BEYOND EXIGENCY: DISPUTED CONSENT AND WARRANTLESS ENTRY IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CONTEXTS

BEYOND EXIGENCY: DISPUTED CONSENT AND WARRANTLESS ENTRY IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CONTEXTS

Intimate partner violence (IPV) cases frequently require law enforcement to make rapid decisions at the intersection of survivor safety and Fourth Amendment privacy protections in the home. The Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph, which bars warrantless entry into the home based on disputed consent between co-occupants, has generated significant uncertainty when a survivor is outside the home, referred to herein as “non-exigent” IPV contexts. Federal and state courts have diverged in interpreting Randolph’s disputed consent rule and the relevance of an officer’s motivation for warrantless entry in such IPV contexts.

This Note identifies and analyzes the circuit split concerning the applicability of Randolph’s disputed consent rule and warrantless entry in these “non-exigent” IPV situations when the survivor is outside the home. This Note proposes to resolve the circuit split by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach of extending Randolph’s disputed consent rule to warrantless entry into the home, regardless of the motivation for entry, and statutorily requiring officers to remain with survivors outside the home until a warrant is obtained or alternative community-based interventions are initiated. This solution reinforces core Fourth Amendment protections of privacy in the home, improves administrability of the consent doctrine, and promotes survivor safety and agency.

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Introduction

On April 28, 2018, Denise Zamora called 911 and reported that her then-husband, Bryce Watkins, had physically attacked her in their shared home in Parker, Colorado. 1 Watkins v. Wunderlich, No. 22-1358, 2023 WL 4145904, at *1 (10th Cir. June 23, 2023); Defendants’-Appellees’ Corrected Response Brief at 3, Watkins, No. 22-1358, 2023 WL 1815959. When the officers arrived, Watkins had already left the home, and Zamora expressed that “she was afraid . . . Watkins would kill her.” 2 Watkins, 2023 WL 4145904, at *1. The next morning, Watkins returned home. 3 Id. Zamora called 911, left to a nearby park, and met with Deputy Kevin Nichols from the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. 4 Id. Zamora reiterated that “she felt unsafe around . . . Watkins.” 5 Id.

During their conversation, Watkins called Zamora, and Zamora handed the phone to Deputy Nichols. 6 Id. Deputy Nichols asked Watkins to “come to the front door of the home to speak,” but Watkins explicitly refused, stating: “[Y]ou cannot come inside my house. I do not want to talk to you.” 7 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting App., Vol. II at 253). Zamora then provided Deputy Nichols with the code to their shared home’s garage door and explained how to enter. 8 Id. The Tenth Circuit found that this constituted consent to enter the garage and house because “[Zamora] providing Deputy Nichols with the means to enter her home—the garage access code—was a ‘gesture[] or . . . indication[] of acquiescence’ to home entry that would be ‘comprehensible to a reasonable officer.’” Id. at *4 (second and fourth alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 789–90 (10th Cir. 2007)). After receiving Zamora’s explicit consent, Deputy Nichols and two other officers entered the shared home without a warrant, announced their presence, and told Watkins to come downstairs. 9 Id. at *1. Appearing in only a towel and “continu[ing] [to] protest[] that the officers were in his home,” Watkins complied and descended the stairs. 10 Id. at *2 (citing defendant Sergeant Wunderlich’s bodycam at 16:07:46–16:08:03). After a brief physical altercation, Watkins was arrested for “second degree assault, domestic violence.” 11 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting defendant Wunderlich’s bodycam at 16:09:16).

The violence and fear that triggered the involvement of law enforcement in Zamora’s situation is far from exceptional in the United States. Every minute, thirty-two people in the United States experience intimate partner violence (IPV). 12 Milena J. Wisniewska, Domestic Violence Statistics 2024, Break the Cycle (Oct. 7, 2024), https://www.breakthecycle.org/domestic-violence-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/6HVD-R3YY] (last updated Jan. 20, 2026). IPV is defined by a pattern of abusive behaviors used by one partner “to maintain power and control over the other” in an intimate relationship. See Learn More About Abuse, Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline, https://www.thehotline.org/resources/learn-more-about-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/VAK9-7PYE] (last visited Aug. 12, 2026). Such violence “can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, psychological, or technological actions or threats of actions or other patterns of coercive behavior that influence another person within an intimate partner relationship.” See Domestic Violence, Off. on Violence Against Women (OVW), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/XLC2-NX7J] (last updated Jan. 22, 2025). IPV is associated with psychological trauma and can result in physical injury or even death. See Ruth W. Leemis, Norah Friar, Srijana Khatiwada, May S. Chen, Marcie-jo Kresnow, Sharon G. Smith, Sharon Caslin & Kathleen C. Basile, CDC, The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Intimate Partner Violence 1 (2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nisvs/documentation/NISVSReportonIPV_2022.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter NISVS Survey].This Note uses “IPV” and “domestic violence” interchangeably when referring to the abusive behaviors present in an intimate relationship. See The Language We Use, Women Against Abuse, https://www.womenagainstabuse.org/education-resources/the-language-we-use [https://perma.cc/P73T-4VE3] (last visited Aug. 12, 2026) (explaining that IPV is a more recent term used to specify “violence perpetrated by a partner in a romantic or dating relationship” as opposed to domestic violence, which more broadly describes “violence among people in a domestic situation . . . [including] siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, cousins, etc.”). Nearly one in two women and more than two in five men have reported experiencing IPV at some point in their life. 13 NISVS Survey, supra note 12, at 5, 7 (defining IPV in this study as “experiencing contact sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking victimization by an intimate partner”). In addition, victimization surveys indicate that only seventy percent of aggravated domestic violence incidents are even reported to law enforcement, since the complex dynamics and varying definitions of IPV cause IPV crimes to be underreported. Alex R. Piquero & Andrew Wheeler, Toward a Better Estimate of Domestic Violence in America, Council on Crim. Just. (2024), https://counciloncj.org/toward-a-better-estimate-of-domestic-violence-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/4UXH-BKDD] (finding that aggravated domestic violence incidents in a sample of the top twenty U.S. cities with the highest number of reported domestic violence incidents are estimated to be twenty-nine percent to fifty-three percent higher than those reflected in law enforcement data).

Courts have responded to such violence by authorizing state intervention into the home through Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions, particularly the exigent circumstances and consent doctrines. 14 See infra section I.A. In Georgia v. Randolph, however, the Supreme Court created the disputed consent rule and held that disputed consent between co-occupants of a shared home cannot justify warrantless entry for evidentiary searches. 15 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (“[A] physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.”). Consequently, courts have generously applied the exigent circumstances doctrine to justify warrantless entry in IPV situations and protect survivors from imminent harm. 16 See Amanda Jane Proctor, Breaking Into the Marital Home to Break Up Domestic Violence: Fourth Amendment Analysis of “Disputed Permission”, 17 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 139, 153 (2009) (“[L]ower courts are usually generous in applying exigent circumstances to permit police entry to protect and aid domestic violence victims.”). But the exigent circumstances doctrine only applies in immediate emergencies, “in which police ha[ve] to act immediately” and do not have the time to obtain a warrant. 17 180 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 10, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2026); see also infra section I.B. Even though survivors remain vulnerable to future acts of violence, 18 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 65 (1991) (“Separation assault is the attack on the [survivor]’s body and volition in which [their] partner seeks to prevent [them] from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force [them] to return.” (emphasis omitted)); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 801, 803, 817 (2007) (highlighting that IPV is an “ongoing exercise of power and control” that extends beyond discrete acts of abuse and can “become particularly intense when victims act to involve law enforcement”). To ignore the “time period between discrete episodes of serious violence—a time period during which the [survivor] may never know when the next incident will occur, and may continue to live with ongoing psychological abuse—is to” ignore a “continuing ‘state of siege.’” Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1191, 1208 (1993) (citing Telephone Interview with Sue Osthoff, Dir., Nat’l Clearinghouse for the Def. of Battered Women (Jan. 2, 1991)). courts rarely consider situations in which a survivor has physically left the home, whether by choice or circumstance, to be exigent for Fourth Amendment purposes. 19 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. As such, this Note refers to IPV situations in which a survivor has left the home as “non-exigent” IPV situations. 20 This Note’s usage of the term “non-exigent” IPV is not intended to minimize the severity or dangerousness of such IPV situations but rather to reflect the doctrinal reality that the exigent circumstances doctrine is often not available to justify warrantless entry when survivors are physically separated from the suspected abuser. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.

Zamora’s situation illustrates a recurring dilemma in law enforcement responses to “non-exigent” IPV situations. When an alleged abuser is inside the home and the survivor is outside seeking assistance, officers must decide whether immediate concerns justify warrantless entry. “Non-exigent” IPV situations thus place two fundamental values in direct tension: protecting individuals from private violence and preserving the constitutional sanctity of the home.

Recognizing that the cycle of abuse does not end just because an IPV survivor is temporarily outside of their home, some courts have limited the application of Randolph’s disputed consent rule to evidentiary searches. 21 See, e.g., infra sections II.A.1–.2 (analyzing the Fourth and Tenth Circuits’ decisions in Trull v. Smolka, 411 F. App’x 651 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and Watkins v. Wunderlich, No. 22-1358, 2023 WL 4145904 (10th Cir. June 23, 2023), respectively). Although not clearly defined by case law, evidentiary searches generally refer to searches for evidence of crime, as opposed to protective searches, arrests, or investigations. 22 See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. Limiting the scope of Randolph’s disputed consent rule therefore allows the police to enter the home and speak with the suspected abuser. Other courts, however, have determined that Randolph’s disputed consent rule applies to warrantless entry, regardless of the motivation for entry. 23 See, e.g., infra sections II.A.3–.4 (analyzing the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions in United States v. Tatman, 397 F. App’x 152 (6th Cir. 2010), and Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2018), respectively). This difference has created a circuit split as to whether Randolph’s disputed consent rule is strictly limited to the context of evidentiary searches in “non-exigent” IPV cases.

This Note argues that Randolph’s disputed consent rule should apply beyond evidentiary searches to all warrantless entry into the home in “non-exigent” IPV contexts, regardless of the motivation for entry. Part I describes the development of the exigent circumstances and consent doctrines as exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and provides background on Randolph’s disputed consent rule. Part II analyzes the circuit split between the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits regarding the application of Randolph’s disputed consent rule in “non-exigent” IPV situations. It also examines how Randolph’s disputed consent rule has been applied by state courts. Part III proposes to resolve the circuit split by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach of extending Randolph’s disputed consent rule beyond evidentiary searches and prohibiting disputed consent from justifying warrantless entry into the home when a survivor is outside. It also recommends statutorily requiring officers to remain with the survivor outside the home until a warrant is obtained or community-based alternatives are initiated.