Federal Agencies

Introduction In 2026, during the second year of the second Trump presidency, many popular accounts have understandably focused on “purges” unfolding within major agencies responsible for protecting the environment, the rights of workers, and the health and openness of financial markets.[footnote]See Madeleine Ngo & Brad Plumer, Layoffs Expand at Federal Agencies, Part of Trump Purge, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/14/ us/politics/energy-department-layoffs.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review ) (describing a purge of federal employees at agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency); see also Katanga Johnson & Weihua Li, Trump Cuts Thousands of Wall Street Cops While Markets Swing, Bloomberg (May 7, 2025), https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2025-05-07/trump-s-layoffs-cut-more-than-2-300-from-us-bank-and-markets-regulators?sref=zNmRQ0gk (on file with the Columbia Law Review ) (describing layoffs at financial regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); Michael Sainato, Panic as US Federal Workers Scramble to Find Out if They’ve Been Fired: ‘I Don’t Have Email Access’, The Guardian (Oct. 15, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/15/trump-federal-workers-layoffs [https://perma.cc/HWB5-9C9B] (describing layoffs at the Departments of Education and Labor).[/footnote] This Book Review tells another, complementary story, one that highlights on the agencies that are thriving—namely, those tasked with enforcing our nation’s immigration laws. When voters went to the polls in 2024, Congress had already devoted more resources to enforcing immigration laws than all other federal law enforcement programs combined.[footnote]See Doris Meissner & Julia Gelatt, Migration Pol’y Inst., Eight Key U.S. Immigration Policy Issues: State of Play and Unanswered Questions 3 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ sites/default/files/publications/ ImmigrationIssues2019_ Final_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9BF-CKVE] (describing 2018 congressional appropriations for immigration enforcement agencies). The resources allocated to Immigration and CustomsEnforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the agency in which the Border Patrol is housed—far outweigh those given to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and other agencies with mission orientations that are ministerial or at least not inherently punitive. Lawmakers and regulators often use the enforcement–benefits distinction to differentiate between the missions of these agencies even though the line separating the two can be blurry in practice. See Stephen Lee, Administrative Violence in Immigration Law, 66 Ariz. L. Rev. 739, 749–54 (2024) [hereinafter Lee, Administrative Violence]. While ICE’s annual budget hovers around $8 billion, USCIS’s annual budget peaked at $855 million. Compare DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification 7 (2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20Enforcement_Remediated.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2TF-9L3B], with DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2024 Congressional Justification 4 (2023), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ files/2023-03/U.S.%20CITIZENSHIP%20AND%20IMMIGRATION%20SERVICES_Remediated.pdf [https://perma.cc/67NP-7AN5] [hereinafter DHS 2024 Budget Overview].[/footnote] As soon as President Donald Trump returned to office, he redirected even more resources towards the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the cabinet-level agency that oversees the actions of the U.S. Border Patrol and of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[footnote]See Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025) (providing the text of the executive order titled “Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States,” issued on January 20, 2025).[/footnote] Congress then amplified this effort by passing an appropriations bill—the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA)—that included a massive influx of funding for these agencies.[footnote]See One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, §§ 90001–90007, 100001–100018, 100051–100057, 139 Stat. 72, 357–61, 364–85, 385–94 (2025) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).[/footnote] Understandably, this influx of resources has put many migrant communities and advocates on edge and has generated fear that this funding will exacerbate the most harmful and violent elements of current immigration enforcement policies.[footnote]See Rosa Barrientos-Ferrer, Ben Greenho & Silva Mathema, Congressional Republicans’ One Big Beautiful Bill Act Creates an Unaccountable Slush Fund for the Trump Administration’s Deportation Force, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Sep. 19, 2025), https://www.americanprogress.org/ article/congressional-republicans-one-big-beautiful-bill-act-creates-an-unaccountable-slush-fund-for-the-trump-administrations-deportation-force/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review ) (arguing that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s massive expansion of the federal government’s deportation capacity will “further escalate the Trump [A]dministration’s unprecedented and indiscriminate deportation agenda”); see also Thomas S. Dee & Mark Murphy, How Strict Immigration Enforcement Harms Schoolchildren, Policy Brief, Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch. (2018), https://drive.google.com/file/ d/1ncLo-2j0yQ0xneBSpRgJ4cttPZtErAcN /view (on file with the Columbia Law Review ) (describing the negative effects of ICE partnerships with local law enforcement on children, such as drops in school enrollment rates).[/footnote] Agents and officials tasked with enforcing immigration laws are sometimes derisively called “foot soldiers,” evoking the use and threat of force under law associated with the military or the police.[footnote]See, e.g., Samantha Michaels, Trump’s Deportation Machine Has Diverted Some 42,000 Crime Fighters From Other Tasks, Mother Jones (Oct. 2, 2025), https://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2025/10/trump-ice-deportation-local-state-federal-police-assisting-287g/ [https://perma.cc/U2NW-FTG7] (“President Donald Trump’s deportation army is growing by the day, and a shocking number of its foot soldiers don’t even work for US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).”).[/footnote] Many legal and sociolegal scholars have noted the quasi-militarism and culture of violence that animates immigration enforcement. Mostly, though, existing scholarship has developed these insights at a distance, providing limited insights on the trajectory and experience of those who join the ranks of immigration enforcement agencies.[footnote]Vega is, of course, not the first scholar to have relied on interview data provided by political appointees and other government officials who come and go as administrations (and political priorities) turn over. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Susan Bibler Coutin & Stephen Lee, Legal Phantoms: Executive Action and the Haunting Failures of Immigration Law 4 (2024); Stephen Lee & Sameer M. Ashar, DACA, Government Lawyers, and the Public Interest, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1879, 1880–81 (2019).[/footnote] Enter Professor Irene I. Vega and her groundbreaking book, Bordering on Indifference: Immigration Agents Negotiating Race and Morality ,[footnote]Irene I. Vega, Bordering on Indifference: Immigration Agents Negotiating Race and Morality (2025) [hereinafter Vega, Bordering on Indifference].[/footnote] which provides an in-depth examination of why a diverse cross section of Americans become immigration foot soldiers and how they make sense of their job and responsibilities. Agencies engaging in politically divisive work like the Border Patrol and ICE have little to gain by opening their doors to scholars and journalists.[footnote]See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President to the Sec’y of Def., Att’y Gen., and Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (June 7, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ presidential-actions/2025/06/department-of-defense-security-for-the-protection-of-department-of-homeland-security-functions/ [https://perma.cc/GPH2-F8VH] (calling the National Guard to protect ICE personnel in response to protests). In deflecting criticisms that agencies like ICE engaged in rogue activity during the Obama Administration, some high-level officials described such agencies as “quasi-paramilitary organizations.” See Chacón et al., supra note 7, at 72. This is a problem that many social scientists face in reaching “organizational elites.” See Kevin J. Delaney, Methodological Dilemmas and Opportunities in Interviewing Organizational Elites, 1 Socio. Compass 208, 210 (2007).[/footnote] As a result, scholars often have to pivot and redesign studies on the fly when best laid plans fail to yield access to bureaucratic institutions. And yet, Professor Vega recounts how she showed up to the Border Patrol sector headquarters near the U.S.–Mexico border in Arizona in July 2014,approached a woman sitting behind a “large, thick glass partition,” and offered this casual introduction: “I’m a graduate student, and I want to talk to Border Patrol agents about their job. Is there someone who can help me?”[footnote]Vega, Bordering on Indifference, supra note 8, at 155–56.[/footnote] From this modest exchange, Vega gained access to some of the most cloistered agencies in the federal government, interviewing ninety agents engaged in enforcement work within both the Border Patrol and ICE. It is hard to overstate the novelty of this dataset.[footnote]More commonly, scholars who focus on immigration officials report difficulties in convincing officials to sit for formal interviews. See Dylan Farrell-Bryan, Agency Entrenchment: Sociological Legitimacy in a Politically Contested Occupation, 49 Law & Soc. Inquiry 2523, 2529 (2024) (noting the need to broaden the pool of interviewees to include former ICE attorneys once agency management cut off access to current ICE attorneys); see also Asad L. Asad, Engage and Evade: How Latino Immigrant Families Manage Surveillance in Everyday Life 195–222 (2023) (describing a methodology that relied on informal engagement with immigration judges because of their refusal to sit for formal interviews).[/footnote] The descriptive clarity provided by Bordering on Indifference makes the book necessary reading for all students and scholars of immigration law, especially in an era when enforcement agencies shape so much of immigration policy. The book providesmany important insights on the agencies most directly responsible for enforcing immigration policies—about the heavily Latino presence among the agency workforce and the false promise of racial representation as a cure for harmful policies;[footnote]See Vega, Bordering on Indifference, supra note 8, at 140 (“[Latina/o agents] are not dissenting or reforming the immigration system; they are sustaining it and even lending the system the legitimacy that comes from having a ‘racially representative’ workforce.”).[/footnote] about how many agents end up in immigration agencies as a “plan B” in life;[footnote]Id. at 29–35.[/footnote] and about how many border communities resent but also rely on the carceral-like economy.[footnote] Id. at 144–45.[/footnote] Tellingly, many of Vega’s interviewees remarked on how they don’t often encounter the dangerous “criminal aliens” nested within transnational organizations that they were trained to target and combat.[footnote]Id. at 65–67.[/footnote] Instead, they note that much of the job involves encounters with mere “economic” migrants or asylum seekers, an almost universally compliant and nonthreatening population.[footnote]Id. at 53, 56–65.[/footnote] These qualitative insights largely track, and provide much needed texture to, the quantitative trends that emerged during the same time period.[footnote] Vega conducted her interviews towards the end of the Obama Administration. Then, from the years 2016 to 2018, the percentage of immigrants in detention with serious criminal convictions declined while the percentage of those with no convictions increased. See ICE Focus Shifts Away From Detaining Serious Criminals, TRAC Immigration (June 25, 2019), https://tracreports.org/immigration/ reports/564/ [https://perma.cc/89S5-T6LL]. This is a trend that continued during the first and second Trump Administrations. See ICE Detains Fewer Immigrants With Serious Criminal Convictions Under Trump Administration, TRAC Immigration (Dec. 6, 2019), https://tracreports.org/immigration/ reports/585/ [https://perma.cc/VX6V-Z954]; see also Muzaffar Chishti & Valerie Lacarte, U.S.Immigrant Detention Grows to Record Heights Under Trump Administration, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/trump-immigrant-detention (on file with the Columbia Law Review ).[/footnote] Beyond its nuanced account of immigration agencies as viable employment options for racially marginalized and minoritized communities, Bordering on Indifference also provides important insights on the relationship between bureaucracies and violence, and more specifically, on how bureaucratic norms and practices obfuscate agency violence. Like many public officials empowered to use force and engaged in “dirty work”—work that is both “denounced and respected”—immigration enforcement agents and officers find ways to “construct a positive professional identity.”[footnote]See Vega, Bordering on Indifference, supra note 8, at 116–17, 182.[/footnote] In Vega’s account, these foot soldiers employ a range of strategies to reduce the stigma of working for these agencies, including assuming the worst about otherwise seemingly nonthreatening migrants, taking steps to be “caring” in apprehending and detaining migrants, and embracing an attitude of “disinterested professionalism” which prioritizes systemic norms of neutrality over the equities of any individual case.[footnote]Id. at 76.[/footnote] All of these strategies aim to reduce stigma, legitimate broadly punitive immigration policies, and denigrate the targets of these regulatory efforts. As a study of bureaucratic governance, Bordering on Indifference frequently compares federal immigration enforcement actors to the police, who are the most obvious government actors at the local level empowered to use and threaten force. In advancing her argument that ICE and the Border Patrol ought to be understood in bureaucratic terms, Vega interrogates the nominal commitments of administrative law—for example, making decisions based on technical expertise, an ostensible commitment to rationality, and a concern with legitimacy in the public’s eye—and shows how these sturdy values quietly reinscribe racial identity and racialized harms. For this reason, framing the Border Patrol and ICE as federal agencies plagued by the same sorts of bureaucratic pathologies associated with the local police makes complete sense. It makes all the more sense when considering the degree to which federal immigration law relies on local criminal law officials.[footnote]See Emily Ryo, Jennifer M. Chacón & Cecilia Menjívar, Criminalization of Immigration, Russell Sage Found. J. Soc. Scis., Oct. 2025, at 282, 283 (“Under this system, state and local law enforcement actors and institutions have come to play a central and ever- expanding role in policing and incarcerating immigrants in service of federal detention and deportation policies.”).[/footnote] In this way, Bordering on Indifference illustrates how bureaucratic rules and practices make it hard to identify and remedy racialized harms caused by law enforcement actors from the federal government all the way down. But this undersells what the book can teach us about bureaucratic governance. ICE and Border Patrol officers work within a broader federal ecosystem of agencies all charged with different immigration-related duties, many of which have nothing to do with the use or threat of force (such as visa adjudications or labor certifications). For this reason, this Book Review focuses less on what Vega’s book can teach us about what ICE officers and Border Patrol agents have in common with police officers but rather what we can learn about how immigration law’s foot soldiers relate to and affect other parts of the federal immigration bureaucracy. While some agencies, like the Border Patrol and ICE, use or threaten force in administering immigration laws, other agency actors like U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers, immigration judges, and consular officers engage in bureaucratic work such as reviewing paperwork, conducting interviews, granting visas, and adjudicating waiver applications far from the field or the streets.[footnote]See Lee, Administrative Violence, supra note 2, at 741–42 (describing the work of administrative bureaucratic actors, such as USCIS, as largely adjudicatory and benefits-related).[/footnote] Roughly speaking, these two ends of the spectrum of agency power—which I have elsewhere described in terms of direct and administrative forms of violence[footnote]Id. at 743–54.[/footnote]—operate along pathways either committed to enforcing immigration laws or allocating immigration benefits. On the enforcement side, agencies like ICE and the Border Patrol are tasked with arresting, detaining, and removing migrants. On the benefits side, USCIS and other agencies, consulate offices, and, to a certain extent, immigration judges adjudicate applications for relief. The efforts by ICE officers and Border Patrol agents to achieve legitimacy through their unrelenting enforcement of immigration laws destabilizes the other agencies focused on allocating benefits. The threat of deportation exerts a gravitational force on other immigration agencies, putting them in the position of withdrawing and pulling away as lines demarcating authority get blurred or disappear. Managing migration challenges through enforcement policies not only leads to punitive and often demeaning regulatory outcomes, it also undermines other parts of the administrative state charged with addressing migration in different ways. This dynamic has only worsened during President Trump’s second Administration. Since 9/11, foot soldiers and bureaucrats have operated within their respective spheres in carrying out their immigration duties, but this commitment to separation of functions has mostly disappeared. Agents who work on the benefits side of the enforcement–benefits distinction are increasingly tasked with enforcement-oriented duties. DHS, for example, has empowered USCIS to issue Notice-to-Appear documents (NTAs), which are the immigration enforcement equivalent to a charging document or indictment issued by prosecutors in the criminal context.[footnote]Ordinarily, such documents must originate within ICE, but this is not the case under the Trump Administration. See USCIS, DHS, PM-602-0187, Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens (2025), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ default/files/document/policy-alerts/ NTA_Policy_FINAL_2.28.25 _FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9LX-6J35].[/footnote] Indeed, this Administration’s approach seems to be aimed at removing any hurdles to reassignment and redirecting other agency actors to support enforcement efforts, including (for example) tasking military lawyers to serve as immigration judges at the border.[footnote]Detailing Attorneys to the Department of Justice to Serve as Immigration Judges and Special Assistant United States Attorneys, 49 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1 (Oct. 23, 2025) (“[W]e advised that the Secretary may send, and the Attorney General may receive, personnel, including military personnel, to serve on detail as temporary immigration judges . . . .”); see also Ximena Bustillo, Military Lawyers Called Up to Relieve a Shortfall in Immigration Judges, NPR (Sep. 2, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/09/02/g-s1-86691/military-lawyers-immigration-judges-jag [ttps://perma.cc/RGT3-QT7D].[/footnote] Within the broader immigration bureaucracy, foot soldiers are the paradigmatic immigration actor exerting outsized influence over immigration policy. Part I summarizes the core, sociological contribution of Vega’s book, which is its focus on how immigration enforcement officers exercise far-reaching legal and punitive authority against a vulnerable population that does not appear to be dangerous or deserving of such punishment. Because existing laws fail to satisfactorily address agent and officer concerns about the legitimacy of their actions, Vega describes the moral economies in which these actors grapple with and attempt to justify their power. Part II focuses on a set of insights that are less expressly developed but nevertheless animate much of the book, namely the mismatch or misalignment that immigration officers see between their training and the day-to-day realities of their jobs. While these agency actors were recruited, trained, and acculturated to focus on dangerous, transnational criminals, the reality has been that many of the migrants they encounter in the field often resemble economic migrants who pose no obvious danger. This misalignment motif, which appears throughout the book, clarifies how the broader immigration system makes it hard—if not impossible—to meaningfully use enforcement policies to achieve just or humane enforcement outcomes. Part III then considers how Vega’s account broadens understandings about the meaning and reach of bureaucratic governance strategies that rely on the threat and use of force. Concerned by the absence of legal constraints on agency violence, critics of immigration enforcement often argue that such actions are lawful but illegitimate acts. The various strategies utilized by the interviewees in Vega’s book ultimately legitimate punitive enforcement policies by denigrating migrants. At the same time, these enforcement policies and the violence for which they are responsible exert a gravitational force over the rest of the immigration bureaucracy, distorting and arguably corrupting other agency missions. Finally, Part IV considers how the agency dynamics highlighted in Bordering on Indifference can yield insights on immigration enforcement under the second Trump Administration.

Federal Agencies

IMMIGRATION LAW’S FOOT SOLDIERS

PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE