The single subject rule, a widespread and oft-litigated state constitutional provision limiting ballot initiatives to one "subject," has confounded judges, lawyers, and scholars for decades.  The problem grows from the inability to define "subject" with precision.  In A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, we attempt to solve this problem.  We propose a democratic process theory of the rule, which interprets "subjects" in terms of voters' preferences.  Professors Richard Hasen and John Matsusaka, experts in election law and direct democracy, are skeptical of our approach.  We appreciate their thoughtful comments, which have contributed helpfully to the debate.  However, we think their skepticism misses the mark.  They seem to confuse opposition to the single subject rule itself with opposition to our test. 

In recent years, scholars have drawn attention to the myriad ways in which the lines between criminal enforcement and immigration control have blurred in law and public discourse.  Some commentators even resist the very term "detention" as misplaced, masking circumstances approximating criminal "incarceration" or "imprisonment."  In response, the Obama Administration has pledged reforms to reconstruct this regime as a "truly civil detention system."  This Essay considers the possibilities and limits of these proposals, situating detention within the broader convergence of immigration control and criminal enforcement.  Notwithstanding the proposed reforms, the expansion of enforcement means that DHS will continue to detain noncitizens, in the words of a senior official, "on a grand scale"—which will significantly constrain its ability to dismantle the more quasi-punitive features of the detention regime.  While excessive detention conditions may well be tempered for many individuals, large-scale immcarceration seems here to stay for the foreseeable future.  

In recent years, scholars have drawn attention to the myriad ways in which the lines between criminal enforcement and immigration control have blurred in law and public discourse.  Some commentators even resist the very term "detention" as misplaced, masking circumstances approximating criminal "incarceration" or "imprisonment."  In response, the Obama Administration has pledged reforms to reconstruct this regime as a "truly civil detention system."  This Essay considers the possibilities and limits of these proposals, situating detention within the broader convergence of immigration control and criminal enforcement.  Notwithstanding the proposed reforms, the expansion of enforcement means that DHS will continue to detain noncitizens, in the words of a senior official, "on a grand scale"—which will significantly constrain its ability to dismantle the more quasi-punitive features of the detention regime.  While excessive detention conditions may well be tempered for many individuals, large-scale immcarceration seems here to stay for the foreseeable future.  

Julie C. Suk addressed a timeless issue in her article Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women?—namely, whether American women would be better served if the United States, following the example of every other industrialized country, offered a paid maternity leave. More evidence exists than perhaps Suk is aware of that bundling maternity leave with medical leave has made enactment of paid leave more difficult in the United States. 

Suk's diagnosis seems correct:  Old-time sameness feminism may well have jeopardized the ability of advocates in the United States to realize universal paid maternity leave.  Her proposed cure is less convincing:  that we should abandon our focus on gender stereotypes, and on antidiscrimination law.  In this short piece, I will try to ensure that disagreements about how to handle the three short months of maternity leave do not undercut our ability to protect women's jobs during the nearly twenty years they spend in childrearing.