Introduction
Federal courts apply stare decisis with “enhanced force” to decisions that interpret statutes.
Common law cases get less respect, and constitutional ones less deference still.
For decades, a broad spectrum of judges has applied this “super-strong presumption” against overruling statutory precedents.
To get a sense of that presumption’s bite, consider the legal history of baseball. In 1922, the Supreme Court held that professional baseball wasn’t subject to federal antitrust statutes because it didn’t qualify as interstate commerce.
Over time, that holding became hard to square with the Court’s increasingly expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. (If growing wheat for one’s own farm counted as interstate commerce,
why didn’t the World Series?) Even so, when the issue popped up again in 1953, the Court relied on statutory stare decisis to reaffirm its earlier decision “[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying issues.”
Baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Court later acknowledged, was an “aberration” that seemed “unrealistic, inconsistent, [and] illogical.”
But it was an aberration “fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis.”
If the Court had unduly restricted the scope of antitrust legislation, the error was Congress’s to fix, not the Court’s.
Courts routinely invoke super-strong stare decisis to retain statutory interpretations they would otherwise discard.
It’s awkward, then, that most scholars view the doctrine’s historical foundations as “shaky.”
“The notion of an enhanced standard of deference to statutory precedent apparently had not occurred to founding-era commentators,” then-Professor Thomas Lee concluded, “or to the Supreme Court in the Marshall and Taney years.”
In his assessment, the doctrine first emerged in the late nineteenth century and “crystallized in a series of opinions in the Hughes Court.”
Professor Caleb Nelson’s research points the same way. Well into the nineteenth century, he argues, “the demonstrated error of a past interpretation of a statutory or constitutional provision was reason enough to overrule the past interpretation unless there were special reasons” to do otherwise.
Indeed, statutory precedents typically received less deference than common law ones because the statutory text made it easier to show that a prior decision was wrong.
If that’s right, then we might doubt the doctrine’s life expectancy before an originalist Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas has already sharpened the knife.
In his view, “the ‘judicial Power’ vested in the federal courts” doesn’t permit the Court’s present doctrine.
Instead, it demands a simpler rule: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent”—one that contradicts “the original understanding of the relevant” constitutional or statutory “text”—courts “should not follow it.”
His critique depends on contrasting English and American law. As he sees it, “[f]ederal courts today look to different sources of law when exercising the judicial power than did the common-law courts of England.”
Stare decisis “made sense in a common-law legal system in which courts systematically developed the law through judicial decisions,” he argues.
“But our federal system is different.”
The Constitution charges federal courts not with developing “unwritten” law in the first instance, as English courts did, but with “interpret[ing] legal texts.”
In light of that basic difference, the old-world “pedigree” of stare decisis has little relevance for federal judges today.
But English courts did interpret statutes—lots of them.
Indeed, just as twentieth-century lawyers lamented the “orgy of statute making” that afflicted American law,
their eighteenth-century counterparts bemoaned Britain’s “epidemical madness” of legislating.
English judges, too, complained of the “enormous size” of the “statute books.”
Given the sheer ubiquity of legislation, it’s no surprise that eighteenth-century lawyers sometimes faced conflicts between a statute’s apparent meaning and the meaning it had previously been given.
But scholars have paid little attention to how lawyers traditionally resolved such conflicts, especially in England.
Instead, scholarship has tended to focus on the early United States or to examine English doctrine without distinguishing statutory from non-statutory cases.
As a result, lawyers interested in the long view of statutory stare decisis have had to rely on generalization and conjecture.
This Essay responds by offering a new history of statutory precedent in the long eighteenth century.
Until well into the nineteenth century, a single statutory decision couldn’t bind later courts, let alone with “super-strong” force. But nor was there a Founding-era consensus that courts should presumptively reverse erroneous statutory decisions. To be sure, courts sometimes overturned statutory precedents. But judges also endorsed the maxim communis error facit ius—common error makes law (or, in Professor David Seipp’s translation, “if everybody has been doing it wrong, let’s just call it right and keep doing it”
). The maxim applied broadly. But it packed a particular punch for statutes: “A series of precedents against the plain words of an act of Parliament have made a law,” as Lord Hardwicke put it in 1737.
Like most maxims, communis error had its limits. As Part I explains, not every error made law. And that maxim sat uneasily with another, which Hardwicke also endorsed: that only Parliament could make a law.
During the common law’s “classical” era (roughly, from Coke to Blackstone), England’s doctrine of statutory precedent reflected an ongoing struggle to reconcile these principles.
The classical approach to statutory precedent came under pressure in the later eighteenth century. As Part II explains, several developments encouraged lawyers to reject communis error for statutes and to argue instead that a statute’s authentic meaning should always prevail over erroneous constructions. First, legislative drafting improved, so that it became more plausible to claim that one construction was textually superior to another. Second, a reconfiguration of partisan politics focused lawyers’ attention on the distinction between legislative and judicial power. And, finally, a series of politically salient treason trials led defense lawyers to insist on strict adherence to statutory text in order to safeguard individual liberty. These developments didn’t destroy the older, communis error–based approach. But they created a second, competing paradigm. As a result, late-eighteenth-century lawyers had to navigate two incompatible theories of statutory precedent: The classical approach held that a series of precedents could sometimes trump a statute’s original meaning, while the revisionist alternative insisted that precedent could clarify but not alter an act of Parliament.
Part III uses this English history to reevaluate statutory stare decisis in the early United States.
American lawyers inherited the English debate, and both the classical and revisionist paradigms had American adherents well into the nineteenth century. But the debate took a distinctively American turn, as those who favored communis error reframed it in republican terms that emphasized the people’s sovereign right to amend their laws, whether legislatively or through everyday practice.
This history raises two further puzzles, which Part IV explores but doesn’t claim to resolve. The first concerns the mismatch between the Court’s present doctrine and its ancestors. Today, the Supreme Court gives “supercharged” deference to a single statutory decision.
Nobody advanced that view in eighteenth-century England or the early United States; the debate was whether a course of precedent could trump a statute’s original meaning. In other words, the Court ultimately resolved the longstanding debate over statutory precedent by rejecting both sides and embracing a third option. Why?
The second puzzle involves the historical relationship between statutory and constitutional precedent. At the Founding, this Essay argues, many lawyers thought precedent could sometimes shift a statute’s meaning. We know, too, that many Founding-era lawyers thought the Constitution should be construed like a statute.
Put together, those premises suggest that some eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans might have thought precedent could alter the Constitution’s meaning, too.
Did they? If not, why?