LOST IN TRANSITION: HOW TRANSITIONAL PEACEBUILDING UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SUDANS

International organizations frequently use democratic transitional agreements as the primary framework for restoring peace after intrastate conflict. These postconflict peacebuilding eﬀorts often result in transitional peace agreements that include a version of interim governance, typically with some power-sharing component, that aims to end armed conflict and usher in democratic elections after a set period. By examining Sudan’s 2022 Political Framework Agreement (PFA) and South Sudan’s 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), this Note critiques the linear transition logic at the core of transitional peacebuilding. It argues that these transitional agreements tend to entrench conflict, exacerbate human rights violations, and marginalize grassroots demands for democracy. This Note proposes a reorientation of transitional peacebuilding by straying away from the standardized transitional sequence, reframing conceptions of national ownership, and leveraging the UN Peacebuilding Commission to better recognize transitions as ends in themselves, maintaining democratic participation and respect for human rights at every stage of the transition process.

The full text of this Note can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

* J.D. Candidate 2026, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Professor Frédéric Mégret for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank my peers on the Columbia Law Review for their work in editing this piece, especially Saleema Ibrahim, Sara Graziano, Hazel Martello, Kenzo E. Okazaki, Caleb Ringger, Ciarra Lee, Margaret L. Broihier, and Adam Burns.

“حرية سلام و عدالة و الثورة خيار الشعب‏”
“Freedom, peace, justice . . . the revolution is the choice of the people.” 1 This was a common slogan during the 2019 Sudanese mass protests. See Barbara Casciarri & Stefano Manfredi, (Freedom, Peace and Justice): A Glossary of the Third Sudanese Revolution 22 (Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie Project, Working Paper No. 2, 2020) https://hal.science/hal-02511485v1/file/FREEDOM_PEACE_AND_JUSTI%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y64N-BRGG].‌‌

Introduction

International organizations often rely on democratic transitional agreements as a framework for facilitating peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflict. 2 See Gregory H. Fox, Old and New Peace Agreements, 52 Seton Hall L. Rev. 797, 835 (2022) (“Many [non-international armed conflict agreements] contain commitments to a menu of liberal democratic reforms. New electoral norms and institutions, for example, featured prominently in agreements for Angola, Bangladesh, Sudan, and Cambodia.” (footnote omitted)). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandates Special Political Missions (SPMs) to guide nations through periods of political transition and prevent conflict relapse, for which promoting democracy and establishing democratic institutions is in many cases an explicit goal. 3 Special Political Missions, UN, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/ en‌/content/repertoire/political-missions-and-offices [https://perma.cc/FQD3-QX22] [hereinafter List of Special Political Missions] (last visited Dec. 23, 2025) (listing current and closed SPMs, several of which explicitly mention democracy while others describe reforming state and national institutions). The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) also explicitly prioritizes establishing democratic governance in its Peace Support Operations (PSOs). 4 African Union, Decade of Accelerated Implementation: Second Ten Year Implementation Plan 10 (2024), https://au.int/sites/default/files/news events/workingdocuments/43517-wd-Agenda_2063_STYIP_Feb_2024 _Launch_Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/57WM-KVJH] (stating that Goal 11 of the second ten-year implementation plan is to ensure democratic values and practices are the norm). Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, which sets out the AU mandate, specifically states the promotion of “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” as an objective. Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 3(g), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3, 36 [hereinafter Constitutive Act of the African Union]. The AUPSC, which authorizes PSOs, has a mandate in democracy promotion. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, art. 3(f), July 9, 2002, https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ psc-protocol-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZB5-ASTR] (establishing the objective of the council to “promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights”); id. at art. 7(m) (authorizing the Peace and Security Commission to “follow[ ]up . . . the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”); see also Robert Gerenge, The Role of the African Union in Tackling Democratic Recession in Africa, 30 S. Afr. J. Int’l Affs. 569, 576 (2023) (describing how the AU has expanded its efforts to prevent democratic recession by including preventative diplomacy in its electoral observation missions). Under their mandate powers, the UNSC and AUPSC react to breaches of international peace and security by trying to bring forward remedies, often by facilitating peace negotiations, but not in ways that are typically understood to be accountable and responsive to local communities. These postconflict peacebuilding efforts often result in transitional peace agreementsoffer a stylized model of transition that includes a version of interim governance, typically with some power-sharing component, 5 See Andreas Mehler, Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements 16–22 (German Inst. Glob. & Area Stud., Working Paper No. 83, 2008), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/ 10419/47779/1/608728098.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2V8-K8EC] (finding that most African peace agre-ements since 1999 contain power-sharing devices). that aims to end hostilities and usher in democratic elections after a set period. 6 Transitional governments are particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa, where they have been installed after over sixty percent of armed conflicts. Julia Strasheim, Interim Governments: Short-Lived Institutions for Long-Lasting Peace, German Inst. Glob. & Area Stud. Focus Int’l Edition, no. 9, 2014, at 1, 2, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/ 186033/gf_international_1409.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q328-NA9R]. Transitional agreements are often implemented in regions facing widespread human rights violations and violations of the laws of war, operating irrespective of whether there is any indication of popular support for the interim arrangement or timeframe. 7 See infra section II.C for a discussion of the unpopularity of transitional arrangements among Sudanese civilians.

This Note argues that, by supporting transitional agreement frameworks in postconflict nations that do not elicit popular support, the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) not only fail to live up to their mandates but also entrench conflict, exacerbate human rights violations, and marginalize grassroots demands for democracy. The concessions made in transitional agreements set the stage for future illegality, demonstrating how these agreements lay the groundwork for their own undermining. Transitional peacebuilding obscures realities on the ground by employing a vocabulary and framework of “transition” that shifts the mandate’s goalposts over time, cementing the conditions it claims to address. Within the standardized sequence of “transition”—typically involving a fragile peace agreement, an interim power-sharing government, constitutional drafting, and elections 8 Rep. of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, Challenge of Sustaining Peace, transmitted by Letter dated 29 June 2015 from the Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council ¶¶ 31–34, U.N. Doc A/69/968-S/2015/490 (June 30, 2015) (introducing the rough template currently observed throughout nations in responding to postconflict challenges, composed of achieving a fragile peace agreement and a limited transition period that often accompanies temporary power-sharing arrangements and/or some form of national dialogue process). The report critiques the sequence but suggests the main issue is haste and that more attention should be put to development. Id. —the issue is not simply the failure to oversee, implement, or finance transitional agreements; this Note argues that the logic of a linear transition itself is the fallacy. This Note operates within the understanding that international legal principles underpin all transitional peace agreements, regardless of whether those principles are articulated explicitly. 9 See Emmanuel H.D. De Groof, State Renaissance for Peace: Transitional Governance Under International Law 371 (2020) (“[I]nternational law prescribes some rules (especially of behaviour and procedure) restricting the freedom of domestic and external actors purporting to influence [transitional governance].”); Chiara Giorgetti, Using International Law in Somalia’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 53 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 48, 76 (2014) (“[A]lthough no overarching international legal framework is specifically applicable to post-conflict reconstruction, international law permeates all actions by states and private parties, from trade to immigration and from food safety to travel. Post-conflict reconstruction requires a sophisticated approach by sophisticated users.” (footnote omitted)).

Examining Sudan’s 2022 Political Framework Agreement (PFA) and South Sudan’s 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) reveals how transitional peace agreements can freeze conflicts in place and become tools for delaying local calls for democratic reforms. As two nations under the authority of transitional agreements that epitomize sustained UN and AU involvement, 10 For a description of how peace agreements build on each other in Sudan, see Hannah Birkenkötter, Review of Vijayashri Sripati, Constitution-Making Under UN Auspices: Fostering Dependency in Sovereign Lands, 19 Int’l J. Const. L. 358, 358 (2021) (“The Constitutional Charter replaced the 2005 Transitional Constitution of Sudan, which had largely been determined by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement . . . . Sudan’s 2019 Constitutional Charter is again of a transitional nature, and its drafting was heavily influenced by international actors once more, in particular the African Union.”). As South Sudan was established through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), its founding took place “in the context of an internationally structured, resourced and legitimated elite peace agreement and reconstruction project.” Sharath Srinivasan, When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans 223 (2021). South Sudan and Sudan are valuable case studies for understanding broader flaws within international organizations’ transitional peacebuilding approaches. Examining the durability of UNSC and AUPSC joint peacebuilding efforts, 11 See Luiza Barbosa & Roberto Kuster, The Coordination Between International and Regional Organizations (Third Party Actors) as an Effective Recourse for the International Conflict Resolution Through Mediation: The African Union’s Example, 26 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 138, 171–72 (2019) (describing the benefits of regional partnerships in international mediation). particularly as Africa becomes the global center of peacebuilding, 12 Africa is home to more UN SPMs than any other continent. See List of Special Political Missions, supra note 3. can inform efforts to reduce countries’ risk of relapsing into conflict and better empower local actors. 13 See Peace and Security, UN, https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/peace-and-security [https://perma.cc/8TWB-B57C] (last visited Dec. 23, 2025) (describing peacebuilding as encompassing efforts to “reduce a country’s risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development”). While acknowledging the influence of other third-party actors, this Note focuses on the UN and AU because of their continued legal authority to mediate and implement transitional agreements under their mandates. 14 See Derrick V. Frazier & William J. Dixon, Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000, 32 Int’l Interactions 385, 401–02 (2006) (finding that international organizations are more effective mediators than individual states or coalitions of states).

Part I discusses a shift from traditional UN and AU peacekeeping efforts toward transitional peacebuilding. Then it provides an overview of the interaction between transitional peace agreements and international law to frame the imposition of such agreements as inherently intertwined with legal questions. Part II uses South Sudan’s R-ARCSS and Sudan’s PFA as case studies to demonstrate how stylized transitions promoted by the UN and AU have frozen conflicts in place, failed human rights victims, and stifled grassroots movements for democracy. Finally, Part III proposes a reassessment of transitional peacebuilding to better recognize that the compromises embedded within transitional agreements shape the eventual political reality. This reassessment emphasizes the need to enhance the legitimacy of interim arrangements and enable civilian-led groups to define their postconflict paths.