AGGREGATING ORIGINAL MEANING

AGGREGATING ORIGINAL MEANING

Public-meaning originalism—the theory that the meaning of legal texts, including the U.S. Constitution, is fixed when authoritatively adopted and binding until authoritatively changed—is ascendant. Although scholars debate this theory, a majority of U.S. Supreme Court Justices describe themselves as originalists and advocates increasingly advance arguments sounding in public-meaning originalism. And even jurists who are not originalists often recognize history’s relevance.

The Court, however, has overlooked a conceptual puzzle: What should originalists do when deciding a case with multiple steps, each requiring its own originalist analysis? For example, courts routinely decide what a constitutional provision means and whether it has been incorporated against the states. Courts also determine whether a right has been violated and what the remedy should be. Because finding original public meaning is difficult, however, judges cannot be certain they have resolved each step correctly. Nonetheless, after resolving one step, they proceed to the next step as if resolution of the first was certain. Such inattention to possible error runs headlong into the mathematical concept of aggregation, which requires using the product rule or conditional probability when assessing the likelihood that multiple claims are true.

This Article introduces aggregation into the originalist literature and demonstrates how the premises of public-meaning originalism support accounting for aggregate uncertainty. Although aggregation may help judges reach decisions more consistent with original meaning, its disruptiveness heightens the significance of many other debates, such as what it means to “prove” the law, the strength of stare decisis, the scope of construction, the validity of liquidation and tradition, the legitimacy of compensating adjustments to offset nonoriginalist precedent, and the value of corpus linguistics. Aggregation, however, should be more than just disruptive. Rather, it may add at least some stability to the law by shoring up familiar features of constitutional doctrines that originalists thus far have struggled to defend, including the presumption of constitutionality, clear-statement rules, and hybrid rights. It may also provide additional arguments in support of originalism itself.

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Introduction

Justice Neil Gorsuch is a public-meaning originalist. 1 See Neil M. Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 116–27 (2019) (embracing and defending public-meaning originalism). He believes that the Constitution’s meaning was fixed upon adoption, the Constitution’s meaning reflects how the public at the time of adoption would have read the Constitution’s text, and such meaning remains binding until the Constitution’s text is authoritatively changed. 2 See, e.g., Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 284 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.) (“[P]eople may rely on the original meaning of the written law.”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning, 101 B.U. L. Rev. 1953, 1964–65 (2021) [hereinafter Solum, Public Meaning Thesis] (identifying premises of public-meaning originalism). Gorsuch thus cites originalist sources, 3 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 348 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[O]riginal public meaning supplies the key . . . .”). advances originalist arguments, 4 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1036 n.2 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (focusing on “the right question,” namely “what the Constitution as originally understood requires”). and criticizes nonoriginalist approaches. 5 See, e.g., id. at 1039 n.5 (“Seeking to understand the Constitution’s original meaning is part of our job.”). And he is not alone. Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett describe themselves the same way, 6 See David E. Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 2317, 2384 & n.383 (2021) (including “Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, and . . . Brett Kavanaugh in this category” of “‘self-avowed originalists’ on the Court” (quoting Ilan Wurman, What Is Originalism? Debunking the Myths, The Conversation (Oct. 24, 2020), https://theconversation.com/what-is-originalism-debunking-the-myths-148488 [https://perma.cc/R7CD-W679])). and Justice Samuel Alito calls himself a “practical originalist.” 7 J. Joel Alicea, The Originalist Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel Alito, 46 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653, 654–55 (2023) [hereinafter Alicea, Originalist Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel Alito] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, Am. Spectator (Apr. 21, 2014), https://spectator.org/sam-alito-a-civil-man/ [https://perma.cc/EX62-4QH8]). Even Justices who are not card-carrying originalists, moreover, often appeal to the historical record as at least relevant. 8 See John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1349, 1362 n.81 (2012) (book review) (“Even committed nonoriginalists . . . find the text’s historical meaning at least relevant to, even if not dispositive of, constitutional decision making.” (citing, inter alia, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11–22 (1991))). Accordingly, advocates have increasingly framed their arguments using public-meaning originalism. 9 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Puzzle of Procedural Originalism, 72 Duke L.J. 941, 946–47 (2023) [hereinafter Sohoni, Puzzle of Procedural Originalism] (explaining the changes in briefing strategy spurred by Justice Gorsuch’s call for originalist analysis regarding personal jurisdiction).

In Ramos v. Louisiana, one of his most significant opinions, Justice Gorsuch made a point to rely on public-meaning originalism. 10 See 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1396 (2020) (focusing on the “original public meaning”). Writing at times for the Court and other times for a plurality, he concluded that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous juries and that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated that right against the states. 11 See id. at 1394–95 (“We took this case to decide whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—as incorporated against the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment—requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense.”). To reach his first conclusion, Gorsuch surveyed historical sources “to determine what the term ‘trial by an impartial jury’ meant at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption,” 12 Id. at 1395 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). including Blackstone, Founding-era practice, and opinions and commentary from soon after ratification. 13 See id. at 1395–97 (citing, inter alia, 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769); Del. Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776); 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 777, at 248 (1833)). After doing so, he concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement for jury unanimity is incorporated against the states. 14 See id. at 1397 (“There can be no question either that the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials equally.”). In reaching that second conclusion, Gorsuch avoided the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause but rather explained that incorporation occurred through “the Fourteenth Amendment” generally 15 Id. —apparently because he believes, like many originalists, that the correct clause is the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 16 See id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (faulting the Court’s doctrine for not grounding incorporation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 157 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (same). It thus appears that Gorsuch intended Ramos to advance originalist jurisprudence and to implicitly critique nonoriginalist approaches.

Whatever one thinks of Ramos, it is hard to describe Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as anything but originalist. 17 See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Informed Jury, 75 Vand. L. Rev. 823, 887 (2022) (describing Ramos as “originalist”); Aaron Tang, Consequences and the Supreme Court, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 971, 986 n.82 (2023) (same). He is a principled jurist who works hard, and it is apparent from Ramos that he wants to get history right. Despite such care, however, the likelihood that Ramos accurately reflects the Constitution’s original public meaning could well be about the same as a coin flip coming up “heads.” This is not because Justice Gorsuch overlooked historical evidence. 18 To be sure, some question Justice Gorsuch’s historical account. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Mosvick & Mitchell A. Mosvick, The Heller-ization of Originalism: Ramos v. Louisiana and the Problem of Frozen Context, 2019–2020 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 310 (claiming that history “paint[s] a far more complicated picture”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 361, 365 (2009) (challenging incorporation on originalist grounds). Nor is it because either of his steps is plainly wrong. No, Ramos’s problem is not its history but its math.

It is a basic rule of probability that, all else being equal, it is less likely for two necessary things to be true than just one. For example, there’s a 50% probability that an unweighted coin flip will come up heads, but the odds that it will come up heads twice in a row are only 25%. 19 See Stephanie H. Barclay, Tension Between Constitutional Meaning and Constitutional Construction, 47 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 613, 626 (2024) [hereinafter Barclay, Tension Between Constitutional Meaning and Constitutional Construction] (“As any statistician could point out, while the probability of flipping heads in one coin toss is 50%, the probability of flipping heads twice in a row is only 25%.” (citing If I Flip a Coin Twice, What Is the Probability of Getting Both Heads?, Cuemath, https://www.cuemath.com/questions/if-i-flip-a-coin-twice-what-is-the-probability-of-getting-both-heads/ [https://perma.cc/CH9E-2PL6] (last visited Nov. 17, 2024))). Scholars have attempted to apply this probability concept—often called “aggregation” or “the conjunction paradox” 20 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 723, 723 (2001); Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 Yale L.J. 2, 4 (2012); Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1199, 1203 (2001) [hereinafter Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right]. Like Porat and Posner, this Article generally refers to the concept as “aggregation.” —to the law. For example, Professors Ariel Porat and Eric Posner have explained that when broad multistep propositions like “this criminal defendant should be convicted of (i) conspiracy to (ii) defraud” require running the table for multiple truth claims, it can be bad math to ignore aggregate uncertainty even if each claim is more likely than not correct. 21 See Porat & Posner, supra note 20, at 38 (“If several elements of the same offense must be proven to establish the defendant’s guilt, then cross-element aggregation could generate a different outcome than if each element were considered separately.”).

Returning to Ramos, even if historical evidence suggests that (i) the original public meaning of “trial[] by an impartial jury” 22 U.S. Const. amend. VI. more likely than not requires unanimity and (ii) the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment more likely than not requires “that incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights bear the same content when asserted against States as they do when asserted against the federal government,” 23 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). it still need not follow that the Court should overturn a state conviction for lack of a unanimous jury. Ramos required the Court to answer at least three distinct questions, including whether: (i) the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous juries, (ii) states are bound by that requirement, and (iii) the U.S. Supreme Court has the power to resolve such questions to begin with. None of these questions has an answer that is 100% certain. Aggregate uncertainty thus creates a puzzle, at least with respect to assessing the validity of the result—who wins or loses—in a case involving multistep originalist analysis.

To see the puzzle, assume it is 70% likely that the Sixth Amendment’s original public meaning requires jury unanimity and that it is also 70% likely that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original public meaning (through whatever clause) incorporates the Sixth Amendment. 24 Some of the difficulties operationalizing such analysis (including what happens when different courts are deciding different parts of a multistep question) are addressed below. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. Scholars will disagree about those assumptions, but given that the Constitution does not plainly answer either, 25 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning, 107 Va. L. Rev. 1421, 1430–32 (2021) [hereinafter Fallon, Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning] (reasoning that it is easy to determine the meaning of some provisions but not for “historically disputed questions”). For a discussion of the conceptual and practical difficulties of actually assigning probability, see infra section III.C. 70% seems reasonable enough for a thought experiment. Next, assume (generously) that it is 99% likely that Article III’s original public meaning allows the U.S. Supreme Court to determine on direct review whether a state criminal judgment violates the federal Constitution. 26 That number is surely too high. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), is canonical, not bulletproof. See Richard A. Epstein, A Speech on the Structural Constitution and the Stimulus Program, 4 Charleston L. Rev. 395, 416 (2010) (“Hunter’s Lessee is dubious as well.” (footnote omitted)). And finally, assume that these questions are all independent 27 This assumption is not conceptually necessary; conditional probability applies if there is dependence, but the math is harder. See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text. —that is, the answer for one tells us nothing about the answer for another.

Under these assumptions, it is more likely than not that the judgment in Ramos does not reflect the Constitution’s original public meaning. To find the probability of three independent events, the product rule requires multiplying the probability of each event occurring: 70% × 70% × 99% = 49%. 28 The answer is 48.51%, which rounds up to 49%. See David M. Lane, David Scott, Mikki Hebl, Rudy Guerra, Dan Osherson & Heidi Zimmer, Introduction to Statistics 192, https://onlinestatbook.com/Online_Statistics_Education.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CTK-EUJN] (last visited Sep. 1, 2026) (“When two events are independent, the probability of both occurring is the product of the probabilities of the individual events.”); see also James Brook, A Lawyer’s Guide to Probability and Statistics 43 (1990) (“If and only if two statements, A and B, are probabilistically independent, then: P(A & B) = P(A) × P(B).”). Of course, these assumed probabilities might be too high or too low. But precise percentages do not matter yet; this is just a thought experiment. The point is that even if the answer to each step in a multistep problem is more likely right than wrong, the ultimate conclusion can still probably be wrong. Evidence theorists have recognized the challenge that aggregation’s probability rules pose for the law, 29 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604, 605–06 (1994) (describing a “relative plausibility theory”); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J. 1254, 1256–57 (2013) (questioning whether prosecutors should quantify certain burdens of proof, like beyond a reasonable doubt, using statistical analysis); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065, 1084–86 (1968) (exploring what may “influence the completely rational decision theorist”); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?: On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1385–88 (1985) (exploring the role of statistics in fact-finding); Michael S. Pardo, The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 233, 266 (2019) (explaining that statistical evidence may lack substantial significance for evidence law, theory, or policy); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1335 (1971) (criticizing the use of probabilistic proof in a criminal trial). but no one has systematically assessed originalism through the lens of aggregation, even though originalism also involves the search for historical facts through the use of evidence. 30 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 47 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, Fixation Thesis] (“[W]hen we are looking for communicative content, the . . . evidence will be found in historical fact . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1671, 1677 (2018) (“[T]he crucial point is that the original meaning is a question of fact—a matter of history.”); accord Alex Stein, Probabilism in Legal Interpretation, 107 Iowa L. Rev. 1389, 1394 (2022) [hereinafter Stein, Probabilism in Legal Interpretation] (“What these commands say and do not say is a purely empirical fact.”).

The purpose of this thought experiment is not to pick on Justice Gorsuch or anyone else. On the contrary, similar probabilistic questioning could be done for almost any opinion (originalist or otherwise) written by any judge or justice. Almost no one approaches law probabilistically. 31 See Levmore, supra note 20, at 723 (“Legal practice seems at odds with scientific logic, or at least with probabilistic reasoning.”); Porat & Posner, supra note 20, at 9 n.8 (“Aggregation has largely been ignored by legal writers.”). What’s more, the likelihood of correctness for each question in Ramos could be greater than 70%, so the judgment there may be more likely than not correct anyway. Instead, the point of this thought experiment is to show how courts address multistep analysis. What often happens is the Court considers one question, decides who has the better of the argument with respect to that question even though the answer is not 100% certain, and then proceeds to the next question as if the answer to the first question was 100% certain. 32 See Levmore, supra note 20, at 726 (“[T]he mathematics . . . instructs us to multiply the two probabilities . . . . Law, however, appears not to abide by this rule.”). As explained below, if courts assigned probabilities to each analytical step, they could avoid treating each of them as certain. See infra note 261.

Setting aside the risk of aggregated error in this way may not be a problem for some methodologies, or at least not as much of a problem. Some pragmatists, for example, are not necessarily trying to figure out the answer to multiple independent questions; they generally want to know the pragmatically best ultimate answer. 33 See John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1168–69 (2007) (explaining Judge Richard Posner’s view that “[t]he ultimate criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonableness” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 61 (2003))). Or for someone who does not believe that meaning is a fact at all, 34 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The “Fixation Thesis” and Other Falsehoods, 72 Fla. L. Rev. 219, 240 (2020) (“[P]hilosophical hermeneutics maintains that textual meaning is mutually constituted by past and present . . . .”). or at least rarely a knowable one, 35 See Fallon, Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning, supra note 25, at 1471 (“[T]he contention that disputed constitutional provisions have uniquely correct original linguistic meanings . . . is unsustainable.”). perhaps aggregated uncertainty also doesn’t matter. Some other methodologies have also mitigated aggregation’s effect through tools such as stare decisis and deference to fact finders (what happens in the jury room often is essentially a black box 36 See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 218 (2017) (explaining that jurors are generally barred from testifying about what occurred during deliberations). ). But one of the premises of originalism is that courts, for reasons sounding in legitimacy, should issue decisions that reflect the fixed meaning of the text being interpreted. 37 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1792 n.11 (2005) [hereinafter Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution] (explaining “the ‘originalist’ position that the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking requires adherence to the original understanding of constitutional language”). So, if it is more likely than not that a judicial judgment is not actually supported by the constitutional provisions at issue, it should be harder for a committed originalist to proceed.

In other words, although aggregation could be relevant to many methodologies, including nonoriginalist ones, it certainly should be relevant (at least presumptively) to originalism. 38 As detailed below, this Article focuses on originalism (the Court’s ascendant methodology), but aggregation can be relevant to other methodologies as well. See infra notes 348–355 and accompanying text. Additionally, as explained infra section IV.B, aggregation sometimes may help defend public-meaning originalism against methodological challenges. By assuming the answer to each question in multistep analysis to be 100% certain rather than assigning each step a probability of correctness, courts applying originalist analysis may side with parties whose ultimate claim more likely than not is wrong as a matter of historical fact. Indeed, even modest degrees of uncertainty about historical meaning can undermine ultimate judgments. Yet courts regularly decide cases with multistep analysis. 39 Of course, aggregation need not extend so far—it could be limited, for example, to provisions that are litigated or for which stare decisis does not apply. This is a threshold question that originalists must confront. See infra notes 271–276 and accompanying text. As with Ramos, for example, any case in which a party argues to the U.S. Supreme Court that a state official has violated a right in the Bill of Rights requires answering (at least) whether the right was violated and whether the right was incorporated. 40 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1393–94 (2020). Indeed, as discussed below, given uncertainty about judicial review itself, any constitutional decision would be subjected to this type of analysis. See infra notes 307–308 and accompanying text. For now, however, put that point aside—there are at least two steps in any case about an alleged violation of a right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Many of the Court’s most significant cases fall within this category. 41 See, e.g., Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025) (Free Exercise Clause); Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383 (2024) (Free Speech Clause); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022) (Establishment Clause); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (Right to Bear Arms Clause); Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (Seizure Clause); Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (Jury Trial Clause); Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019) (Excessive Fines Clause). Likewise, every case in which a criminal defendant asks a court to exclude evidence because of an alleged constitutional violation requires evaluating at least whether: (i) the claimed right exists; (ii) the claimed right was violated; and, if so, whether (iii) exclusion is required. 42 See, e.g., Case Comment, Michigan Supreme Court Holds Exclusionary Rule Inapplicable in the Civil Context, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 1941, 1943–44 (2025) (discussing a case in which the Michigan Supreme Court assumed a Fourth Amendment violation but did not require suppression). And courts often decide (i) whether a right or power exists and then (ii) whether an “edge” case falls within that right or power. 43 See Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1059, 1095 (2019) (“The recognition of a fundamental right involves two distinct inquiries: (a) whether a right exists, and (b) the scope of the right.”); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2019) [hereinafter Baude, Constitutional Liquidation] (“Even if the law has a clear core, . . . there will always be edge cases.”). If originalists wish to issue judgments reflecting what is most likely the Constitution’s original public meaning, why would probability-sensitive rules designed to minimize aggregate error not play at least some role? Ignoring the possibility of being wrong “could leave us less rather than more faithful to the original plan.” 44 Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 802 (2022) [hereinafter Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure]; accord William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 313, 327 [hereinafter Baude, Precedent and Discretion] (explaining “halfway originalism” as selectively invoking original meaning while retaining favorable precedent (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 585 U.S. 878, 903 (2018))); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Selective Originalism and Judicial Role Morality, 102 Tex. L. Rev. 221, 232 (2023) (defining “selective originalism” as professing adherence to original meaning in some cases while subordinating it without obligatory reasons in others).

There are significant obstacles, however, to incorporating aggregation into originalism. For one, doing so raises questions about legal interpretation itself and how likely propositions of law must be before courts should enforce them. Should judges only accept propositions about meaning that have a greater than 50% likelihood of being accurate? 45 See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 877 (1992) [hereinafter Lawson, Proving the Law] (noting that the legal system does not specify “standard[s] of proof” for every “proposition of law”); Rohith V. Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as Fourth Amendment Judicial Review, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 179, 208 (2012) (urging a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for originalist claims (internal quotation marks omitted)). Originalists presumably should not accept Interpretation A when historical evidence suggests that competing Interpretation B is more likely, but is a “more likely than not correct” standard appropriate or is a greater showing required? 46 See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 411, 422 (1996) [hereinafter Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy] (arguing that “nothing in the nature of interpretation, of originalism, or of the Constitution” answers how to prove meaning). This threshold question of how one “proves” the law is even more significant when multistep analysis—and with it, aggregation—is considered.

Aggregation, moreover, can be difficult to do. It is easy to posit as a thought experiment that incorporation is 70% likely; it is more challenging in the real world to accurately assign such a probability. 47 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2137–39 (2016) (book review) (assigning probabilities but admitting that “judgments about clarity versus ambiguity turn on little more than a judge’s instincts”); see also Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 191 (2019) (noting limits of the “judicial mind” when confronted with “different gradations of deference”). A strong form of aggregation also may change the outcome of many cases. For example, putting aside stare decisis (which lower court judges, of course, can’t do), originalists may be hard pressed to ever exclude evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds in state criminal trials—even if the violation is egregious and even assuming (probably a stretch) that the Constitution’s original public meaning more likely than not requires the exclusionary rule. 48 Cf. Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1885, 1928 (2014) (arguing that the Due Process Clauses incorporate Fourth Amendment exclusionary requirements into the procedures necessary for a lawful conviction). Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 793 n.135 (1994) (“[T]ext, history, structure, and early implementation do not support the exclusionary rule.”), with Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2010) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is soundly based in the original understandings of the Constitution and the practices of the Founding period.”). After all, assuming for argument’s sake that there is 60% originalist support for the exclusionary rule, uncertainty about whether the Fourth Amendment is incorporated by itself could prevent exclusion even when it is 100% certain that the right at issue was violated. 49 Even if incorporation were 80% probable, 60% (exclusionary rule) × 80% (incorporation) × 100% (constitutional violation) = 48%. Aggregation, moreover, may destroy “congruent” constitutionalism, which treats federal and state governments the same when enforcing the U.S. Constitution, because of uncertainty about the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 50 See Jay S. Bybee, The Congruent Constitution (Part One): Incorporation, 48 BYU L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2022) [hereinafter Bybee, Part One] (explaining congruent constitutionalism); Jay S. Bybee, The Congruent Constitution (Part Two): Reverse Incorporation, 48 BYU L. Rev. 303, 309 (2022) [hereinafter Bybee, Part Two] (same). Yet many of the Court’s highest-profile cases in recent years involve state officials. 51 See cases cited supra note 41. “[R]everse incorporation” cases—those that apply the Fourteenth Amendment against the federal government, see Bybee, Part Two, supra note 50, at 308–09—would be the exception.

Aggregation’s potentially disruptive implications thus elevate the importance of other already significant debates, including those about the strength of stare decisis, 52 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1921, 1924 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis] (“[O]riginalism prioritizes what we might think of as the original precedent: the contemporaneously expressed understanding of ratified text.”). Compare Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23, 24–25 (1994) [hereinafter Lawson, Constitutional Case Against Precedent] (characterizing precedent as potentially unconstitutional), with John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 836–38 (2009) (defending some uses of precedent). the manner and scope of construction, 53 Compare Fallon, Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning, supra note 25, at 1477 (“[M]ost constitutional issues requiring decision by the Supreme Court arise in the ‘construction zone’ . . . .”), with John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Power of Interpretation: Minimizing the Construction Zone, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 919, 921 (2021) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Power of Interpretation] (arguing that the construction zone is “small” and the Constitution’s original meaning solves the “great bulk” of constitutional issues). the legitimacy of appeals to liquidation and tradition, 54 Compare Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, supra note 43, at 4 (“Liquidation was a specific way of looking at post-Founding practice to settle constitutional disputes, and it can be used today to make historical practice in constitutional law less slippery, less capacious, and more precise.”), with Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2020) (arguing that “attention to post-Founding historical practice fits more naturally with non-originalist theories”). the permissibility of a “compensating adjustment that approximates” what originalism might require, 55 See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 20 (2009) (“[T]he President’s veto power might be interpreted . . . as authorizing a line-item veto—a form of compensating adjustment that approximates the first-best regime.”). But see E. Garrett West, Refining Constitutional Torts, 134 Yale L.J. 858, 931 (2025) (noting “legitimacy” questions about such “adjustments”). and the value of corpus linguistics. 56 Compare Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 Yale L.J. 788, 795 (2018) (describing corpus linguistics), and Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the Critics, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 275, 281–87 (2021) [hereinafter Lee & Mouritsen, Corpus and Critics] (explaining how it increases accuracy), with Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 726, 799 (2020) (questioning the accuracy of using corpus linguistics). If, for example, a court could treat the likelihood of incorporation as 100% certain because of stare decisis, one step would disappear. The opposite, of course, is also true; if such doctrines should play little role, many cases may have to be revisited. Even “fearless originalists,” 57 See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1232, 1232–33 (2006) (contrasting “‘faint-hearted originalists’” who apply stare decisis with “fearless originalists” (quoting Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1989))). however, may stagger before discounting every constitutional decision by the possibility (even if slight) that Marbury is wrong. 58 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also infra note 307 (discussing the originalist debate about judicial review itself). Reluctance to think probabilistically about every step may cut in favor of the less rigorous “soft aggregation” discussed infra Part V.

Aggregation, however, need not be only disruptive—it also can lend at least some additional stability to constitutional law by offering conceptual support for features that originalists struggle to defend. 59 No doubt, aggregation on net may produce more instability than stability; this Article is not making a claim about overall stability. Rather, the point is that aggregation is not entirely disruptive. For example, is there a place for hybrid-rights analysis? 60 See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067, 1070 (2016) [hereinafter Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses] (describing “combination analysis,” in which courts derive constitutional outcomes from multiple clauses acting together (internal quotation marks omitted)). Maybe, because the Court might have misapplied more than one provision, making it more likely than not overall that the alleged right exists somewhere. Should courts embrace a presumption of constitutionality? 61 Compare Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers) (stating that a presumption of constitutionality is given to every Act of Congress), with Steven G. Calabresi, On Originalism and Liberty (Sep. 17, 2015), in 2015–2016 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 17, 18 (“[O]riginalism means endorsing a presumption of liberty and not a presumption of constitutionality . . . .”). Perhaps, not because any discrete provision creates the presumption, but because judicial review itself is subject to some historical doubt (even if slight) that it may be wrong. So why wouldn’t close questions favor judicial restraint? Similarly, should there be clear-statement rules? 62 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399, 404–05 (2010) (criticizing clear-statement rules). Possibly, at least sometimes, because when it is not certain the federal government has power to act in the first place, statutory clarity is more important. And what about qualified immunity, another doctrine often attacked by originalists? 63 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 157–60 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (questioning the Supreme Court’s current doctrine of qualified immunity as compared with its roots); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 45, 88 (2018) [hereinafter Baude, Qualified Immunity] (arguing that qualified immunity lacks support in Section 1983 or the common law). Even setting aside historical support for such immunity, 64 See, e.g., Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 1337, 1344–45 (2021) (offering a partial originalist defense of qualified immunity). this defense may also be supported by everyday math. If the doctrine is applied correctly, the cases in which qualified immunity bars recovery should be those in which it is not obvious that a constitutional violation occurred. 65 Cf. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 735, 745–46 (2002) (finding that prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit because prior law provided officials with fair notice of the unconstitutionality of their actions and the constitutional violation arising from their actions was “obvious”). Finally, although aggregation matters for originalism because debates about stare decisis are particularly sharp among originalists, aggregation may also help shore up public-meaning originalism itself because certain competing methodologies may be less able to account for aggregation. For example, purposivists who believe they can “cull legislative ‘intent’ or ‘purpose’” from sources other than the text 66 See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1911, 1912 (2015) [hereinafter Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind] (explaining that a complex, multimember legislature generally lacks collective intent on difficult questions). must also account for the possibility that they have performed that difficult—perhaps impossible 67 See id. at 1919–20 (“That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870–71 (1930))). —task wrongly, thus increasing uncertainty; such risk becomes more important given multistep analysis.

These are not the only potential consequences, but they illustrate why aggregation creates a puzzle for constitutional theorists, including and perhaps especially originalists. But that puzzle comes with an opportunity. By confronting aggregation, originalists can better appreciate the stakes of other significant debates, while also finding a conceptual path to defend some familiar aspect of constitutional law. This may be particularly true, moreover, if judges adopt what this Article dubs “soft” aggregation that focuses on aggregation’s intuition against stacking inference upon inference rather than taking the concept so far as to exceed judicial competence. Just because it may not be realistically possible for courts to do the types of calculations that the purest form of aggregation requires, it does not follow that courts should disregard aggregation’s intuitive value—everyday logic teaches that, all else equal, it is more likely for one proposition to be true than for a party to run the table for multiple necessary propositions, or for two easy questions to be both right rather than two difficult ones. By itself, following that intuition should lead to greater accuracy for judgments requiring multiple propositions to all be resolved in favor of the same party.

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This Article proceeds as follows. It first explores the basics of originalism. It then explains aggregation and how evidence scholars have addressed the product rule and conditional probability. Next, it shows how the premises of public-meaning originalism support aggregation and offers five exemplars of what such analysis may include. The Article then sketches aggregation’s disruptive and stabilizing effects. Finally, it concludes with a potential path forward that relies on a softer, more administrable form of aggregation dubbed soft aggregation. Even if the most demanding form of aggregation is beyond judicial competence, there still may be a place for soft aggregation.