STRENGTHENING THE RIGHT TO MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES IN THE POST-COVID ERA

STRENGTHENING THE RIGHT TO MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES IN THE POST-COVID ERA

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the severe public health dan­ger that institutional and congregate care settings pose to people with dis­abilities, older adults, and the care professionals who work in those settings. While the populations residing in congregate care settings are naturally more susceptible to the virus, the COVID-19 crisis in these set­tings could have been far more limited if there had been broader access to home and community-based services (HCBS), which allow people to live with the supports they need in their own homes and communities and avoid many of the health risks of congregate care settings.

A major barrier to broadening access to HCBS is existing judicial interpretations of the reasonable modifications regulation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This regulation requires states and other public entities to “make reasonable modifications” to avoid dis­ability-based discrimination (which includes unjustified institutionaliza­tion) but does not require measures that would “fundamentally alter” the na­ture of the entity’s programs. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s 1999 Olmstead v. L.C. decision and subsequent lower court decisions inter­preting have created a standard for this fundamental alteration defense that fails to fully protect individuals’ ADA right to services in an integrated setting and does not account for the public health risks of institutionalization. This Note argues that in light of the new and undeniable evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic of the public health risks of institutionalization, the Department of Justice should use its broad regulatory authority under the ADA to promulgate additional regulations that clarify and strengthen the fundamental alteration framework.

The full text of this Note can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the severe public health dan­ger that institutional and congregate care settings pose to people with disabilities, older adults, and the care professionals who work in those settings. As of August 2020, over forty percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the United States were linked to nursing homes and other long-term care facilities. 1 More Than 40% of U.S. Coronavirus Deaths Are Linked to Nursing Homes, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-nursing-‌homes.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). By November 2020, over 100,000 residents and staff at long-term care fa­cilities had died of the virus. 2 Priya Chidambaram, Rachel Garfield & Tricia Neuman, Kaiser Fam. Found., COVID-19 Has Claimed the Lives of 100,000 Long-Term Care Residents and Staff (2020), https://www.‌kff.org/policy-watch/covid-19-has-claimed-the-lives-of-100000-long-term-care-residents-and-staff/ [https://perma.cc/2GUG-YYQS]. Some observers referred to such insti­tutions during the pandemic as “death pits” and the public health crisis in institutions as a “human tragedy.” 3 See ACLU, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Am. Ass’n of People With Disabilities, Autistic Self-Advocacy Network, Disability Rts. Educ. & Def. Fund, Nat’l Council on Indep. Living, P’ship for Inclusive Disaster Strategies & World Inst. on Disability, Petition to HHS, CMS, CCSQ, and CDC 3 (June 23, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/petition-covid-19-response-nursing-homes-and-other-congregate-settings-where-people-disabilities (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Farah Stockman, Matt Richtel, Danielle Ivory & Mitch Smith, ‘They’re Death Pits’: Virus Claims at Least 7,000 Lives in U.S. Nursing Homes, N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/‌2020/04/17/us/‌coronavirus-nursing-homes.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Mar. 15, 2021). While the known death counts in insti­tutions serving people with disabilities and older adults are horrific enough, the full magnitude of the virus’s devastation in such settings is unknown because there is no nationwide, comprehensive dataset available on COVID-19 cases and deaths across all congregate care settings, includ­ing those that primarily serve people with disabilities. 4 See infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.

A tragedy of this magnitude among people with disabilities and older adults was not inevitable. Even holding constant the rampant spread of the virus in the United States as a whole, infection and death rates among peo­ple with disabilities and older adults could have been far more limited if this population had broader access to home and community-based services (HCBS). HCBS offer a cheaper and typically preferred alternative to insti­tutionalization, allowing people with disabilities and older adults to live safely with the services they need in their own homes and communities. 5 See, e.g., Joshua M. Wiener & Wayne L. Anderson, Pa. Medicaid Pol’y Ctr., Univ. of Pittsburgh, Follow the Money: Financing Home and Community-Based Services 3 (2009), http://‌www.‌agnewbeck.com/pdf/‌statewide/AMHTA_LTC_PlanningProcess/‌Followthe‌Money_‌‌Financing_‌HCBS_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/996A-BHZT] (discussing evidence of the preference for HCBS over institutional services among people with disabilities); H. Stephen Kaye, Charlene Harrington & Mitchell P. LaPlante, Long-Term Care: Who Gets It, Who Provides It, Who Pays, and How Much?, 29 Health Affs. 11, 11, 18 (2010) (“[H]ome and community-based services . . . enable[] many people with disabilities to maintain their independence; avoid institutionalization; and participate in family, community, and eco­nomic activities.”). In the context of the pandemic, HCBS can help individuals avoid many of the health risks of institutions, where social distancing is difficult or impos­sible and various protocols proved insufficient to stem the increases in COVID-19 infections before vaccines became available. 6 See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 29, 59 (2020) (“[R]eduction of the population of people with disabilities in congre­gate settings may be the only meaningful way to prevent public health emergencies from disproportionately affecting people with disabilities because social distancing or other pre­scriptive practices are not possible.”); Priya Chidambaram, Rising Cases in Long-Term Care Facilities Are Cause for Concern, Kaiser Fam. Found. (July 21, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/rising-cases-in-long-term-care-facilities-‌are-cause-for-concern/ [https://perma.cc/43EG-MTCC] (“Long-term care facilities have implemented the strictest protocols in the country . . . . Some of these policies include uni­versal testing for residents and staff in long-term care facilities, strict visitor restrictions, and isolating positive-testing residents. Regardless of these measures, facilities continue to see a rise in cases.”).

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) named isolation and seg­regation as forms of unlawful discrimination, and its “integration regula­tion” declared that individuals have a right to services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2019); see also infra section II.A. The “most integrated setting” is defined as “a setting that enables individuals with dis­abilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” See Statement of the Department of Justice on Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C., DOJ C.R. Div. (June 22, 2011), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/‌q&a_olmstead.htm [https://perma.cc/YJR5-UBK8] (last updated Feb. 25, 2020). An additional regulation, however, requires states and other public entities to “make reasonable modifications” to avoid “discrimination on the basis of disability” but does not require measures that would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the entity’s programs. 8 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i); see also infra section II.A. Unfortunately, existing judicial interpretations of the right to community-based services under the ADA have created a standard for the fundamental alteration defense that is too deferential to states, fails to fully protect individuals’ right to services in an integrated setting, and does not account for the public health risks of institutionalization. 9 See infra section II.C. In its 1999 Olmstead decision, the Supreme Court answered the question of whether people with disabilities must be provided the option of services in the community rather than in institutions with “a qualified yes.” 10 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999); see also id. at 597–600 (recognizing that unjustified institutionalization of people with disabilities is a form of dis­crimination under the ADA). The Court ruled that the state’s responsibility is “not boundless” 11 Id. at 603. and the fun­damental alteration defense could apply if a state can show that it has an “effectively working plan” for deinstitutionalization and a “waiting list [for HCBS] that move[s] at a reasonable pace.” 12 Id. at 605–06.

As a result of the Olmstead decision, subsequent circuit and district court interpretations of Olmstead’s fundamental alteration framework, 13 See infra sections II.B.2–.3. and interpretations of certain provisions of the Medicaid statute, 14 See infra section I.B.3. states are still allowed to limit the number of people who can receive Medicaid HCBS at a time. This is in contrast to Medicaid institutional services, which states must provide to all individuals who qualify. 15 See Carol Beatty, Implementing Olmstead by Outlawing Waiting Lists, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 713, 736 (2014). Consequently, the ma­jority of states maintain long waiting lists for HCBS—over 800,000 Americans are on Medicaid HCBS waiting lists and the average wait time for services is thirty-nine months. 16 MaryBeth Musumeci, Molly O’Malley Watts & Priya Chidambaram, Kaiser Fam. Found., Key State Policy Choices About Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services app. tbl.11 (2020), https://www.kff.org/report-section/key-state-policy-choices-about-medicaid-‌home-and-community-based-services-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/NXS2-ZDL2] [hereinafter Musumeci et al., Key State HCBS Policy Choices]; Waiting List Enroll­ment for Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers, Kaiser Fam. Found. (2018), https://www.kff.org/‌health-reform/‌state-indicator/waiting-lists-for-hcbs-waivers/?‌currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%‌7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%‌22sort%‌22:%‌22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/JC95-6S2F] [hereinafter Kaiser Fam. Found., Waiting List Enrollment]. Many individuals have few options other than institutionalization to access the services they need. 17 See infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. Many people in institutions are eager to and fully capable of transitioning back into home and community settings with appropriate supports and services. See, e.g., H. Stephen Kaye, Cmty. Living Pol’y Ctr., Lurie Inst. for Disability Pol’y, Brandeis Univ., Evidence for the Impact of the Money Follows the Person Program 1 (2019), https://clpc.ucsf.edu/sites/clpc.ucsf.edu/files/reports/‌Evidence%‌20for%20the%20Impact%20of%20MFP_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M2Y-THT3] (finding that in each year between 2012 and 2017, over 10,000 people transitioned from institutions to the community under the Money Follows the Person program, which provides states with funding to transition people receiving Medicaid-funded long-term services and supports to HCBS). But for others, institutionalization may prove detrimental and even irreversible, demonstrating the harms of even brief periods of institutionalization while on waiting lists for HCBS. See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 735 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing expert testi­mony that “[i]nstitutionalization . . . creates an unnecessary clinical risk that the individual will become so habituated to, and so reliant upon, the programmatic and treatment struc­tures . . . found in an inpatient setting that his or her ability to function in less structured, less restrictive, environments may become severely compromised”). Over two decades after Olmstead, it is clear that the right to integration has not been fully realized.

The problem of institutionalization and the slow pace of deinstitu­tionalization efforts under the ADA, at a broad level, is not new. Other scholars have proposed a variety of legal solutions to this problem before COVID-19. 18 See, e.g., Charles R. Bliss & C. Talley Wells, Applying Lessons from the Evolution of Brown v. Board of Education to Olmstead: Moving from Gradualism to Immediate, Effective, and Comprehensive Integration, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705, 706 (2010) (arguing that courts should shift from requiring gradual to immediate deinstitutionalization under Olmstead, as courts did in the years following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in order to quicken the pace of desegregation over time); David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 763, 766 (2010) (suggesting a return to consti­tu­tional arguments against involuntary institutionalization under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution); Elliott Schwalb, Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii: The Right of Medicaid Beneficiaries to Home-Based Services as an Alternative to Institutionalization, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 803, 849 (2010) (suggesting that courts have erro­neously failed to apply Medicaid’s “reasonable promptness” provision to Medicaid HCBS waivers and that proper application of this provision could eliminate the practice of denying services to eligible individuals for undetermined, indefinite periods). Yet prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, arguments for deinsti­tutionalization largely focused on how unwanted and unjustified institu­tionalization harms people by preventing them from living independently, making basic decisions in their everyday lives, and fully participating in their communities. 19 See, e.g., About Community Living, Admin. for Cmty. Living, https://acl.gov/‌about-community-living [https://perma.cc/SUN2-JTMF] (last modified Sept. 29, 2020). While the public health risks of institutions have al­ways existed, few people paid attention to these risks prior to COVID-19 despite warnings from some researchers and advocates about the fre­quency and severity of infectious disease outbreaks in institutions. 20 See, e.g., Larry J. Strausbaugh, Shirin R. Sukumar & Carol L. Joseph, Infectious Disease Outbreaks in Nursing Homes: An Unappreciated Hazard for Frail Elderly Persons, 36 Clinical Infectious Diseases 870, 870 (2003); see also Nursing Home Outbreaks Lay Bare Chronic Industry Problems, Mod. Healthcare (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.‌modern‌healthcare.‌com/providers/nursing-home-outbreaks-lay-bare-chronic-industry-problems [https://perma.cc/RWY9-M37R] [hereinafter Mod. Healthcare, Chronic Industry Problems] (“Burgeoning coronavirus outbreaks at nursing homes . . . are laying bare the industry’s long-running problems, including a struggle to control infections and a staffing crisis that relies on poorly paid aides who can’t afford to stay home sick.”); Serious Infections and Outbreaks Occurring in LTCFs, CDC, https://‌www.cdc.gov/‌longtermcare/‌staff/‌report-publications.html [https://‌perma.‌cc/‌7E93-L4ST] (last updated May 28, 2020). But because of its larger scale and publicity, the COVID-19 pandemic provides new, impossible-to-ignore evidence that unjustified institutionalization is not only discriminatory but also dangerous to the health and lives of people with disabilities and older adults. 21 See infra section I.A.

This Note suggests that the COVID-19 experience offers a new basis on which to clarify and strengthen existing interpretations of the Olmstead fundamental alteration framework. It is the first analysis to address the in­consistency between courts’ interpretations of this framework and the re­ality of what an “effectively working plan” or “waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace” 22 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999). would actually look like in the context of the public health risks in institutions. In light of the new evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic provides on these risks, this Note argues that the Department of Justice (DOJ) should use its regulatory authority over the ADA to prom­ulgate new regulations that clarify and strengthen the fundamental altera­tion standards in order to broaden access to Medicaid HCBS.

Part I describes the current public health crisis in institutions and other congregate care settings, which is more apparent than ever during COVID-19 but has long been a risk of institutionalization in the United States. It also provides background on why and how the Medicaid statute and regulations limit access to HCBS and leave many people with few al­ter­natives to institutionalization. Part II explores the legal structures that failed to prevent the COVID-19 crisis in institutions. It explains the statu­tory and regulatory framework for the right to services in an integrated setting, describes judicial interpretations of the right to services in an inte­grated setting, and argues that the COVID-19 crisis exposes the Olmstead fundamental alteration framework’s failure to account for the public health risks of institutionalization. Part III argues that a regulatory ap­proach to strengthening the fundamental alteration framework is supe­rior to attempting to do so through litigation because of agencies’ author­ity, expertise, and motivation on this issue, especially in the Biden Administration. It also proposes substantive ideas for regulations that DOJ might consider for strengthening each of the fundamental alteration framework elements, such as requiring separate analyses for the “effec­tively working plan” and “reasonable pace” elements and devising a for­mula for calculating whether the pace of waiting list movement is “reasonable” in any given state or program.