieve substantive goals but not by paralyzing courts and directly compelling specific policy results. Rather, the common thread running through these examples is that Congress can at best delay, but not forever preclude, federal courts’ involvement in a particular issue or set of questions. And even then, jurisdiction stripping doesn’t always succeed as an indirect policy tool. Thus, congressional attempts to use jurisdiction stripping to protect federal statutes reveal some nuanced and qualified success stories. They also show the limits—and, sometimes, failures—of jurisdiction stripping as a strategy.

1. *Pure Statutory Interpretation.* — We begin with jurisdiction stripping as to statutory questions. Congress probably can evade all judicial review of federal-law questions that don’t raise a constitutional issue—that is, pure statutory questions. Imagine that Congress, seeking to protect efforts

216. See supra notes 212–215.
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate carbon emissions, denies the Supreme Court jurisdiction over administrative challenges to EPA regulations concerning greenhouse gases. That move would have prevented West Virginia v. EPA, in which the Court invalidated the EPA’s Clean Power Plan rule. At first glance, that jurisdiction strip appears successful. But on closer analysis, jurisdiction stripping of this ilk doesn’t achieve much, if anything, that Congress could not accomplish directly through substantive legislation.

Start with the logistics. Although Congress legislates against a background assumption that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions, it can choose to vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction on federal statutory questions. So, when enacting a federal statute, Congress may deprive state courts of jurisdiction. And then the familiar architecture of Article III comes into play. Congress has plenary authority to strip lower federal courts of jurisdiction and, under the Exceptions Clause, to prevent the Supreme Court from hearing the matter.

On rare occasions, Congress has taken full advantage of these jurisdictional levers. Most famously, the Portal-to-Portal Act, which the Second Circuit examined extensively in Battaglia, changed the underlying labor laws, effectively overruling the Supreme Court’s more worker-friendly interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Furthermore, Congress stripped all courts of jurisdiction to hear any claims based on the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions. These provisions, taken together, meant that workers who had sued for unpaid wages and overtime (relying on Supreme Court precedent) but who had not secured a final judgment by the time Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act were out of luck.

220. Note the contrast with respect to state-law questions, over which Congress may not deprive state courts of jurisdiction.
221. See supra section I.C.
223. See id. at 259–62 (discussing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), which determined that previously uncompensated activities were entitled to compensation and overtime under the FLSA).
224. See id.
Congress’s zeal to protect the titans of industry at workers’ expense was striking in its comprehensiveness, but the jurisdiction strip didn’t add anything. Congress always has authority to change the underlying substantive law. Moreover, even though such changes normally apply prospectively only, Congress may apply them to past conduct without violating due process. In the case of the Portal-to-Portal Act, the end result for the workers may seem unfair, but Congress had sufficient legislative power to impose those new substantive standards and even to make them retroactive.

Professor Richard Fallon has succinctly summarized what he terms the “Battaglia principle”: “[W]hen Congress can validly extinguish a substantive right, it can also strip courts of jurisdiction to enforce the right that it has abolished.” Note what this meant as a practical matter in Battaglia itself. Once Congress had changed the substantive law to abolish certain rights that the Supreme Court had read into the FLSA, the jurisdiction strip—that is, Congress’s withdrawal of jurisdiction from all state and federal courts to enforce the extinguished rights—added nothing.

The same basic scenario played out in Patchak v. Zinke. At the behest of a Native American tribe in Michigan, Congress changed the underlying

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225. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 230–32 (2016) (holding that Congress does not impinge on the judicial power when it creates a “new legal standard” that courts must apply); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1856) (finding that a change in the underlying substantive law, when applied prospectively, did not impermissibly annul a final judgment); see also The Federalist No. 81, at 594–95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Floating Press 2011) (“A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.”).

226. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994), the modern case most on point. It noted that “[a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment . . . or upsets expectations based in prior law.” Id. at 269 (citing Republic Nat’l. Bank of Mria. v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Moreover, Landgraf observed that Congress may overcome the presumption against retroactivity through a clear statement of its intent. See id. at 270 (“Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made clear its intent.”).

227. Fallon, supra note 24, at 1104.

228. See Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 259. In Battaglia, the Second Circuit did probe whether the jurisdiction strip had the effect of violating workers’ due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. So, the court did end up evaluating the constitutionality of the underlying substantive change in the law. The Battaglia principle undermines the widely shared intuition that a comprehensive jurisdiction strip of all federal and state courts “would undoubtedly have a major effect in allowing Congress and state legislatures to insulate their preferences and judgments of constitutional validity from judicial review.” See Final Report, supra note 8, at 161.

229. See 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion). Technically this applied only to federal courts. But because it relied on the federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the suit never could have proceeded in state court.
substantive law (albeit only as it applied to that tribe), allowing the Secretary of the Interior to take certain tribal land into trust.\textsuperscript{230} That move, in turn, allowed the tribe to build a casino on the property.\textsuperscript{231} In addition to changing the substantive law, Congress—according to the plurality—stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any claims related to the land in question.\textsuperscript{232} As with the Portal-to-Portal Act, though, the substantive part of the legislation already accomplished Congress’s goal. As Justice Stephen Breyer aptly summarized, the jurisdiction strip just “gilds the lily.”\textsuperscript{233}

So too with our example from the beginning of this discussion. Congress could strip the Court of jurisdiction over EPA cases involving carbon emissions. But Congress just as easily could change the substantive law to make clear that EPA has authority to regulate carbon.\textsuperscript{234} Jurisdiction stripping is just a more complex way to accomplish indirectly what Congress could do directly. If anything, jurisdiction stripping would be less effective. If judicial review of EPA decisions about carbon emissions were eliminated, a new administration could simply repeal any prior regulations limiting emissions. And even if the new administration’s repeal were arbitrary and capricious or otherwise violated administrative-law principles, opponents of the repeal could not challenge the administration’s decision in court.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{Patchak}, 138 S. Ct. at 903 & n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{232} The language of the supposed jurisdiction strip is frustratingly imprecise. It provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described [herein] shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913, 1913–14 (2014). The plurality found that it stripped federal courts of jurisdiction. \textit{Patchak}, 138 S. Ct. at 904–06. The dissent disagreed. See id. at 918–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor would have avoided the hard jurisdictional question by finding that Congress had reasserted the federal government’s sovereign immunity. See id. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
\item \textsuperscript{233} \textit{Patchak}, 138 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. (noting that “the jurisdictional part . . . does no more than provide an alternative legal standard for courts to apply that seeks the same real-world result as does the [substantive] part”).
\item \textsuperscript{234} In fact, Congress recently has attempted to do something along these lines with respect to the Mountain Valley Pipeline project. See generally MVP’s 2023 Construction Progress, Mountain Valley Pipeline, https://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info [https://perma.cc/QU8V-9LT3] (last updated Aug. 31, 2023). Congress stripped all courts of jurisdiction to consider whether various departments and agencies had properly issued the necessary authorizations and permits. See Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5, § 324(c)(1), 137 Stat. 10, 47–48. This seems strikingly similar to the statute at issue in \textit{Patchak}. Congress appears well within its substantive powers to change the underlying environmental laws, even as applied just to the Mountain Valley Pipeline. And it seems to have done that in essence. See id. § 324(c). Using jurisdiction stripping to lock in the approved permits looks like another exercise in lily-gilding. We consider one other wrinkle within the jurisdiction strip in the discussion of sequencing. See infra section III.A.
\end{itemize}
Shortly we will discuss what happens if Congress does not have substantive legislative power to enact a substantive provision—the flip side of the “Battaglia principle.” On a matter of pure statutory interpretation, though, a jurisdiction strip might, at most, clarify Congress’s substantive intent. But a jurisdiction strip on its own accomplishes hardly anything.

2. Constitutional Issues. — What about when Congress seeks to use jurisdiction stripping to limit review in cases that involve constitutional, and not merely statutory, questions? Here, the analysis depends on Congress’s goals: Is it merely trying to stop hostile lower courts from too eagerly issuing aggressive remedies, or is it concerned with protecting a federal law or program from the Supreme Court (or the Article III judiciary more generally)?

   a. Inferior Federal Courts and Aggressive Remedies. — Start with situations in which Congress is pushing back on the overly aggressive use of federal remedies, particularly injunctions. This scenario illustrates the subtle way that Congress can use jurisdiction stripping in a targeted and surgical fashion to promote its goals. Congress can withdraw from lower courts the power to issue injunctions or other forms of relief. Though not a complete strip of jurisdiction over a category of cases, such a restriction of judicial power nonetheless is fairly characterized as a jurisdiction strip.235

In these scenarios, the Supreme Court itself doesn’t present an actual or potential problem, so Congress isn’t trying to stymie Supreme Court review and, in fact, usually leaves open the possibility that cases eventually could end up there. A couple of examples from the 1930s show how this works. In both examples, Congress faced constitutional constraints that prevented it from simply changing the underlying rights but nonetheless found a way to manipulate jurisdiction to stop meddling by the lower courts.

First, consider the Norris–LaGuardia Act. At the turn of the twentieth century, a nascent labor movement had trouble gaining traction, in large part because federal courts issued sweeping labor injunctions that applied to enormous swaths of people.236 Moreover, the injunctions did not simply prevent picketing or strikes but often covered every aspect of a union’s activities.237 These sweeping injunctions defied core tenets of equity: They applied far beyond the specific harm that employers alleged, covered

235. The Supreme Court itself analyzed the Norris–LaGuardia Act as a withdrawal of jurisdiction. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 305 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”); see also Fallon et al., supra note 185, at 312–14 (discussing the implications of Lauf on Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction).


numerous people who were not parties to the lawsuits, and were based on cookie-cutter complaints rather than specific allegations of harm. Temporary restraining orders, which federal courts had begun to issue as a matter of course rather than as an exceptional remedy, had especially devastating effects by snuffing out strikes. At that point, the harm to workers was done. Getting to trial, to say nothing of seeking appellate review, was beside the point. Lower federal courts, in Congress’s estimation, had thus become the central problem.

But constitutional obstacles stood in the way of simply changing the law. In *Truax v. Corrigan*, the Court had held that changing state law to authorize union picketing, permit union promotion of a boycott, and deny a business owner the right to obtain injunctive relief against such conduct was unconstitutional. Congress’s solution was the Norris–LaGuardia Act (NLGA) in 1932. Among other things, it created new substantive law, such as outlawing “yellow dog” contracts that prohibited workers from joining a union. But it also stripped all lower federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions except in narrowly defined circumstances. Congress chose to “phrase the [NLGA] in jurisdictional terms to avoid an apparent conflict” with *Truax*.

The NLGA’s jurisdiction strip worked as its proponents hoped it would. In large measure it prevented federal courts from granting labor

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238. See Norris, supra note 237, at 485.
239. See Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 52 (1963) (contending that “the extraordinary remedy of injunction has become the ordinary legal remedy, almost the sole remedy”); see also id. at 62–65 (describing the complaints in these cases as being “perfunctorily dictated” and written in a manner that was “unsupported, one-sided [and] in general terms”).
240. Kerian, supra note 236, at 50–51.
241. See id. (“The aim of employers basically was . . . to secure a temporary restraining order. A temporary order was the most [important] of all injunctive writs because strikes are usually won or lost within a few days and they were issued as a matter of course.”).
242. See id. at 52 (“Appeals were rarely brought on injunction. Once the injunction was granted, the strikers’ fervor [sic] was abated and the strike was lost.”).
243. 257 U.S. 312, 330 (1921). Specifically, the Court held that changing the substantive law to completely deny any remedies for the challenged conduct would violate due process, while simply denying injunctive relief when it was otherwise available would violate equal protection. Id. at 330, 334–35.
245. Id. § 3.
246. Id. § 7 (prohibiting a “court of the United States” from issuing such injunctions except under narrow circumstances); see also id. § 13(d) (defining “court of the United States” to mean inferior federal courts but not the Supreme Court).
injunctions, which had had a devastating effect on union organizing. Time proved critical. It created an opportunity for workers and unions to build a movement. Effective social organizing, including widespread labor protests in the summer of 1934, ultimately spurred Congress to pass the transformative National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Though the NLGA left open the possibility that the Supreme Court could hear a case, the breathing room it created was most essential. By 1938, when the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the jurisdiction strip, “Truax was already in peril,” meaning that the NLGA “merely had[d] the effect of accomplishing through jurisdiction what Congress could do through substantive rulemaking.”

In a similar vein, Congress passed the Tax Injunction Act of 1937 in response to overly hasty district court injunctions. Here again, large corporations had turned to federal courts, which they perceived as sympathetic to their interests, and often had persuaded those courts to enjoin certain taxes as unconstitutional. Congress feared that these injunctions had created financial instability for states and localities. Congress’s jurisdictional and remedial response proved effective not by changing the substantive law or circumventing ultimate Supreme Court review but by buying time.

Consider several interlocking features of the Tax Injunction Act’s jurisdiction strip. As with the labor injunctions that spurred Congress to pass the Norris–LaGuardia Act, federal courts had tipped the scales in

249. See Goldfield, supra note 248, at 1273 (“The most reasonable hypothesis to account for the passage of the NLRA is that labor militancy, catapulted into national prominence by the 1934 strikes and the political response to this movement, paved the way for the passage of the act.”).


251. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 529.


253. See, e.g., Fulton Mkt. Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1074–75 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing S. Rep. No. 75-1035, at 1–2 (1937)) (observing that Congress, according to the Senate Report, feared that corporations could invoke diversity jurisdiction and persuade a federal court to enjoin the tax, whereas state residents had no such recourse).

254. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 109 (1981) (observing that before Congress passed the Act, many federal courts had found that “available state remedies did not adequately protect the federal rights”); Note, Federal Court Interference With the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 782–83 (1946) (noting that “prior to 1937, jurisdiction for injunctive relief was freely assumed by federal courts, readily amenable to persuasion that the state remedy was inadequate” and collecting cases).

favor of big businesses by ignoring well-settled principles of equity, which permit relief such as injunctions only when remedies at law are inadequate.\footnote{256}{See Lowinger, supra note 255, at 744 (“What may have prompted Congress to act, despite the limitations on federal equity jurisdiction already recognized by courts, was the narrow construction given by the federal courts to ‘adequate’ remedies at law and their resulting failure to cut back sufficiently on tax-injunction suits.”).} That is, federal courts were jumping the gun, especially when challengers hadn’t demonstrated the inadequacy of legal remedies in state court. As a result, these injunctions had undermined state and local governments’ financial stability.\footnote{257}{See id. at 742 (“Both the Senate and House reports on the bill that became the Tax Injunction Act emphasized that suits brought in federal courts by foreign corporations for injunctive relief from state or local taxes disrupted the continuous flow of governmental revenues.”).} By taking away district courts’ power to enjoin the payment of taxes, the Tax Injunction Act effectively compelled entities to pay a tax and only then challenge it as unconstitutional (in a refund suit or a damages action under § 1983).\footnote{258}{The Tax Injunction Act provided, “[N]o district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any State where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the courts of such State.” Tax Injunction Act of 1937, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738.} So, Congress sought to foster financial stability for states and localities by buying time—taking away federal courts’ injunctive power, except in rare cases.

Both of these examples show how Congress used its jurisdiction-stripping power to prevent lower federal courts from undermining important federal policies through overly aggressive injunctions. In the labor context, prohibiting those injunctions essentially stymied employers’ capacity to thwart labor organizing.\footnote{259}{In theory, it could have shifted litigation to state courts. See S. Rep. No. 72-163, at 17 (1932) (criticizing federal courts for “prohibit[ing] laboring men from litigating in State courts, under the law of the State, to sustain what they claim to be their rights”). And, again in theory, Supreme Court review remained available.} The precise mechanics of the Tax Injunction Act are different. Congress remained attuned to ensuring that taxpayers could challenge the constitutionality of taxes, but it tweaked the sequencing, largely ensuring a pay-before-you-litigate policy to protect state and local financial stability.\footnote{260}{See, e.g., Lowinger, supra note 255, at 743, 761 (noting pay-before-you-litigate sequencing of challenges).} Moreover, it left the Supreme Court with the final word on the taxes’ constitutionality.

b. Protecting Federal Laws and Programs. — Finally, Congress might use jurisdiction stripping to try to protect federal laws or regimes against constitutional challenges. Here, Congress sees the danger as coming from the Supreme Court, or the Article III judiciary as a whole, and not merely the lower federal courts. This particular form of jurisdiction stripping has captured the imagination of some scholars in recent years, who urge that
it offers a uniquely effective way for progressives to pursue their priorities and circumvent a hostile Supreme Court.261

The jurisprudential building blocks, which we mentioned earlier,262 turn on the idea that Congress may deprive state courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate federal statutes; that Congress has plenary authority to deprive inferior federal courts of jurisdiction; and that, through its plenary power under the Exceptions Clause, Congress may deprive the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction, too.263 This sort of complete jurisdiction strip would constitute the most extreme exercise of Congress’s power. Congress also has other options, including channeling cases into an administrative agency,264 an existing lower court,265 or a specially created lower court.266

In other words, Congress can mix and match these options, creating a bespoke system (or none at all) for constitutional review of federal statutes.

We contend that whichever option Congress chooses, it is unlikely to succeed in forever insulating a federal law or program from constitutional scrutiny. We have two overarching points. First, we look to historical examples of jurisdiction stripping and find that even where Congress apparently succeeded in its goals by using jurisdiction stripping, it did not preclude Article III review entirely. Second, we argue that whatever the limits of Congress’s constitutional authority, a jurisdiction strip is not a viable long-term strategy because most federal laws and programs ultimately need courts to cooperate for those laws to have any force.

Lessons from history. At first blush, history justifies enthusiasm for jurisdiction stripping. Congress used it to protect Military Reconstruction of the South after the Civil War and a massive federal takeover of the American economy during World War II. We agree that these experiments with jurisdiction stripping count as successes, but only in a limited and qualified way. Other scholars, we contend, have drawn the wrong lessons from these episodes, which don’t reveal an unbridled authority to evade judicial scrutiny.

Consider three examples—two successful attempts at jurisdiction stripping and one failure. Together they suggest the subtle and indirect ways that jurisdiction stripping can work and begin to illustrate why the

261. See supra section I.D.
262. See supra section I.C.
263. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66 (1979) (noting that “it is extremely doubtful that [Congress’s broad powers to control federal jurisdiction] include the power to limit in this manner the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution”); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 98 (1869) (noting Article III’s conferral of original and appellate jurisdictions on the Supreme Court and Congress’s power to create exceptions only as to the appellate jurisdiction); see also James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 558 n.12 (1994).
264. See infra notes 336–338 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 273–276 and accompanying text.
robust version—forever wresting interpretive control from the courts—won’t.

The first, and probably most famous, success story comes from *McCardle*. In laying out the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the view that Congress has plenary power to control both lower courts’ and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, we recounted the twists and turns of *McCardle*.267 For all of the complications—including the case’s multiple trips to the Supreme Court and the irony that someone like McCardle would invoke the new 1867 habeas statute to attack the Reconstruction project—the jurisdiction strip was straightforward. Congress made clear that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals pursuant to the new 1867 statute was repealed.268

The Supreme Court famously acquiesced to that jurisdiction strip, which some members of Congress had openly described as an attempt to prevent the Court from opining on the constitutionality of Reconstruction.269 Thus, Congress staved off McCardle’s constitutional challenge. The ambitious Reconstruction project continued.

*McCardle* ranks among the most consequential Supreme Court decisions of all time. The Court broadly endorsed Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power under Article III, and it showed tremendous deference to the political branches during a precarious period when the future of the United States hung in the balance. From the perspective of whether Congress succeeded in achieving its policy goals through the jurisdiction strip, most people would agree that it did.

We do, too—but not for the reasons most assume. Congress’s jurisdiction strip did not build an impenetrable jurisdictional fortress around the Reconstruction efforts. Instead, the Court in *McCardle* cryptically suggested that someone in McCardle’s shoes could bring a habeas action pursuant to the original Judiciary Act of 1789 rather than the repealed 1867 statute.270 The Court, in other words, took pains to emphasize that Congress had not closed off all avenues of review. It confirmed as much in late 1869 when it heard the case of Edward Yerger,
another unreconstructed newspaper publisher from Vicksburg, Mississippi.\footnote{See \textit{Ex partee Yerger}, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103–06 (1869) (reviewing \textit{McCordle} and stating that the Judiciary Act of 1867 did not repeal the Act of 1789, which provided for habeas corpus review of Yerger’s case).}

The jurisdiction strip in \textit{McCordle} thus did not take the Court out of the picture entirely. Instead, it succeeded as a way for Congress to buy time—about a year and a half—before the Supreme Court decided \textit{Ex partee Yerger}. In Part III, we return to what \textit{McCordle} made possible during the Reconstruction period. For now, though, the point is that for all that \textit{McCordle} rightly stands for today, it’s easy to overread the case as sustaining Congress’s limitless power under the Exceptions Clause. No one can say with certainty what the Supreme Court would have done if Congress had truly closed off all avenues of review. But as Professors Richard Fallon and Henry Monaghan underscore, even in the most famous endorsement of the view that Congress has broad authority under the Exceptions Clause, the Court knew that constitutional review was still possible.\footnote{See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1081 (arguing against the “intractable insistence that a single sentence in \textit{McCordle} definitively resolves a question that that case did not present—namely, whether Congress could strip all jurisdiction to entertain constitutional challenges”); Monaghan, supra note 24, at 18 (arguing that cases like \textit{McCordle} “are simply unable to bear the weight put on them”); see also Hart, supra note 50, at 1364 (“You read the \textit{McCordle} case for all it might be worth rather than the least it has to be worth, don’t you?”).} Moreover, in case after case since \textit{McCordle}, the Court has bent over backward to conclude that Congress has left a sliver of judicial review available notwithstanding a jurisdiction strip.\footnote{See \textit{Hamdan v. Rumsfeld}, 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006) (avoiding a “grave” constitutional question by interpreting the statute not to preclude all review); \textit{Felker v. Turpin}, 518 U.S. 651, 660–62 (1996) (finding that Congress left open an avenue for review, thus avoiding a constitutional question about the outer boundaries of Congress’s Article III powers); see also Final Report, supra note 8, at 167 (noting the historical constitutional importance of leaving some Supreme Court review available).}

The second qualified success story stems from the Second World War. Congress successfully used its power over federal courts’ jurisdiction to help entrench a price control regime. With the United States government infusing the economy with massive amounts of wartime spending (and deficits), the threat of inflation loomed large. To prevent inflation and related price speculation, which Congress feared could have destabilized the national economy in wartime, it enacted price control mechanisms. It also crafted a unique jurisdictional arrangement for any challenges to maximum prices. If the jurisdiction strip in \textit{McCordle} was straightforward—repealing the 1867 habeas statute and stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction—Congress’s jurisdictional innovation in the price control context looked more like a Rube Goldberg machine.

To those who view jurisdiction stripping as an effective way to protect a federal regime against judicial review, the Emergency Price Control
Act—which led to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Yakus*—comes as close as one can imagine. Even still, it doesn’t vindicate the idea that Congress can avoid judicial review altogether.

The Emergency Price Control Act created a bespoke method of judicial review that put a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the government in any constitutional challenge. Someone subject to a maximum price could file an objection with the administrative agency tasked with setting those prices. If dissatisfied with the result, the person could then appeal the administrative decision to a new Article III court that Congress created—the Emergency Court of Appeals. Importantly, Congress prohibited the Emergency Court of Appeals from issuing temporary or interlocutory relief. Moreover, permanent injunctions couldn’t take effect for at least thirty days and (if the aggrieved party sought certiorari) not until final disposition by the Supreme Court. The Emergency Court of Appeals shows Congress at its most innovative and aggressive. Congress created it “to avoid hostile courts imposing delays and jeopardizing the overall implementation of the emergency price control program.” In other words, as with the Norris–LaGuardia Act and the Tax Injunction Act, Congress intentionally steered cases away from the “problematic” courts.

Congress included another jurisdictional twist that created an enormous incentive for those subject to price controls to comply. Someone could face criminal prosecution in federal or state court for charging prices above those set by the Administrator. But during those prosecutions, a defendant who had failed to challenge the constitutionality of the maximum prices through the novel administrative mechanism was barred from asserting a defense that the prices were unconstitutionally confiscatory.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the jurisdictional innovations—from the administrative exhaustion requirement to the specialized court of appeals to the bifurcation of federal defenses and

277. Id.
280. See id. §§ 203, 204; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 467 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The crux of this case comes . . . in the question whether Congress can confer jurisdiction upon federal and state courts in the enforcement proceedings, more particularly the criminal suit, and . . . [yet] deny them ‘jurisdiction or power to consider the validity’ of the regulations for which enforcement is thus sought.” (quoting Emergency Price Control Act § 204)).
criminal prosecutions.\textsuperscript{281} From a substantive policy perspective, economists have raised important questions about whether the price controls did long-term harm. They basically agree, though, that in the short run, the controls succeeded in keeping inflation down.\textsuperscript{282} From a legal perspective, some commentators have offered unsparing criticism of what they contend was perfunctory judicial review that allowed the government to trample on individual rights.\textsuperscript{283}

We don’t necessarily endorse that perspective. But to the extent that this criticism has bite, it’s because Congress’s jurisdictional tweaking worked. One of the postmortems of this entire scheme found that the Emergency Court of Appeals set aside only thirty (of nearly 400) decisions by the Price Control Administrator.\textsuperscript{284} Perhaps even more importantly, Congress succeeded in directing cases away from “hostile” courts—preventing those courts from delaying the price control scheme or granting provisional relief that could have hobbled the endeavor.

For all that Congress accomplished through these jurisdictional innovations, notice what it didn’t try to do—eliminate Article III review altogether. The Emergency Price Control Act provided for review as a matter of right in the new Emergency Court of Appeals and authorized the Supreme Court to review these decisions by way of its usual certiorari jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{285} Thus, any challenges to the validity of price control regulations had to be resolved up front rather than down the line after someone had violated the rules and was being prosecuted. That could have significant consequences for how those issues might be resolved, as we will discuss later. But this is a far cry from outright denying Article III review.\textsuperscript{286} As in \textit{McCardle}, scholars can grapple with counterfactual questions. Would the Supreme Court have acquiesced if Congress had vested final decisionmaking authority in a politically accountable agency? Or if the Emergency Court of Appeals had been the only Article III court with


\textsuperscript{282} See, e.g., Paul Evans, The Effects of General Price Controls in the United States During World War II, 90 J. Pol. Econ. 944, 955 (1982) (arguing that “price controls were effective” insofar as “the inflation rate actually fell after 1943” despite the fact that “government purchases and the money supply were surging”).

\textsuperscript{283} See Conde & Greve, supra note 213, at 861–63 (labeling \textit{Yakus} a “fulsome judicial endorsement” of “a constitutionally unconstrained administrative state”).


\textsuperscript{285} Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 203.

\textsuperscript{286} Some might argue that as a practical matter, Article III review didn’t amount to much. The Emergency Court of Appeals was staffed with New Deal judges hand selected by Chief Justice Stone, as provided for by the Emergency Price Control Act. See supra note 214. Moreover, when Congress passed the Act in 1942, eight of the nine members of the Supreme Court had been appointed by President Roosevelt. Schwartz, supra note 66, at 241. But the fact remains that Congress did not attempt to oust all Article III courts of jurisdiction.
jurisdiction to review those agency decisions? Maybe the Supreme Court would have stood idly by, but history, including the myriad ways that courts have nimbly dodged complete jurisdiction strips over the centuries, strongly suggests otherwise.287

Reconstruction and the Emergency Price Control Act illustrate, to our mind, the best-case scenario when Congress actively tries to stack the jurisdictional deck by outright depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction or engineering a review mechanism designed to uphold the federal program. Though both instances helped Congress effectuate its goals, for reasons we will discuss in the next Part, neither supports the notion that Congress can evade Article III review indefinitely. Nor do these examples create a foolproof blueprint for how Congress can protect federal programs, even on a short-term basis.

By contrast, the clearest example of a failed jurisdiction strip arose during the Bush Administration’s so-called War on Terror. Congress had established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which gave suspected terrorists detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, limited opportunities to challenge their detention.288 Several detainees sought habeas relief instead. Congress quickly intervened to strip all federal courts of jurisdiction to hear detainees’ habeas petitions, making the CSRTs the exclusive form of relief.289

The ensuing litigation demonstrated that jurisdiction stripping is not a trump card that Congress can play at will. For starters, during the first round of litigation, the Court, as it had in McCardle and Yerger, construed the jurisdiction strip narrowly—as applying only to future cases, not to those already pending—to avoid a “grave” constitutional question.290 Congress tried again and made clear that the jurisdiction strip applied to pending cases as well.291 The second round of litigation thus teed up the question that the Court initially had avoided—whether Congress had unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus and then (à la Klein) attempted to insulate that unconstitutional action through a jurisdiction strip. Boumediene determined that Congress had done both.292

And thus, for only the second time in the country’s history, the Court

290. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575–84.
292. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771–72, 795.
found a jurisdiction strip invalid.\textsuperscript{293} When the Court really wants to weigh in on the constitutionality of a federal program, it can find a way.

The need for courts. History, then, shows that jurisdiction stripping is not a foolproof method for precluding constitutional challenges to a federal program. But assume for purposes of argument that the courts would accede to a jurisdiction strip broader than those in \textit{McCardle} and \textit{Yakus} or even \textit{Boumediene}—one that eliminated any possibility of Article III review. Even here, jurisdiction stripping simply won’t provide a long-term guarantee of the success of a federal law or program.

To have any real-world significance, a federal law or program will ultimately need to rely on courts to enforce its guarantees. Jurisdiction stripping’s proponents, we argue, have not recognized that taking courts out of the picture entirely simply won’t work. Courts are ultimately essential.

Understanding this point requires working through some examples. Consider first a hypothetical federal law, suggested in passing by Sprigman, that guarantees a right to abortion and purports to preempt state laws forbidding abortion.\textsuperscript{294} Imagine Congress fears that a conservative Court would strike the law down as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers.\textsuperscript{295} So, Congress includes in the law a jurisdiction-stripping provision that forbids the Court from hearing any case contesting the law’s constitutionality. Indeed, progressive members of Congress have urged this strategy to insulate potential rights-granting federal statutes against judicial interference.\textsuperscript{296} Would this work?

Almost certainly not. How, exactly, is the federal law guaranteeing abortion rights supposed to be enforced? What if Texas courts simply refused to follow it (on the theory that it was unconstitutional) and upheld a criminal conviction of a woman who received an abortion? Requiring a state court to follow federal law is one of the Supreme Court’s most important roles. But if the Court has been taken out of the picture, there is no other institution that could obviously stop Texas from enforcing its

\textsuperscript{293} Interestingly, the \textit{Boumediene} Court did not spend much time addressing the link between the unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus and the invalidity of the jurisdiction strip. The Court seemed to assume that if Congress had violated the Suspension Clause, then the jurisdiction strip was necessarily impermissible. See id. at 739 (concluding that “the [Act] deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus actions now before us” and then in the next sentence proceeding to take up the constitutional question of whether Congress had violated the Suspension Clause).

\textsuperscript{294} See Sprigman, \textit{Congress’s Article III Power}, supra note 2, at 1859.


\textsuperscript{296} See Vakil, supra note 6.
criminal law. Perhaps the President could call in the National Guard to liberate the defendant from state prison, but this seems far-fetched—to say the least.

Nor could Congress craft the law to permit the Supreme Court to hear cases enforcing the statute yet deny it jurisdiction only over the issue of constitutionality. If Congress tried that move, the Court almost assuredly would strike it down on one of two grounds.

First, and most likely, it could conclude that the jurisdiction strip represented an impermissible attempt by Congress, as in *Klein*, to dictate the outcome of a particular case—rather than simply to remove certain cases from its docket. The Court could then rule on the substantive federal law's constitutionality. Alternatively, the Court might accede to the jurisdiction strip but then rule that without jurisdiction to determine whether such an order would be constitutional, it was powerless to overturn a conviction. For the jurisdiction strip to succeed in making the statute effective, one would need to believe that the Court would take neither path and instead willingly overturn a state-court ruling based on a federal statute that the Court believed exceeded Congress's substantive powers.

What about a situation in which Congress is trying to insulate a federal program from judicial review? Imagine that when passing the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress paired it with a jurisdiction strip forbidding the Court from addressing any constitutional objections to it. And assume that,

297. The progressive commentator Ian Millhiser is perhaps the only voice in the recent debate about Supreme Court reform to have emphasized this problem with jurisdiction stripping. See Ian Millhiser, 10 Ways to Fix a Broken Supreme Court, Vox (July 2, 2022), https://www.vox.com/23186373/supreme-court-packaging-roes-v-wade-jurisdiction-stripping [https://perma.cc/X2FJ-GW4Z] (“Congress might be able to prevent the Supreme Court from striking down the Voting Rights Act, for example, by stripping the Court of jurisdiction to hear voting rights cases. But if voting rights plaintiffs cannot obtain a court order enforcing the Voting Rights Act, that law ceases to function.”).

298. Several readers of early drafts have suggested that calling in the National Guard might not be far-fetched after all. Consider how this could play out. The President would need to be not just sympathetic to the federal law protecting abortion rights but also willing to expend maximal political capital to enforce it through violence against a state. Prison authorities might be caught between judgments and injunctions from state courts (commanding that the prisoner remain incarcerated) and armed federal authorities (demanding, at the President's behest, that the prisoner be released)—with no Supreme Court to mediate the constitutional conflict. Even if this "works," and even if calling in the National Guard is right and just, the entire gambit would hark back to the most precarious times in American history when the survival of the country hung in the balance. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 82 (Apr. 27, 1861), reprinted in 12 Stat. app. 1259 (1863) (deploying federal troops to Virginia and North Carolina to extend the Union blockade of Southern ports during the Civil War). At the very least, spinning out this hypothetical reinforces our thesis that jurisdiction stripping's effects are contingent and unpredictable.

299. See Final Report, supra note 8, at 168 (noting constitutional problems "if Congress sought to provide for coercive enforcement of a statute by the courts while purporting to withdraw judicial jurisdiction to entertain constitutional objections to the statute").
contrary to fact, five Justices were willing to declare the entire ACA unconstitutional but for the jurisdiction strip. So far, so good while Barack Obama was President. But what if the Trump Administration simply refused to follow and enforce any of the ACA’s requirements? The typical solution would be to go to court to get the Administration to follow the law. But if the Supreme Court thought that the law as a whole was unconstitutional, it again would either (1) declare itself powerless to consider whether to enforce the law given Congress’s Klein-like attempt to dictate its decision in a case; or (2) overcome the jurisdiction strip by reviewing the constitutional question to determine whether it had power to order the Administration to follow the law. Yet again, the jurisdiction strip fails to accomplish its goals—at least in the long term.

The point here is that any federal program will ultimately require the active participation of the judiciary if it is to be durable as administrations change hands. When the Court is hostile to Congress’s efforts, it is unrealistic to expect the Court to nonetheless be an active partner, which would be necessary to ensure the long-term success of the program. To summarize these last points: To accomplish almost any of its goals, Congress will eventually need the judiciary’s help.

C. Mythology Reexamined

Having worked through various permutations of how jurisdiction stripping likely would play out, let us revisit the mythology that has grown up around it. Amidst the robust scholarly debate about Congress’s constitutional authority over jurisdiction, scholars continue to rely on an assumption about jurisdiction stripping’s practical consequences that is descriptively wrong. As our polarized country wrestles with profound questions about democratic legitimacy, understanding how these levers of power do (and don’t) work is critical.


301. One also can imagine a hostile Court coming up with other ways to meddle with Congress’s efforts. For example, consider a case like Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, which involved a question of statutory interpretation that was hugely consequential to the ACA’s proper functioning. See Rachel Sachs, King v. Burwell: Appreciating the Stakes of the Case, Bill of Health (Mar. 15, 2015), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2015/03/05/king-v-burwell-appreciating-the-stakes-of-the-case/ [https://perma.cc/4VU3-WJX2] (noting the possibility of an “insurance death spiral” if the government lost in Burwell). A Court firmly opposed to the ACA (and perhaps willing to operate in bad faith, or at least one engaged in motivated reasoning) could have chosen an interpretation that would have crippled the ACA. See Epps & Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, supra note 16, at 844–46 (suggesting this possibility).

302. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3.
In just the last few years, several scholars have pointed to jurisdiction stripping as a tool progressives can use to respond to the hyperconservative Court. These scholars contend that Congress could foreclose all constitutional challenges to a federal regime. Doerfler and Moyn suggest, for example, that Congress could pair the Green New Deal with a jurisdiction strip that would insulate the program from constitutional challenge. Going further, they contend that “[a] total or near-total strip over constitutional cases would . . . dramatically reallocate decision-making authority within our constitutional scheme.” Similarly, Sprigman argues that “[i]f it wishes to, Congress can seize interpretive authority with respect to particular cases or issues.” Or, to put it more bluntly, Congress could simply tell the courts to “stay out.” The check, these scholars all suggest, comes from the people’s ability to vote out members of Congress—either because voters disagree with the substantive policy or because they believe Congress has transgressed the separation of powers.

This rosy conception of jurisdiction stripping’s efficacy doesn’t withstand analysis. In the long run, Congress is unlikely to succeed in impermeably insulating a regime against constitutional review. We have shown that courts have numerous tools at their disposal to engage in normal judicial review, even in the face of language that purports to deprive courts of jurisdiction categorically. The idea of external constraints looms largest in this regard. Although we have discussed external constraints previously, this section revisits them for a moment because they form an integral part of our descriptive claim that Congress can’t really accomplish what most scholars assume it can.

One might counter that under our argument, external constraints become an exception that swallows the rule. On this view, if any allegedly

303. See supra note 2 for a list of such scholarship.
304. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1735.
305. Id. at 1736.
306. Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1836.
307. Sprigman, A Constitutional Weapon, supra note 1; Sprigman, Stripping the Courts’ Jurisdiction, supra note 130.
308. See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1784 (“Correction, if it comes at all, will come from voters.”); Sprigman, A Constitutional Weapon, supra note 1 (arguing that “Congress will face discipline from voters, not judges”); Sprigman, Stripping the Courts’ Jurisdiction, supra note 130 (“If voters disagree [with a jurisdiction strip] they can discipline Congress in the next election.”); see also Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1735 (arguing that interpretive decisions “would be made by Congress and the President and, in turn, voters, who hold those officials accountable—however imperfectly”).
309. Professor Sprigman makes a thoughtful normative claim about the power of jurisdiction stripping. See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1836–43; Sprigman, A Constitutional Weapon, supra note 1; Sprigman, Stripping the Courts’ Jurisdiction, supra note 130. So, too, Professors Doerfler and Moyn argue as a normative matter for the democratizing effect of such jurisdiction stripping. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1735–36. We leave to one side these normative questions and focus here on their descriptive accounts.
unconstitutional law implicates an external constraint, then Congress’s power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction becomes meaningless when constitutional claims are at issue.\textsuperscript{310}

We have gamed out various scenarios based on the traditional theory of jurisdiction stripping (plenary power, subject to external constraints) not because we think it reflects the best reading of Article III but because the Supreme Court consistently has subscribed to it. That’s what matters most when trying to figure out how a Court hostile to a substantive law will respond to jurisdictional hardball. One could argue that external constraints \textit{should} be narrowly defined (as a normative matter). But the limited precedent from the Supreme Court and lower federal courts suggests a broad understanding of external constraints (as a descriptive matter). While Sprigman, for example, argues that the external constraints on Congress are vanishingly small,\textsuperscript{311} the case law strongly suggests that courts would not agree with so bold a reading.\textsuperscript{312} Going back as far as \textit{McCardle}, federal courts often have construed jurisdiction strips narrowly and ensured that some avenue of constitutional review remains available.\textsuperscript{313} Courts also have been willing to consider whether a jurisdiction strip attempts to shield an otherwise unconstitutional action (such as a potential due process violation) from review.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{310} Of course, even the most expansive approach to external constraints doesn’t categorically quash Congress’s power to regulate federal courts’ jurisdiction. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906–07 (2018) (plurality opinion) (describing congressional power over federal jurisdiction as an “essential” ingredient of separation of powers). As this Essay has explained, Congress might still strip courts of jurisdiction as to statutory questions that don’t implicate the Constitution, even if such stripping constitutes lily-gilding. The power to regulate jurisdiction still has enormous utility when Congress acts to regulate docket congestion and promote uniformity of federal law. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 116–17 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress sought to improve accuracy and efficiency rather than “aggrandize” power to itself by setting up specialized bankruptcy courts). And the power to regulate jurisdiction remains integral to non–Article III adjudication, including agency adjudication. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1986) (emphasizing the extent of Article III supervision).

\textsuperscript{311} See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1829–31 (cabining statements in \textit{Patchak} about external constraints as not essential to the holding, confining \textit{Boumediene} to its precise facts, and arguing for a narrow interpretation of \textit{Klein}).

\textsuperscript{312} Doerfler and Moyn do not engage the descriptive problem beyond one footnote. They suggest (without fully endorsing) the notion that Congress has unfettered authority to foreclose constitutional review of federal laws, “excepting \textit{textually grounded} external constraints such as the Suspension Clause,” with a citation to \textit{Boumediene}. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1725 n.109 (emphasis added). The long history of cases that consider a wide array of external constraints belies the implication that few such constraints exist and that they apply only in a few exceptional situations. See supra section I.C.

\textsuperscript{313} This was the situation in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869); and Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).

\textsuperscript{314} This is precisely what the Second Circuit did in \textit{Battaglia} (by inquiring whether a jurisdiction strip masked a deprivation of workers’ due process rights), Battaglia v. Gen.
To crystallize the point: The Supreme Court has never acquiesced in a jurisdiction strip of the Court’s power of constitutional review without either engaging in constitutional review in the case at hand or pointing to another readily available avenue for such review in a future case. And if Congress perceives the Court as so hostile that jurisdiction stripping is necessary, there is no particular reason to expect that the Court would embrace a sweeping understanding of jurisdiction stripping going well beyond precedent and the scholarly mainstream. In short, if the Court wants to decide a matter, particularly a constitutional question, it has numerous options at its disposal. Jurisdiction stripping might be a speed bump along the way; it isn’t an insurmountable wall.

External constraints aren’t the only reason jurisdiction stripping may fail. Even if the judiciary does not interpret external constraints broadly, Congress may not be able to effectuate its goals over the long term, at least if it is trying to enshrine federal rights. Much of what Congress wants to accomplish will ultimately require the judiciary’s active participation. If the Court thinks Congress has exceeded its constitutional powers (say, by codifying a right to abortion in federal law), believing that that same Court will willingly enforce that law simply because Congress has stripped the Court of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges is naïve. Getting courts out of the way is—at best—a temporary solution.

III. LIMITED POTENTIAL

This Part returns to the ultimate question that overlays this entire project: Can jurisdiction stripping work? Our resounding answer has been “no.” At least in the strong form that has animated so much of the scholarly and political conversation, jurisdiction stripping does not allow Congress to directly defy or prevent a constitutional ruling.

But jurisdiction stripping can have more subtle benefits. Throughout this discussion, the Essay has alluded to Congress’s ability to sequence decisionmaking, creating time and space for policies to take hold and gain political support. This Part elaborates on that basic idea. It also suggests

Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), and what the Supreme Court did in Yakus (similarly analyzing whether Congress’s allocation of jurisdiction deprived a criminal defendant of due process), Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 418 (1944). And, as explained above, this is also how the Supreme Court in Boumediene analyzed whether a jurisdiction strip tried to cover up an otherwise unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 725 (2008). Arguably the same is true of Klein and the presidential pardon power, but how much or how little Klein stands for is in the eye of the beholder. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537, 2549 (1998) (arguing that Klein means that “whatever the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate federal court jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a way that requires a federal court to act unconstitutionally”); Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Federal Courts Stories 103, 103-94 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (noting that “Klein may be read to stand for a number of different propositions, many of which have not held up over time”).
that Congress can use jurisdiction stripping to raise the salience of issues in an exhortative way and to impose political and reputational costs on the judiciary.

A. Sequencing and Delay

If Congress can’t use jurisdiction stripping in the direct way that nearly all scholars and commentators have assumed, that doesn’t mean jurisdiction stripping has no value as a policy tool. This section contends that Congress still can use jurisdiction stripping to exert indirect influence on how and when courts decide issues. Most significantly, it can sequence courts’ decisionmaking, and sequencing can have a tremendous effect on Congress’s extrajudicial efforts to implement policies. Most intriguingly, many of the following examples reveal that across varied contexts, time can be a commodity even more precious than a favorable judicial decision.

On some occasions Congress has homed in on the problem of time and crafted an effective jurisdictional response. Congress’s 1802 cancellation of the Supreme Court’s Term can be seen as the first example of instrumental jurisdiction stripping. Here, Congress necessarily had the goal of delay in mind, as the strip itself was temporal rather than subject-matter based. When the Court finally reconvened in 1803, it upheld the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act.315

Observers have attributed the Court’s acquiescence to Chief Justice John Marshall’s realization that declaring the repeal unconstitutional could provoke a crisis that would seriously damage the judiciary.316 We cannot know whether the case would have come out differently absent the delay. Professor Bruce Ackerman argues, however, that by “disrupting the Court’s deliberative processes,” Congress’s decision to cancel the Term “may have succeeded in its basic strategic objective. If the Justices had come together for their customary face-to-face deliberations in June, the dynamics may well have been different.”317 Moreover, Congress’s gamesmanship delayed resolution of the constitutional question until after the Republicans’ decisive victory in the 1802 election.318 That result “immediately reshaped the debate” regarding the 1802 elimination of circuit judgeships, as it revealed that “the voters were not impressed by the

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315. See supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text.
316. See Wood, supra note 102, at 440. Chief Justice Marshall’s correspondence supports this interpretation. In the wake of Congress’s cancellation of the Court’s Term, the Justices privately discussed whether to refuse to carry out their circuit-riding duties that had been imposed by the legislation repealing the 1801 Judiciary Act. See Ellis, supra note 101, at 60–61. Chief Justice Marshall urged his colleagues to acquiesce and noted concern that “[t]he consequences of refusing to carry the law into effect may be very serious.” See id. at 61.
318. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 103, at 58–59.
Federalist defense of judicial independence. Marshall and his Federalist colleagues must have recognized that they stood on shaky political ground.

With the Norris–LaGuardia Act, Congress recognized that labor injunctions had become one of the single greatest impediments to collective organizing by workers. Congress responded by stripping lower federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions except in narrow circumstances. It technically left alone the jurisdiction of state courts as well as the Supreme Court, but that didn’t really matter. From a policy perspective, putting a halt to the temporary restraining orders was the jurisdiction strip’s focal point, creating time and space for an incipient labor movement to take root.

The Tax Injunction Act evinced a similar concern with hasty injunctions that in Congress’s view threatened the financial stability of state and local governments. Unlike in the context of labor injunctions, though, Congress sought to balance different policy concerns, and its solution reflects a sensitivity to this unique mix of problems. Congress largely put a halt to the injunctions by federal courts, yet it preserved multiple opportunities for taxpayers to litigate the constitutionality of a tax in either state or federal court and under different causes of action. And it left untouched the Supreme Court’s ultimate authority to determine whether a tax passed constitutional muster. So, here, sequencing—specifying the precise order in which taxes would be paid and then when and where litigation could take place—enabled Congress to respond precisely and creatively to myriad competing concerns.

Although Congress seems to have embraced a temporal strategy in the cases above, the success of the famous jurisdiction strip in *McCardle* might owe more to serendipity. Congress scrambled when it realized the profound irony that William McCardle, of all people, was trying to challenge Reconstruction using a habeas provision intended to protect Black citizens. The Court acquiesced in *McCardle*, but in *Yerger*, the Court explicitly recognized that another avenue existed for someone in McCardle’s shoes to seek habeas relief (and thus also to challenge the Military Reconstruction project). So, to the extent that the jurisdiction strip worked, it did so by delaying the Court’s intervention through an alternative habeas route.

A skeptic might contend that the jurisdiction strip in *McCardle* didn’t give Congress that much extra time—a year and a half. Historians can

319. Ackerman, supra note 317, at 177.
320. See supra section II.B.2.a.
321. See supra notes 252–258 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
323. The Supreme Court had concluded the *McCardle* oral arguments in March 1868. Later that same month, Congress enacted the Repealer Act over President Johnson’s veto.
debate the difference that this time made, but it seems significant. McCardle challenged his detention—and the entirety of Military Reconstruction—mere months after the Reconstruction project had commenced.324 Between the time that Congress repealed the habeas statute on which McCardle relied and when the Court decided *Yerger*, Reconstruction had a chance to take hold.325

This consequential period saw the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,326 the election of Ulysses Grant as President (who, unlike his predecessor, was committed to the cause of civil rights),327 the adoption of new constitutions in Southern states that guaranteed Black citizens greater rights,328 the readmission of most former Confederate states to the Union on terms dictated by Congress,329 and Congress’s formal proposal of the Fifteenth Amendment to the states.330 We don’t suggest that a jurisdiction strip magically made this all possible. But forestalling a decision on Reconstruction’s constitutionality did at least create more breathing room for a Republican Congress to remake the country in the wake of the Civil War.

A modern Congress should internalize the right lesson from *McCardle* and other successful examples of jurisdiction stripping. It can’t expect to pass something like the Green New Deal and then append a jurisdiction strip with the belief that a court will never entertain a legal challenge to a massive new government program. But what about a more modest goal of giving the program time to blossom and become entrenched? On this score, jurisdiction stripping could perhaps succeed. Although the Affordable Care Act didn’t include a jurisdiction strip, it offers an example of how Congress can de facto entrench a program through politics.331

This stopped the Supreme Court in its tracks. The ultimate decision did not come down for more than a year—in April 1869. See Van Alstyne, supra note 48, at 242. *Ex parte Yerger* was argued and decided in October 1869. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).

324. See Van Alstyne, supra note 48, at 241–42 (setting out the chronology).

325. Another example of jurisdiction stripping being used as a delay tactic is found in Texas’s S.B. 8. Through its devious procedural strategy, Texas managed to effectively outlaw abortion in Texas, notwithstanding binding Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, for nearly a year before the Supreme Court actually overturned *Roe* in *Dobbs*. See supra note 34.


331. See generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 Yale L.J. 400 (2015) (conceptualizing de facto political entrenchment as
program, vilified in its early years, grew increasingly popular, so much so that even when Republicans controlled both Congress and the White House in 2017, they couldn’t muster enough votes to repeal it.\(^{332}\) Entrenchment, though, required time.

The Norris–LaGuardia Act’s restriction on injunctive relief provides a model that Congress might use today. In recent years, the propriety of so-called universal injunctions has generated a robust debate.\(^{333}\) A single court’s power to enjoin particular governmental conduct in its entirety—and not just as it affects the plaintiffs to a lawsuit—offers a way for politically motivated litigants to quickly smother a controversial federal program in its infancy.\(^{334}\) The potential to abuse these sweeping injunctions is exacerbated when litigants forum shop by filing suits before ideologically friendly judges.\(^{335}\) Just as the Norris–LaGuardia Act limited injunctions directed at labor activity,\(^{336}\) Congress might restrict district courts’ ability to issue sweeping injunctions against the government. Such a reform might give federal programs breathing room without eliminating the possibility of later judicial review.

Perhaps most significantly, in terms of modern debates about jurisdiction stripping, Congress can sequence decisions by routing them through administrative agencies.\(^{337}\) The example of the Emergency Price

shifting the composition of political community or altering the structure of political decision).


336. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text.

337. Another possibility, as discussed in conjunction with the Price Control Act, is rerouting judicial review through different Article III courts. Earlier we mentioned the Mountain Valley Pipeline jurisdiction strip, which seems to confirm that Congress has simply changed the underlying substantive law. See supra note 234. But Congress also foresaw challenges to this regime and directed them away from the Fourth Circuit, which would normally hear such challenges, and into the D.C. Circuit. See Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5, § 324(e)(2), 137 Stat. 10, 48 (2023). Ultimately, though, the regime leaves in place ultimate Supreme Court appellate review as to the statute’s constitutionality, even if Congress has tweaked the usual sequencing.
Control Act illustrates how Congress might do so to great effect. In some ways, the story of price controls during the Second World War offers another example of how Congress used its power over courts’ jurisdiction to buy time and allow a novel federal regime to become entrenched. But the broader lessons from this episode stem from the use of a politically accountable administrative agency whose decisions predictably skewed in favor of upholding the government’s price controls. This structure provided a significant impetus for adjudication within the administrative state.

Notice that the modern administrative state does not try to prevent constitutional review of federal policies or regimes. To the contrary, Congress almost always provides for the possibility of Article III review, including before the Supreme Court, and the Court routinely notes the importance of Article III supervision of non–Article III adjudicators. Moreover, Congress does not try to direct a particular outcome in any given case. In fact, this set of affairs leads to one of the central critiques of the modern administrative state: Democratically accountable institutions do not actually make consequential decisions but instead delegate them to agencies. We hesitate to wade too deeply into the boisterous normative debates about the administrative state. Our point is that this kind of decisional sequencing offers one of the most powerful indirect methods by which Congress can shape policy outcomes through its power over jurisdiction.

Sequencing isn’t just about delay. Congress can also manipulate jurisdiction to have the opposite effect and speed things up. Return to

338. See, e.g., Leanora Schwartz Gruber, Establishment and Maintenance of Price Regulations—A Study in Administration of a Statute, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 503, 535 (1948) (noting the remarkable infrequency with which Administrator decisions were reversed by the Emergency Court of Appeals during the price control program).

339. See, e.g., Conde & Greve, supra note 213, at 826–27.


342. See Oldham, supra note 20, at 474 (“After all, agency heads don’t stand for election. What’s more, independent agencies are designed precisely to protect against influence by the one executive (the President) who does stand for election.”).

343. For example, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its approach to determining whether a party must raise certain issues before an agency or may proceed directly to a district court. See Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 143 S. Ct. 890, 900 (2023). Either way, normal appellate review, including before the Supreme Court, is available. But as Justice Gorsuch noted in concurrence, the precise path that a case takes—its sequencing—can prove enormously consequential in terms of time, resources, and settlement incentives. See id. at 916–18 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
The statute required constitutional objections to price control regulations to occur early: If a person subject to the regulations challenged the regulation when issued, they could obtain possible Supreme Court review of any constitutional objection. But if they failed to take advantage of that opportunity, they couldn’t raise the issue when later prosecuted for violating the regulation. In practice, this meant that if the Supreme Court were to consider a constitutional objection to price control regulations, it would do so sooner than if review were available after a prosecution. And that meant any Supreme Court review would occur when wartime exigencies were at their zenith, when one might expect the Court to exercise utmost deference to the political branches. Individuals subject to the regulations would know they couldn’t violate the rules in the hope that, perhaps as the fog of war receded, the Supreme Court would find the scheme unlawful.

Thus, even if Congress cannot use jurisdiction stripping to preclude review of a particular constitutional question, it can use it to influence when that review occurs. And that power over sequencing can sometimes help Congress achieve its goals in the face of anticipated judicial opposition.

B. Salience and Political Costs

Beyond the power of sequencing, Congress can use jurisdiction stripping to influence policy in an even more indirect way. If Congress knows that it can’t entirely prevent judicial review in the medium-to-long run, jurisdiction stripping still can serve an exhortative role. By invoking the threat of jurisdiction stripping, Congress raises the political salience of an issue. Drawing attention to an issue can have political benefits of its own but also can make the Supreme Court (or other courts) less willing to diverge from congressional preferences. And even when the Court proves unwilling to accede to the attempt to block judicial review, Congress will have forced the Court to expend valuable political capital by intervening.

Start with the value that Congress gets by using jurisdiction stripping to send a message to voters. Imagine that Congress enacts (or threatens to enact) legislation that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases involving an issue that arouses passion among the public—say, flag burning, abortion, or gun rights. By turning to the rare tool of jurisdiction stripping, Congress (or its members) shows that it deeply cares about the issue—and that Congress believes the Supreme Court has gone, or is about to go, far astray of its proper role. Precisely because jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nigh-nuclear option, supporters of the Court may feel

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345. Id. at 427–29.
346. Id. at 430–31.
compelled to defend the Court from its attackers—further raising the salience of the issues that Congress seeks to highlight.

Jurisdiction stripping, then, could drive a national dialogue, potentially placing an issue in the country’s political consciousness for far longer than even the most unpopular Supreme Court decision can. Indeed, the most famous successful jurisdiction strip in American history had the effect of drawing the nation’s attention to an issue that Congress cared about. As Professor Barry Friedman has documented, “[t]he attention of the country was galvanized” after Congress initially passed the jurisdiction-stripping measure that ultimately led to *McCardle*.

But to provide political benefits, a jurisdiction-stripping proposal need not succeed or even have a real prospect of becoming law. Threatening to dial back the Court’s jurisdiction provides a way for politicians to signal their disapproval of the Court to co-partisans. For example, Professor Neal Devins has explained how Republicans in the early 2000s used jurisdiction-stripping proposals “to stake out a position on . . . socially divisive issues” in order to “solidify support among their base.” A similar dynamic may explain progressive Democrats’ recent endorsement of jurisdiction stripping in response to disfavored Supreme Court decisions, given that such measures would seem doomed in the closely divided Senate.

The political benefits of jurisdiction stripping, however, extend beyond posturing to voters. A potentially more important benefit is the potential to influence the Court. By using or threatening jurisdiction stripping, Congress sends an important signal to the Court: that the Justices are treading on thin ice and risking a collision with the political branches that could severely damage the Court’s legitimacy. Although courts have doctrinal tools to overcome a jurisdiction strip, they may be “disinclined to play ‘chicken’ with the legislature on a large scale.”

Even if Congress does not succeed in stripping the Court of jurisdiction, the mere threat can encourage the Court to stay its hand. Political science research has shown that threatened Court-curbing efforts by Congress are “followed by marked periods of judicial deference to legislative preferences.” According to one explanation for this finding,

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349. See *Vakil*, supra note 6.
351. Id. at 1463 (noting that “actual jurisdiction stripping may prove unnecessary, as the mere threat may suffice to affect judicial decisions”).
the Court responds to these threats because they serve as “a credible signal about waning judicial legitimacy” given that “Congress is more directly connected to the public than the Court.”

Several historical episodes illustrate how jurisdiction-stripping measures can cause the Court to blink. Friedman has documented several examples where jurisdiction stripping, actual or threatened, put political pressure on the Court and may have caused it to change course; we rely extensively on his thorough historical excavation here.

Return to Friedman’s account of how the jurisdiction strip in *McCardle* attracted great public attention. Discourse in the popular press centered on whether the Court should respond to the assault on its power that the jurisdiction strip presented, with some pressing the Court to stand up for itself and others urging deference to Congress. Given the attention to the case, there’s plenty of reason to suspect that the Court’s decision to back down owed partly to political, not exclusively legal, considerations.

Threats of jurisdiction stripping alone can force the Court to change course. In the late 1950s, the Supreme Court ruled against the government in a number of cases involving Communists. Congress took up, and nearly passed, jurisdiction-stripping legislation in response. Again, the proposed legislation ultimately failed after a close vote in the Senate, but the Justices seemed to get the message nonetheless. Facing the credible threat of jurisdiction stripping, the Court “relented, issuing decisions that limited the scope of earlier rulings and otherwise permitting the government to prosecute subversive cases.” The episode sent a strong signal to the Justices that “running afoul of public opinion . . . would mean harsh criticism and the very real possibility of reprisal.”

In another example of how the Justices have paid close attention to jurisdiction-stripping threats, the Supreme Court found itself in conflict with the states over its authority in the decades after the War of 1812. This led to debates on various proposals in Congress that would have restricted

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353. Clark, supra note 352, at 972.
354. See generally Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 103.
355. See id. at 132.
356. See Devins, The Supreme Court, supra note 113, at 1342–43.
357. See id. at 1343 (noting that Chief Justice Earl Warren feared Congress would enact legislation stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in five domestic security areas).
358. Id.; see also Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 103, at 255–58 (arguing that political pressure and criticism by legal elites played a role in the Court’s switch).
the Court’s jurisdiction over decisions by state high courts. These reforms never became law but still may have accomplished something. One particularly heated debate over such a proposal occurred in 1825 and 1826; in its aftermath, Professor Dwight Wiley Jessup argues, the Marshall Court reined itself in “so as to more nearly accord with the economic and political life of the nation.” Nonetheless, reform proposals continued for several years, and the Court continued to pay attention. Friedman has documented how Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story both expressed consternation about an 1830 jurisdiction-stripping bill in private correspondence.

Of course, the Court sometimes holds firm even in the face of actual jurisdiction-stripping laws. For the reasons we’ve explained, courts unquestionably have doctrinal tools to overcome a jurisdiction strip. If the Court remains determined to stand in Congress’s way, it can do so. But even then, Congress could still benefit by instigating a high-stakes separation-of-powers battle. A jurisdiction strip can force courts to expend reputational and political capital if they do ultimately take up an issue that Congress supposedly has removed from their cognizance. If the Court effectively overrules Congress and the decision backfires, the Court will have to face the political consequences.

_Boumediene_, for example, arose in the years following the September 11 attacks. Volatile questions of national security and civil liberties infused much of the national discourse, including during the presidential election of 2004. Congress had staked out a firm position on Guantanamo Bay and repeatedly attempted to keep courts at arm’s length. If the stakes weren’t already clear enough, Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, put an especially fine point on the matter: “The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” One must imagine that the Court did not relish finding itself in

360. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 103, at 88.
361. See id. at 88–91 (discussing how the Justices considered public sentiment in their decisionmaking).
363. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 103, at 88.
364. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., Doran G. Arik, Note, The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the Struggle to Balance National Security and Constitutional Values During the War on Terror, 16 J.L. & Pol’y 657, 659 (2008) (“[E]ach time the Supreme Court held that habeas extended to alien detainees held at Guantanamo, Congress responded with legislation to strip federal courts of their jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions.” (footnotes omitted)).
a position of countering the political branches and exposing itself to such reputational jeopardy.

As it happened, the Court seemed to suffer no real blowback from *Boumediene*. But then, the decision came at the very end of the Bush Administration, when support for the War on Terror had waned.\(^{368}\) One can imagine alternative scenarios in which the Court’s willingness to assert its authority over Congress could produce backlash. If, say, the current conservative Supreme Court majority overcame a jurisdiction strip to declare a novel but popular progressive policy initiative unconstitutional, Democrats could make the case to voters that the Justices were out of control.

All that said, the indirect political upsides described in this section are anything but guaranteed. For each possible benefit, there is a countervailing potential cost. Stripping jurisdiction may increase the salience of an issue with voters—but it could cause a backlash given the popularity of judicial independence.\(^ {369}\) It might show the public that Congress cares deeply about an issue—or it might be seen as a concession by Congress that it has reached beyond its constitutional authority. It might pressure the Justices to back down—or it might make them feel compelled to protect the Court’s prestige when they otherwise might have stayed their hand.\(^ {370}\) Here, as elsewhere, jurisdiction stripping’s benefits are contingent and uncertain, making it an unreliable tool for reining in the judicial branch.

One further cautionary note. We’ve discussed various historical episodes when the Court seems to have blinked in response to political opposition and public opinion. But the Court won’t inevitably respond to those forces and change course. One might wonder whether the situation on the Court today is profoundly different. Constitutional law has become more deeply polarized as Presidents have become better at ideologically screening potential nominees and as the Justices increasingly see

\(^{368}\) See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, This Is What a Failed Revolution Looks Like, Balkinization (June 13, 2008), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/this-is-what-failed-revolution-looks.html [https://perma.cc/J9W5-Y9NP] (“By the time Boumediene was decided, support for Bush and his unilateral vision of the Presidency was very weak indeed.”).

\(^{369}\) See Devins, The Supreme Court, supra note 113, at 1356 (“Americans have historically supported judicial independence . . . .”).

\(^{370}\) See id. at 1347 (identifying the tension between legislative and judicial policy preferences, and the ways the Justices respond to that tension). As compared to jurisdiction-stripping proposals in the past, the Court today might also see such threats as toothless given extreme polarization in Congress and the ability of the minority party in the Senate to block legislation via the filibuster. For a discussion of the extent to which the Supreme Court might take into account such considerations when rendering decisions, see Richard H. Pildes, *Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law*, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 33–35.
themselves as speaking to audiences of co-partisans.\textsuperscript{371} Today’s conservative supermajority asserts its confidence in its chosen methodology—originalism—to dictate the one correct answer to every constitutional question\textsuperscript{372} and thus might not respond to outside pressure. This is not to say that jurisdiction stripping could have no value today, but merely to underscore the uncertainty about its effects.

**CONCLUSION**

For all that academics have debated constitutional constraints on Congress’s power over jurisdiction, they have paid far too little attention to the question of whether jurisdiction stripping could actually effectuate Congress’s goals. Proponents and skeptics alike seem to assume that the strong form of jurisdiction stripping will work. This Essay has shown that it won’t. Jurisdiction stripping can have indirect benefits as a policy tool. It might succeed in allowing Congress to sequence how and when issues are litigated and thus buy time for policies to become entrenched. And it can raise the salience of issues and put the Court on the defensive.

But as a straightforward strategy for wresting control of the Constitution from the Court, jurisdiction stripping almost assuredly will fail. Its effects are chaotic and unpredictable; the Court can find a way to overcome a jurisdiction strip if it so desires; and the judiciary is ultimately needed to enforce, and to make durable, federal guarantees. To overcome a hostile judiciary, Congress and the President cannot simply get the Court out of the way. They may have no choice but to transform the Court. In this way, understanding jurisdiction stripping’s limitations offers a rejoinder to those who argue that Court reformers should seek to disempower courts rather than pursuing institutional change.\textsuperscript{373}

Beyond this practical takeaway, clarifying how jurisdiction stripping will and won’t work as a policy tool has implications for deeper normative questions. Even among those who subscribe to the plenary view of Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power, many argue that taking whole classes of cases away from the courts in pursuit of a political agenda is

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\textsuperscript{371} See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, The Company They Keep: How Partisan Divisions Came to the Supreme Court (2019) (arguing that judicial nominees’ ideologies reflect the dominant ideology of both their appointing Presidents and their broader social networks).

\textsuperscript{372} See generally Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 689 (2009) (discussing originalism’s tendency to reshape constitutional interpretation in its own image).

\textsuperscript{373} See, e.g., Doerrler & Moyn, supra note 2, at 1738–46 (advocating disempowering reforms). See generally Epps & Staraman, Supreme Court Reform, supra note 16 (arguing for transformation). Of course, some institutional reforms might themselves face obstacles from a hostile Court, but identifying the kinds of reforms most likely to overcome judicial opposition is a topic for future work.
fundamentally unwise and even dangerous.\textsuperscript{374} Professor Charles Black offered one of the few normative defenses of jurisdiction stripping. He supported the plenary view of Congress’s power for a “reason primarily of a political kind,” arguing that, leaving to one side the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, every federal court exercises jurisdiction only upon an explicit congressional directive.\textsuperscript{375} And this, he contended, “is the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy.”\textsuperscript{376}

If our arguments are right, then Black’s normative defense takes on new relevance. Jurisdiction stripping can’t subvert the constitutional order. But it can create space for a dialogue between the political and judicial branches. In its soft and subtle form, it can allow federal innovations—from Reconstruction to labor laws—to take root and even blossom rather than being prematurely cut down by the judiciary. Professor Black perhaps overstated the role that this congressional power plays in legitimizing the judiciary’s work. But seen in its proper and humble light, jurisdiction stripping can be consistent with—rather than a grievous affront to—the separation of powers.

There is a broader lesson, though. In our nation, at any given point there have been, and will be, those who believe the Supreme Court has lost faith with true constitutional values. Today that describes progressives, but it could describe others yesterday or tomorrow. For those out of power, looking for easy answers is tempting. Jurisdiction stripping’s allure lies in its supposed promise as a constitutional loophole that Congress can exploit to disable a hostile judiciary. But there are no constitutional cheat codes. The Supreme Court is, for all else, a political institution. Those who seek to tame and control it can do so only by building political coalitions, winning elections, and ultimately retaking control of the judiciary. That is a long and grueling path, and it is one for which the Constitution provides no shortcuts.

\textsuperscript{374} See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 8, at 898 (noting that “in this area as in others, it is useful—and often difficult—to bear in mind the distinction between constitutionality and wisdom”); Redish, supra note 8, at 927 (arguing against “confus[ing] issues of constitutionality with questions of propriety and wisdom”).

\textsuperscript{375} Black, supra note 2, at 846. Sprigman builds his thoughtful normative defense of “the desirability of a legislative check on judicial power” around this same basic insight about democratic legitimacy. See Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power, supra note 2, at 1800.

\textsuperscript{376} Black, supra note 2, at 846.