Introduction
Commentary on § 1782 nowadays mostly hovers around two schools of thought. Traditionally, the statute’s
hallmark has been that it gives federal courts broad discretion to assist with the gathering of evidence for use in proceedings abroad.
This traditionalist, liberal approach to § 1782 furthers Congress’s twin aims of providing efficient assistance to litigants in foreign proceedings and encouraging reciprocal assistance.
More recently, however, commentators have lamented the rise of excessive uses of § 1782 that, in their view, unduly burden stakeholders.
This line of commentary reflects practical concerns that certain actors may be abusing American discovery and that federal courts risk becoming complicit in that perversion.
The conflict between these two schools of thought—traditionalists and pragmatists—borders on the existential, and those who value the statute’s role in the American legal system would be wise to view it as a pressing matter.
Resolving the tension requires balancing the statute’s flexible design
against the risk of overreach on the part of litigants.
It requires attention both to Congress’s broad purpose and to the practical effects of unbridled United States–style discovery on nonparties, foreign tribunals, and the federal courts. Recently, the Supreme Court relied largely on textualism to draw the line under one misuse: discovery for private arbitral proceedings.
Yet, § 1782’s text and purpose—along with the practicalities of civil discovery—can leave room for innovation as procedure evolves.
This Note assesses these considerations in the context of one growing disagreement among the federal circuit and district courts regarding § 1782: the standard for whether a person “resides or is found” in a district.
A faithful construction based on the statute’s text, Congress’s intent, and the broader system of transnational litigation warrants reading the requirement as extending to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.
Embracing this reading hews closely to the meaning of the term “resides or is found” at the time of the statute’s enactment and furthers courts’ duty to help collect evidence for proceedings elsewhere.
This Note makes its argument in three parts. Part I traces the history of discovery assistance at chancery and common law and reviews the modern statutory scheme. Part II examines the conflicting approaches to federal courts’ jurisdiction under § 1782. And Part III proposes a resolution to the conflict among lower courts that blends the current personal jurisdiction doctrine with the requirements of discovery assistance for courts past and present.